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The study of governance is often divided between formal state institutions and informal 
types of authority. Some scholars focus on state institutions: engineers, bureaucrats and 
politicians. Others concentrate on so-called “traditional” authority: landed relations and 
family networks, usually seen as motors for corrupting state resources. Instead of such 
divisions, this dissertation examines how different modes of governance interacted, to 
rethink conventional understandings of how state authority works. The peculiar modern 
history of Réunion Island – a sugar-growing French colony in the Indian Ocean whose 
multiracial inhabitants were French citizens from 1870, which became a French 
Department in 1946, and is now the only European Union region in the Southern 
Hemisphere – creates an opportune site for considering how different ruling practices 
interact.  
From 1946 all French laws were to apply in Réunion Island, where Creole 
agricultural workers were dominated by white landowning minority who also ran the 
local government. Through historical archive research and ethnographic fieldwork the 
dissertation examines how Metropolitan French and Réunionnais politicians, civil 
servants, property owners, landlords, tenants and families claimed and reconfigured 
French social rights in rural areas, shantytown and social housing neighborhoods in 
Réunion’s capital St Denis.  The dissertation demonstrates how the underlying logics of 




administration in Réunion, which became a participant in landlord-tenant relations rather 
than assimilating Réunion to French forms of governance. 
 The governance of social legislation in Réunion is an important case study 
combining histories of socialism, the demise of colonial empires and the rise of state 
interventions overseas. The dissertation extends conventional interpretations of French 
colonialism by examining how the project of French social rights for colonial political 
loyalty endured in Overseas France - beyond the 1962 Algerian defeat when France is 
considered to have “decolonized.” French welfare eventually transformed class and racial 
divides in Réunion, enabling Creole descendants of Africans, Malagasy, Indians and 
Europeans to create meanings about being French in Overseas France and eventually to 
appropriate the governance of French welfare systems themselves. The dissertation thus 
provides a new, comparative overseas perspective for understanding racial difference and 




CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In June 2009 I attended the closing ceremony of the Institut des Hautes Etudes en 
Defense Nationale senior seminar, run by the French Ministry of Defense. It took place in 
the long, gilt-decorated and mirrored ballroom of St Denis city hall in Réunion.1 The 
company was illustrious; the two most important people presiding over the ceremony 
were the Prefect of Réunion and the General of France’s Southern Indian Ocean forces, 
both wearing their tropical white dress uniforms. The first rows of the audience were 
filled with the forty seminar participants, dressed in their best suits. They all had senior 
management positions in civil service, religious organizations, business, military or 
medical professions in France, Mauritius, the Comoros Islands and Madagascar. I was 
present as a member of the “junior” defense seminar; we had come to listen to the final 
presentation of the day and to enjoy the lavish cocktail reception afterwards.  
 The final group presentation of the senior seminar was entitled “What place for 
the French overseas territories in French strategy, especially defense and security 
policy?” The group’s presenter was Mr. Jean-Pierre Philip, a professor of economics at 
the University of Réunion and a local media pundit. Mr. Philip began his talk proclaiming 
that France is the second biggest maritime power after the US in terms of area, thanks to 
Overseas France. France’s national territory extends from St Pierre-et-Miquelon off the 
                                                 
 
1 IHEDN (Institut de Hautes Etudes en Defense Nationale) is the French Defense Ministry’s educational 
wing. It runs political science seminars in Paris and the French provinces for young people aged 20-30 
alongside a prestigious seminar for managers and high-ranking military officers (above colonel) for people 
aged 35-55. In 2009 Réunion Island was one of the French provinces designated to host the IHEDN junior 




coast of Newfoundland in Canada to the Kerguelen Islands and New Amsterdam in the 
Southern Ocean; from French Polynesia and the Society Islands in the Pacific to the 
French Antilles and French Guyana in the Caribbean, not to mention its territories in the 
southwest Indian Ocean: the Glorious Islands in the Mozambique Channel, the island of 
Mayotte in the Comoros archipelago and, of course, Réunion Island.  
Mr. Philip enumerated how these overseas territories are strategically important 
for France’s future, and even for the present: French naval vessels stationed in Réunion 
Island had recently participated in anti-piracy operations off the Seychelles Islands, a 
thousand miles further north. He then ranged over the “added value” that Overseas 
France could give to other areas of French policy: from its marine resources and 
biodiversity to its developing capacities in specialized research. Overseas France was 
important for political stability in the regions neighboring these tiny French territories. It 
would also help maintain international francophone culture. In conclusion, said Mr. 
Philip, “Overseas France is the transmission antenna for the French exception.” 2 
Mr. Philip’s rhetorical exuberance about France’s glorious and natural 
relationship with Overseas France, which proved something exceptional about France’s 
ability to maintain a worldwide political presence, was too much to resist. In the Q & A 
section I stood up, and disingenuously asked whether economists are able to measure if 
the cost of subsidizing French welfare in Overseas France correlates with its strategic 
importance to France? My query was insincere because I did not want an answer; rather I 
wanted to provoke Mr. Philip into admitting the mechanisms of the link between France 
                                                 
 
2 The notion of “French exceptionalism” is deeply embedded in the nation's self-image and in a range of 
political and academic discourses which are explored in Tony Chafer and Emmanuel Godin, The French 




and its overseas territories, especially in the very Republican French context of the 
IHEDN seminar. M Phillip replied cogently, but defensively, as I expected: “Yes La 
Réunion costs [France] 5 billion Euros per year, yes the [entire] Overseas France budget 
is 16 billion Euros, but these costs cannot be separated out (ils ne sont pas 
modularisables).” After having numerically separated the budget of Réunion from the 
budget of Overseas France for me, M Philip then underlined that in the Republican 
French logic, these costs cannot be separated ideologically.  
I was most surprised at the audience’s defensive reaction to my question about 
France’s role overseas. A man took the floor and reminded the audience that French 
Guyana “had done nothing for France for 300 years and then it turned out to be an ideal 
place for launching space rockets. So watch out before you say anything about the 
economic cost of Overseas France!” A woman added “we shouldn't say France in the 
Overseas territories, but the France of the Overseas territories” (on ne devrait pas dire la 
France à l'outre-mer but de l'outre-mer, des outre-mers)." The entire assembly gave her a 
round of applause for underlining that France’s Overseas territories were so 
fundamentally French that one shouldn’t talk of a French presence in them, but more of 
the Frenchness that emanated from them. 
The following week, I went to the St Denis ravine, not more than a mile away 
from St Denis city hall, to make a third interview with a Réunion Islander named Nelson 
Dijoux. Since it was the month of June, when I passed the church of Notre Dame de la 
Deliverance, there were Catholic first communions being celebrated. The girls outside the 
church were all dressed in white dresses, and the boys wore smart black trousers and 




Dijoux’s house, men standing in the shade of the Chinese grocery store looked on as a 
woman walked by dressed in a kanga and holding a baby to her chest. A child walked in 
the opposite direction towards the city council sports centre with his fencing kit in a long 
bag on his shoulder. As I drove along the St Denis river road, women washed their 
clothes in the river, and dried them along the rocks – an increasingly rare site in Réunion, 
but Bas de la Rivière has a lot of comparatively poorer French migrants from Mayotte 
Island. The road crossed the river on a narrow bridge made of clanking sheets of metal, 
just wide enough for the car. On the other side of the river I passed a Hindu temple before 
arriving at Nelson Dijoux's house, the last house before the road ended. He was waiting 
for me with his wife, dressed in an old green blazer half-eaten by damp, ragged shorts, 
and new flip flops.  
Nelson Dijoux and his family live in a different way to most Réunion Islanders. 
They live in a house built from river rocks and cement, on land belonging to the city 
council. Their house has a rough floor as well as cable TV, and their front and back yard 
contains all manner of useful objects in case of need. Their garden has fruit trees and a 
fish pond; far removed from most of the other Réunion Islanders I knew who either lived 
in professionally built villas or who lived in social housing.  
Mr. Dijoux had come from a family of sharecroppers in rural Réunion. When they 
were thrown off their land in the 1950s, he had moved to St Denis and become a 
committed member of the Réunion Island Communist party, which had sought Réunion’s 
independence from France. He had been a passionate CGTR trade union militant and 
presided over its marches in St Denis – to the extent that no-one wanted to employ him 




committed to brotherly love and peace. However, our conversations about his radical past 
invariably brought a passionate glint into his eyes. As Mr. Dijoux walked me back to my 
car after my last interview, he stopped in the middle of the road and looked at me with 
this same fire in his eyes. “We could have had a real revolution here! We could have 
overthrown the capitalists! All it would have taken was a loss of 10% of the Réunionnais 
population! We could have made a land reform.”  
When I talked to Mr. Dijoux about land, it transpired that he did not own his land. 
He had built his house on land belonging to the St Denis city council. In the past, many 
poor Réunion Islanders had done the same. They had worked as sugar cane sharecroppers 
or agricultural workers on land belonging to richer landowners who had the monopoly of 
landholding on the island. The poor had built houses on other people’s land. If they were 
loyal workers who voted for the landowners’ choice, the local landowner could grant 
workers plots of land for themselves. 
Nowadays most poor Réunion Islanders who do not own their houses are able to 
live in social housing. Yet the St Denis city council had not built social housing in the St 
Denis ravine, which was supposed to be a protected natural area. The city council 
tolerated the presence of Nelson Dijoux and his neighbors. The city council had even 
built a neighborhood meeting hall and a basketball court in the ravine, to curry favor with 
voters at election time. What did it mean to live for free on city council land? Would 
tenants have political obligations in return? While sharecropping no longer exists in 
Réunion, and sugar cane farming has vastly diminished, in Nelson Dijoux’s 
neighborhood, it appeared that relations of political obligation and gifts of land between 




As I left Mr. Dijoux and his wife who waved me off from the edge of the road, I 
thought: how could it have been that Nelson Dijoux was now a radical exception to most 
Réunion Islanders? Why did the vast majority stop supporting independence movements? 
How could it now be unthinkable to question the political and moral link between 
Réunion Island and France? France’s presence in Réunion was not only normal for the 
pro-Republican upper crust in Réunion, but also for much poorer Réunion Islanders who 
told me that when they were growing up in the 1960s “like all Creoles I thought that 
France was super, immense, you know, the dream.” I wondered to what extent the arrival 
of the French administration in Réunion from 1946 had been able to change the social 
and economic relations which were structured around the sugar cane agriculture and land 
monopolies? By becoming a French Overseas Department, had property relations in 
Réunion really become as French as Metropolitan France?  
Frequently from 2006-2008 when I talked of my research about the idea of France 
in Réunion, Réunion Islanders would give me a quixotic look: what was there to 
question? There is little notion of imperial debris here. The “ruins of empire” and an 
“implacable … disregard, and abandonment” by France in Réunion seem absent.3 All 
Réunion Islanders admit that the island has its own political and regional identity. But 
they consider that it is part of France and they intend that it stays that way.  
This dissertation investigates how the French policy of granting social legislation 
in return for political loyalty was used in Réunion. It asks how the links between 
Metropolitan and Overseas France became naturalized, and what the role of French social 
legislation was in this. It also examines how social legislation was appropriated by 
                                                 
 





different Réunion Islanders and Metropolitan French to further their own political and 
social interests. Was French social legislation able to resolve the fundamental inequalities 
of the island’s plantation-based economic and social systems by legally assimilating 
Réunion into France? 
I. Literature review 
i. Governance, governments, governmentality  
The study of governance is often divided between formal state institutions on one hand, 
and informal types of authority on the other. While some scholars focus on state 
technologies and institutions, studying engineers, bureaucrats and politicians, others have 
concentrated on so-called “traditional” authority and examined landed relations or family 
networks. These forms of governance are sometimes even opposed to each other, with the 
latter types of authority seen as vehicles for the corruption of state resources. This 
dissertation does not rely on artificial divisions between formal and informal or rational 
and corrupt governance. Rather, it studies the interaction of many different forms of 
governance to broaden conventional understandings of the workings of state authority. 
The peculiar modern history of Réunion Island – a sugar-growing French colony in the 
Indian Ocean whose multiracial inhabitants were French citizens from 1870, which 
legally became a French Department in 1946, and is now the only European Union region 
in the Southern Hemisphere – creates an opportune site for reconsidering multiple 
domains of ruling practices in the same framework.  
By using historical archive research and ethnographic fieldwork the dissertation 




owners, landlords, tenants and families conceived, claimed and reconfigured French 
social rights. The dissertation reveals the underlying logics of Réunionnais governance, 
social rights, racial distinction and the political projects of Overseas France which 
motivated these different groups to reshape governance through French social legislation 
in shantytown and social housing neighborhoods in Réunion’s capital St Denis.   
From 1946 all French laws were to apply in Réunion Island, where the majority of 
Réunionnais were agricultural workers, dominated by a minority white factory and 
landholding elite who also ran the local government. This dissertation examines how the 
meanings, practices and material forms of French social legislation were shaped and 
transformed through the interactions of these formal and informal governing authorities 
in Réunion.   
On March 14 1946 the French National Assembly voted to transform the French 
colonies of Réunion, Martinique, Guadeloupe and Guyana to French Overseas 
Departments. Their colonial legal regimes would be changed into French law.4 However, 
applying French social legislation to Réunion would not prove to be straightforward or 
uncontested. The application of French social laws and worker equality in a 
fundamentally unequal plantation society would call into question the privileges of the 
landowning Creole elites, a powerful minority. “The sugar barons and landowners have 
always had everything [for themselves]… administration, justice, armed forces, in short 
the efficient apparatus of the state” declared Réunion deputy Dr Raymond Vergès in 
1946 discussions of Réunion’s political future with France. He contrasted the elites’ 
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governing power with the mass of the laboring population, who had no rights except 
“killing themselves with work, and keeping quiet.”5  
In 1946 the French colonial authorities did not dominate social and labor relations 
in Réunion even though there was a French colonial governor and small colonial 
administration. Rather, the numerically small landed Creole elite – socially white 
Réunionnais landowners and factory owners whose families had lived on the island for 
generations – dominated political life, positions in the colonial administration, transport 
management and the import and export business.6 The vast majority of Réunionnais 
cultivated sugar cane and geranium or worked in the sugar factories. They were Creoles 
with mixed African, Chinese, European and Indian origins. These Réunionnais usually 
did not own the land they worked or lived on; they rented or sharecropped it from large 
landowners. Landlords usually gave employment, so labor and tenancy arrangements 
were closely linked. In short local systems of patronage and obligation structured social 
and political relations between Creole elites and workers.  
From 1870 there was no official distinction between citizenship and subjecthood 
for anyone in the “Old Colonies” of Réunion, Martinique, Guadeloupe, Guyana, or the 
inhabitants of the four oldest communes in Senegal. All the inhabitants of these places, 
regardless of race or religion, were able to vote and send their deputies to the French 
National Assembly in Paris. They were colonial citizens who had political representation 
in France, but French laws only applied to them through special decree. Their deputies 
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were able to vote for social laws which applied in Metropolitan France, but did not apply 
in the colonies. These deputies were always from the socially white Creole elite, 
however. Réunion’s 1946 legal assimilation with France also required French 
administrative services, adding further layers of political and social power to the already 
existing landed, commercial and colonial political relations in Réunion. 
There is a rich body of work on colonial processes of control which can be helpful 
in understanding legitimacy and governance in colonial conditions.7 Yet from 1946 
Réunion was legally assimilated with France, its inhabitants having the same social and 
political rights as Metropolitan French. Not all Réunion Islanders considered that the 
island was still under a colonial power after 1946.8 On the contrary, historians of Réunion 
consider that the process of “decolonization” immediately began when Réunion gained 
the legal status as part of France.9 
Which analytical framework can take into account these different political and 
social relations in Réunion when government was both colonial and not, and was 
concerned with the French nation-state although not completely defined by it?10 The 
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concept of governance permits a focus on the forms, content and detail of practices of 
rule without trying to define Réunion only as a plantation, colony or a nation-state.11 The 
concept of governance can also help us to understand changing practices and interactions 
of rule over time. Some scholars interested in governance have studied 
“governmentality”; how administrations or institutions govern conduct, and control 
populations, through statistics, expertise, administrative assumptions and institutional 
control.12 Others have questioned whether we can study formal institutional control in 
areas where state institutions may be absent, or do not have wide-ranging control (such as 
parts of colonial Africa or Réunion in 1946).13 Thus we need to also study “informal” 
institutions in Réunion alongside the arrival of the French administration. 
Scholars with an interest in the anthropology of “corruption” study people’s moral 
view of the world and their rights in it, and how formal and informal types of governance 
are intertwined. These studies most frequently occur outside Europe, yet this corruption 
could just as easily be found in France. Identifying these local definitions of corruption is 
sometimes considered a goal in itself, which implies that a domain of untainted 
bureaucracy exists somewhere where “real”, rational governance is conducted.14 More 
interesting work does not search for “corruption” per se; rather, it examines how 
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administrations work on a daily level and how governance is embedded in informal local 
interactions.15  In Réunion, the governance of social legislation is strongly linked to 
neighborhood micro-politics, and to non-public landed relations between property 
owners, landlords and tenants. Far from merely identifying corruption in Réunion, this 
dissertation explores “uncivil politics” - the governance of social legislation within both 
bureaucracies and patron-client relations. 16  
ii.  The problem of landholding 
Although it was only 400 miles east of Madagascar, Réunion was an uninhabited 
volcanic island when Europeans discovered it in the 16th century along with its nearest 
island neighbor Mauritius. Reunion was colonized by French and Malagasy in the late 
17th century, beginning trade and population movements between the Indian Ocean and 
France. The profitable cultivation of coffee, spices and indigo was the reason for 
introducing slavery in Réunion and Mauritius. Unlike in the French colonies of the 
Caribbean, slavery was not officially abolished in the French Indian Ocean colonies 
during the French Revolution.17 There were no massive slave revolts as in Haiti or 
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Guadeloupe. After French defeats in the Napoleonic wars, in 1815 Mauritius became a 
British colony, and Réunion remained French. 
After the 1848 abolition of slavery in France and its Empire, all freedmen and 
freedwomen were to be treated equally in front of the law. Yet the regime of freedom in a 
post-slavery society did not benefit all populations.18 Poor whites with small amounts of 
land in Réunion could no longer afford to cultivate land without slave labor. Some 
retreated into the mountainous interior of the island and subsistence agriculture, others 
remained small, unprofitable landowners.19 Slaves quickly purchased land in the years 
after emancipation but many quickly re-sold their land to Indian-origin workers at the end 
of the latters’ indenture contracts.20 The 1860s sugar cane depression affected all of these 
groups, as the French government agreed to favor sugar beet producers in Metropolitan 
France. Many smaller landowners in Réunion became deeply indebted to the island’s 
only colonial bank. They were obliged to give their land to the bank which ended up with 
a property monopoly of cultivable land. The vast majority of Réunion’s population 
became sharecroppers or laborers, and the majority of Réunion’s cultivable land was 
concentrated among a minority of people.21 The continued importance of landed relations 
would resurge in debates and practices over social legislation a century later in 1946.  
Despite the early arrival of French voting rights for Réunion Islanders, and the 
promise of legal assimilation into France in 1946, it is essential to understand the power 
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of rural and urban landholders in Réunion. The arrival of French social legislation - social 
housing, shantytown clearance and rent controls - threatened to change this power, 
especially in urban areas. The introduction of social housing policies, and the threats they 
posed to landlords and property owners underlined the fact that the problems of post 
emancipation societies stretched far beyond the moment of the emancipation of slaves.22 
Landholding is a general term which can denote a holder, proprietor, or occupier 
of land. Understanding the importance of social legislation for landholding in Réunion 
requires appreciating types of landholding systems which emerged in Europe, in African 
colonial regimes, and in plantation societies, and combining analysis of each type. 
 Landholding and property in Europe have often been based on the forming of 
responsible citizens.  Locke viewed private property as the central idea of society with 
the property-owning citizen becoming a responsible subject of a democratic polity.23 This 
logic led European governments to encourage the social assimilation of the working 
classes through home ownership from the 19th century. Scholars of French history have 
studied how these early philanthropic schemes became large-scale housing projects in 
urban areas of Metropolitan France from the 1950s.24 They have focused on how the 
urban environment of modernist social housing contributed to social problems which 
                                                 
 
22 Cooper, Holt, and Scott, Beyond slavery : explorations of race, labor, and citizenship in 
postemancipation societies. 
23John Locke, "On Property," in Two Treatises of Government, ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, [1690] 1964); J.G.A. Pocock, "Authority and property: The question of liberal origins," in 
Virtue, Commerce and History: Essays on political thought and History, Chiefly in the Eighteenth Century 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985). 
24 Rémy Butler and Patrice Noisette, Le logement social en France 1815-1981 de la cité ouvrière au grand 
ensemble, Fondations (Paris: La Découverte Maspero, 1983); Rosemary Wakeman, Modernizing the 




emerged in these neighborhoods, and have usually focused their attention on Paris.25 
From the 1950s, the French state intervened in Réunion with a similar logic, even though 
it had fewer financial resources than in Metropolitan France. It also used the same format 
of mass produced social housing and the grands ensembles construction method, albeit 
on a smaller scale.  
Despite the arrival of French social legislation, prior Réunionnais concepts of 
tenancy agreements, squatting rights, and moral claims to land ownership endured in the 
post 1946 French regime.26 Thus, the dissertation asks how the effects of French-style 
urban development in Réunion interacted with Réunionnais concepts of property 
ownership and appropriation.27 Studies of colonial housing have explored urban 
development overseas although they sometimes focus more on Metropolitan architects, or 
on formal housing than on informal construction or worker housing.28 Property owning, 
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social housing and the urban environment in Reunion must also be understood in the 
context of local landholding ideas.  
Studies of landholding in rural Africa have often focused on the relationship 
between state-making, governance and the politics of land, which is relevant for 
understanding the interlinking of Réunionnais and French ideas of landholding. They 
have examined how different systems of property and land tenure existed inside and 
outside colonial regimes, and how such regimes attempted to shape “traditional” 
landholding, or make land reform. These studies have closely examined reciprocal types 
of landholding obligations between families, or patrons and clients.29 These notions of 
reciprocal attachment over land are also important for understanding landholding in post-
emancipation plantation societies, whether in post-abolition colonial Africa, the 
Caribbean, or the Indian Ocean. Here, scholars have examined the construction of post-
emancipation societies and their definitions of public and political rights. Should 
governments enact land tenure reform for the freedmen, or make them landless 
laborers?30  
                                                                                                                                                 
 
architecture and Britain's Raj, Oxford India paperbacks (New Delhi Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002). 
29 T. O. Ranger, "The Invention of tradition in colonial Africa," in The Invention of tradition, ed. E. J. 
Hobsbawm and T. O. Ranger (Cambridge [Cambridgeshire] ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1992); Henrietta L. Moore and Megan Vaughan, Cutting down trees : gender, nutrition, and agricultural 
change in the Northern Province of Zambia, 1890-1990, Social history of Africa (Portsmouth, NH; 
London: Heinemann ; James Currey, 1994); Parker MacDonald Shipton, Mortgaging the ancestors : 
ideologies of attachment in Africa, Yale agrarian studies series (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009); 
Donald S. Moore, Suffering for territory : race, place, and power in Zimbabwe (Durham [N.C.]: Duke 
University Press, 2005); Jocelyn Alexander, The unsettled land : state-making & the politics of land in 
Zimbabwe, 1893-2003 (Oxford: James Currey ;, 2006). Holly Elisabeth Hanson, Landed obligation : the 
practice of power in Buganda, Social history of Africa, (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2003). 
30 Frederick Cooper, From slaves to squatters : plantation labor and agriculture in Zanzibar and coastal 
Kenya, 1890-1925 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980); Rebecca J. Scott, Degrees of freedom : 




Even though all Réunion Islanders could vote after 1870, whatever their race or 
religion, social perceptions of skin color, landholding power and the power of the 
“plantocracy” continued to fundamentally structure social and economic relations in 
Réunion, as they would in other plantation economies.31 Réunion’s regime of indentured 
labor did not end until 1936. The broadest social problem continued to be landowning, as 
the vast majority of Réunionnais descended from poor whites, slaves and indentured 
laborers continued to work as day laborers and sharecroppers on land they did not own.    
 In 1946 the possibility of applying French social legislation to Réunion promised 
to reshape land obligations.  Social legislation was partly about new social rights and 
labor laws, and partly about urban property reform through the construction of worker 
housing.32 The control of landed relations and its importance for social and political life 
would affect how social legislation would be applied and understood in Réunion. 
iii. Social rights in the French colonies  
Studying social legislation in Réunion provides an important case study combining 
histories of socialism, the demise of a colonial empire and the rise of French state welfare 
interventionism overseas. Studying social legislation in Réunion from 1946 and after 
1962 extends conventional interpretations of French colonialism. These have tended to 
consider demands for social rights in the colonies as a precursor to colonial nationalism 
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and independence. In contrast, demands for social rights in Réunion and the other Old 
colonies were predicated on closer assimilation with France. After 1962, when French 
colonialism is traditionally considered to have ended, France bound Réunion and the 
other Overseas Departments ever legally and politically closer. Despite France’s policy of 
applying increased social rights in return for political loyalty, the governance of social 
legislation in Réunion was not merely a successful example of postcolonial French rule. 
Rather social legislation was reshaped by local Réunionnais distribution networks of state 
welfare altering its meanings and uses on the island.  
Unlike Reunion, most of the inhabitants of France’s colonies were not French 
citizens in the 19th century. Political and legal differences between French citizens and 
French colonial subjects were legislated around the perceived racial or religious 
distinctions of subject populations.33  In 1936 the Metropolitan French ‘Popular Front’ 
governing coalition instituted a wave of significant social reform and worker rights. This 
had an important impact on worker demands in the French colonies, where colonial 
subjects demanded similar worker rights as Metropolitan French citizens. Some scholars 
have identified the colonial Popular Front movements as deeply influencing later colonial 
movements towards nationalism and decolonization. 34  
Others have considered that we not must interpret the Popular Front or post-1946 
demands for social rights as inevitably leading towards decolonization. Rather they were 
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moments of possibility for the meaning of France and its colonies.35 French colonialism 
had become unstable thanks to subject populations mobilized by World War II. Leaders 
in France sought to rewrite the French constitution. Representatives from the French 
colonies were included in the discussions at the French Constituent Assembly in 1946.36 
France and its colonies would no longer be politically separate entities. Distinctions 
between French citizens, colonial citizens and colonial subjects would also be abolished. 
Instead, all inhabitants of the French Empire, now renamed the “French Union”, would 
benefit from a new, multinational, French citizenship. One could be a French citizen in 
Metropolitan France, or a French citizen in an ex-French colony in Africa. This was 
agreed in the new French Constitution of October 1946.37    
The inhabitants of the Old Colonies possessed both civil and political French 
citizenship. All but one of their deputies wanted immediate social citizenship. “After 
fraternity and liberty, we come to demand equality in front of the law, the equality of 
rights … through the application of social laws” stated Gaston Monnerville, deputy for 
Guyana and future president of the French Senate. 38 They demanded the immediate legal 
assimilation of the Old Colonies to France. Their populations should have the same social 
equality as Metropolitan French workers.  
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Shepard has suggested that after 1962, France made a breakpoint with 
colonization.39 The continued existence of Overseas France, and especially Réunion, 
stands as important proof that this was not the case everywhere. One of the main authors 
of the Algerian decolonization in 1962, ex-Prime Minister Michel Debré, zealously 
continued to carry out a vision of French influence in Réunion until the late 1980s, in 
order to reinstate the power and influence of the French state in the Indian Ocean (see 
chapters 3 and 4). Debré used very similar colonial idioms that Shepard claims had ended 
in 1962. If the 1946-1962 period was a moment of possibility for France rather than an 
inevitable road to decolonization, I claim the post-1962 period and the politics of 
Overseas France should also be reconsidered. France did not simply become a post-
colonial country in 1963, and the official borders of France did not suddenly shrink to 
Europe.  
Wilder has described France and its colonies before 1962 as an “imperial nation 
state.” The Metropole and the colonies must be analyzed in the same framework, rather 
than separately.40 His call is increasingly being acknowledged in French colonial history. 
However scholars of France after 1962 tend to frame the country as ‘post-colonial’ and 
they prefer to study the French colonial populations who immigrated to France. Apart 
from work on Antillean migration to the Metropole, scholars routinely pass over 
Overseas populations, and the existence of Overseas France, despite these populations 
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being French.41 Conversely, Overseas France is also often studied in isolation. Scholars 
often pay scant attention to considering Overseas France and Metropolitan France in the 
same framework, nor with Overseas France and their surrounding countries. Rather, they 
imply that Overseas France is not exotic enough to be foreign and not “quite” France 
either.42 
Specifically, I propose that the study of contemporary France, especially French 
welfare policies, should be considered alongside the study of welfare in Overseas France, 
rather than separately.43 It is not enough to study the colonial origins of modern French 
welfare institutions before 1962, without also considering their continuation in Overseas 
France after this period.44 It is not enough to study culturally different uses of welfare 
only in Overseas or Metropolitan France.45  France’s welfare budget in Overseas France 
is reason alone to include it in histories of the contemporary French welfare state. The 
history of the French project of welfare for political loyalty overseas, enacted by Michel 
Debré in Réunion after 1962, is the basis for understanding this continued, accepted, and 
financially significant French presence in Overseas France.  
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iv. Race in Metropolitan and Overseas France 
Studies of race and difference in France have usually been constructed around the history 
of immigration and assimilation in Metropolitan France. The contemporary functioning 
of markers of race, ethnicity and religion in Overseas France has been much less studied. 
Yet the different, but complementary, history of Overseas France, especially Réunion 
Island, provides an important counter-perspective on the way that difference and diversity 
are commonly understood and practiced in the French Republic. In addition, studying the 
20th century history of landless Creole populations in Réunion adds to the literature of 
population movements in the Indian Ocean after the end of the slave trade. However, 
studying Creoles in Réunion Island also poses some methodological problems which are 
different from conventional studies of race and French colonialism.  
Overseas France provides an important counter-example to ideas about race in 
France. There has been an increasing focus on the politics of racial exclusion and 
religious intolerance in the French Republic. These narratives usually only focus on 
Metropolitan France and are often closely linked to the history of immigration in France. 
Sometimes it is implied that the ideologies of the French Republic are inherently racist, 
or are incapable of incorporating difference.46   
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Racism and exclusion are certainly not absent from Réunion, or other places in 
Overseas France.47 All areas of Overseas France have been historic sites of immigration, 
if not forced labor and immigration continues in the contemporary period.48 Social and 
ethnic diversity also varies widely across Overseas France. Despite this, the populations 
of Overseas France are French, and are educated in the same Republican tradition as their 
contemporaries in Metropolitan France. However ways of interpreting racial and 
religious diversity are different to Metropolitan France. Réunion’s socially and racially 
cohesive atmosphere is locally recognized and celebrated, but it is not well-known in 
Metropolitan France. Perhaps this is because the racial diversity of Réunionnais renders 
them less easily recognizable than Caribbean French in the Metropole.49  
This dissertation suggests that the governance of social legislation in Réunion 
flattened racial and class divisions, enabling Republican welfare to be an important factor 
of social cohesion. I argue that in the absence of an identifiable racial majority in 
Réunion, the French state effectively acted as a mediator of race and class differences. 
This slowly enabled landless descendents of slaves and indentured laborers to obtain 
minimum social and health care, flattening social divisions. The Creole descendants of 
Africans, Malagasy, Indians and Europeans came to practice being French in Overseas 
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France through their appropriation and local governance of French welfare systems. The 
dissertation thus provides a new, comparative perspective for understanding racial 
difference and equality in contemporary France.  
i. Histories and anthropologies of Réunion  
Réunion Island is usually studied in splendid isolation. There have been relatively few 
historical studies of Réunion after 1946 in the broader political context of French 
decolonization, France’s policies in Metropolitan France or elsewhere in Overseas 
France.50 Studies of Réunion since 1946 have more often focused on the local 
developments that French departmentalization brought to the island, and the radical 
changes that this brought to the dominant form of rural life on the island, and to identity 
politics in general.51 
Most historians of Réunion Island also use this model of rapid change to explain 
social life in Réunion. They also assume that after 1946 Réunion Islanders slowly became 
like the Metropolitan French in their political habits. As overt electoral fraud diminished, 
and ballot boxes were no longer stuffed in Réunion these historians imply that Réunion 
Islanders slowly assimilated into rational French-style political action.52 In contrast, this 
dissertation examines how political action in Réunion continued to be influenced by 
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informal practices, including social relations which were strongly linked to rural 
landlord-tenant relations. 
Recent studies on urban social relations in social housing in Réunion have been 
framed as a break with the past, than a continuation of previous forms of landlord-tenant 
relations.53 While anthropologists and historians of Réunion have studied landholding 
practices these have usually been focused on property holding and inheritance in rural 
Réunion.54 The relations that tenants and sharecroppers held with property owners have 
been largely passed over. Excellent studies of urban architecture in Réunion, and the 
history and anthropology of housing have also passed over the history of urban 
landholding holding in Réunion and the rise of social housing – even though 25 % of 
Réunion Islanders now live in social housing.55  
This dissertation attempts to combine historical and anthropological concerns 
with rural and urban forms of political and social life in Réunion. It aims to understand 
how these affected Réunion Islanders’ acceptance of the French administration in 
Réunion, and how the French administration was transformed Réunion Islanders without 
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positing either a fundamental break with Réunion’s past, or a straightforward assimilation 
in to Metropolitan French political forms. 
II. Racial distinctions in Réunion  
Historians of colonialism have often studied anthropological and administrative 
representations of colonial populations, to understand the ideologies of colonial rule and 
racial distinctions.56 This dissertation focuses on the Creole descendants of slaves, 
indentured laborers and poor whites from these places. However, unlike other French 
colonies, it is very difficult to make simple racial classifications about these Réunion 
Islanders. Slavery transported large numbers of people with different African and 
Malagasy origins to Réunion. Post 1848 indentured labor brought tens of thousands of 
people from the Indian subcontinent, Eastern Africa, the Comoros Islands, Madagascar, 
Rodrigues, Indochina, New Caledonia, and China through 1936. This enabled 
intermarriage between working people from many different backgrounds.  
Racial classification was also difficult in the 19th century. In 1863, Desiré 
Charnay, a French anthropologist, came to Réunion to do an anthropometric study of 
local racial “types” who were not part of the “white” population. Charnay took photos of 
clearly uncomfortable naked and semi-naked men and women, some with clear marks of 
chains on their ankles fifteen years after the official end of slavery. He used the 
categories of Malagasy, Mozambique, Creole, Indian, Annamite and Chinese to classify 
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these working people, already simplifying their diverse origins.57 By 1946 some of these 
racial categories – Mozambique, Annamite - were no longer in use. Others – Kaf, Zoreil, 
and Zarab – were more frequently used in local racial vocabularies, partly because of the 
arrival of free migrant populations had arrived in Réunion from Western India (especially 
Bombay) and Metropolitan France. Free populations from India – Zarabs - typically 
started work as coolies, peddlers or cloth traders; Metropolitan French often worked in 
the administration on the Island.58  
After Réunion became a French Overseas Department in 1946, the French 
administration tried to analyze the Creole population in a 1952 INSEE survey. French 
officials found it very difficult to make clear distinctions of the island’s highly mixed-
race working class population.59 
In 1952 Réunion Island had 274,370 inhabitants, of whom 4,775 people were 
foreign-born, probably from China, British India and Madagascar. The administration 
estimated that there were 15,000 poor French-origin and socially white Petit Blancs. 
These people typically lived in the rural, mountainous interior of Reunion, in areas where 
sugar cane could not be cultivated. In addition to these poor whites, the administration 
guessed there were around 1,000 or so Metropolitan French (Zoreys). There was also the 
Creole economic elite (Grand Blancs) although the administration did not count them.   
The administration then attempted to account for all the “Asian” population 
together - in the French parlance this meant free Indian and Chinese migrants although 
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some of their children were naturalized as French. The administration estimated 6,000 
individuals ‘of the pure yellow race’ who worked in the food trade and 4,000 Indians or 
Pakistanis who worked in the cloth trade. This idea of Chinese racial “purity” was 
shorthand for counting the shopkeepers who worked in commerce and came from 
Cantonese backgrounds, rather than the Hakka-speaking indentured laborers who had 
arrived earlier in Réunion. 
The 1952 administration thus classified approximately 40,000 people as racially 
“identifiable” in Réunion. It was obliged to account for the rest – 230,000 people - as 
métisse or “mixed race”. The Prefect reported “these individuals comprise the majority of 
the population. They are French citizens and have civil rights. The mixing between 
whites, blacks [i.e. African and Indian] and yellows has been general and in this 
population has given a great variety of ethnic and color characteristics.” In an attempt to 
make the population more “legible” the administration listed people’s occupations.60  
Agricultural laborers    26.7% 
Undeclared     17.0%  
Non-agricultural workers   16.9%*   
Sharecroppers    10.4% 
Independent [workers]   7.8% 
[Landowners]     7.7%  
Other      4.8% 
Administrators    4.6% 
Private sector workers   3.3% 
Fishermen     0.8% 
 
* Construction workers, woodworkers, seamstress, domestic servants 
 
Despite these neat statistics, 17% of this Réunionnais working population was classified 
as “undeclared”, and 26% agricultural laborers were often seasonal workers. The Prefect 
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commented that in Réunion there were “almost 100,000 people with few resources and 
with few reserves, working a few months a year. This group of poor, landless laborers of 
mixed racial origins is the subject of my dissertation. 
In 2009 racial and labor distinctions are no longer so sharp in Réunion, even if 
they still exist as prejudice, media representation, or as consumption for tourists. 
However it is undeniable that the diversity of obvious racial characteristics is a frequent 
and mostly anodyne subject of conversation in Réunion. That is not to say there is no 
racial prejudice.61 Nowadays, the visual attraction of Réunion’s diverse, racially mixed 
and socially French racial groups is a selling point for Réunion’s tourist board. 
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1.1 Le Zarab, le Chinois, le Yab, le Malbar 
nais house, le Zorey, le Kaf, Réunionnais woman







Réunion Island tourism poster 2004
 
.3 La Réunion, a thousand smiles in one island.  






The shot glasses, photographed in August 2009 designate, in a typified yet highly 
untypical ‘national costume’, Réunion’s main ethnic groups as understood today. They 
designate the Creole words for male Réunion Islanders: le Zarab, le Chinois, le Yab, le 
Malbar, le Zorey, le Kaf. The first glass portrays a male Muslim Réunion Islander 
(Zarab), pictured wearing a tunic and prayer hat, with a bolt of cloth in his hand, 
conforming to the stereotype of Zarabes as people who work in textiles The Chinese man 
is dressed in a representation of Chinese clothes, with a backdrop of a rum shop and old-
style grocery store behind him, designating the tradition of Cantonese Chinese as owners 
of food retail stores. The poor white Réunion Islander, usually known as a Petit Blanc is 
here designated as Yab (from the Creole pauv’diab, meaning poor devil). He is drawn 
with red hair, next to geranium plants and a geranium essence still – one of the main 
income sources of Petits Blancs in western and southwestern Réunion until the geranium 
decline of the 1950s and 1960s.  
The Réunion Islander with southern Indian-origins is designated as Malbar (most 
British Indian indentured laborers came from the Malabar Coast in the 19th century).  He 
wears a yellow tunic and behind him is a goat ready to be sacrificed. He is holding 
coconuts in his hand, presumably also ready for sacrifice. This portrayal denotes his 
Hindu religion, but ignores local practices where many Hindus are also Catholic.62 The 
second row has the Metropolitan French-born Zorey pictured as a white, very muscular 
blond man holding a surfboard with a self-satisfied grin. Finally, the Kaf (from the 
French Cafre) is the word most Réunion Islanders use for people who appear to have 
marked African origins. Here he is pictured as a poor fisherman, holding a vouve, a 
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Malagasy-origin conical fishing trap for baby fish which enter the river. The nameless 
Creole woman dances with her back turned from the viewer, and is not designated as 
anything. These images are clearly ambiguous, if not to say problematic. The shot glasses 
of racial types are redolent of colonial collections of racial imagery, denoting the 
“typical” ethnic groups which were sold on postcards for Metropolitan consumption or 
which advertized colonial commodities.63 These Réunionnais groups are still portrayed 
for Metropolitan consumption, not only on shot glasses but on postcards, books and 
clothing. 
The broader point of this dissertation is to demonstrate how French social 
legislation became a mediator of racial and class divides, to enable the sale of such shot 
glasses and other types of racial consumption without protest in Réunion. Creole 
descendants of Africans, Malagasy, Indians and Europeans came to practice being French 
in Overseas France through their appropriation and local governance of French welfare 
systems.  However, even as France bound Réunion ever legally and politically closer, 
French social legislation was reshaped by Réunionnais networks of welfare distribution. 
Rather than becoming a simple tool of French hegemony in Réunion, the local 
governance of social legislation eventually enabled even Réunion’s poorest inhabitants to 
force French welfare agencies to entirely change their policies.  
Additionally, there is a gap in the English-language historiography on East 
African or Indian Ocean slavery. It is generally assumed, that the Mascarene Islands and 
especially Réunion Island stopped any relationships with Eastern Africa after 1848 and 
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the end of the slave trade.64 The implication is that Réunion was self-evidently part of 
France after this time. My dissertation underlines the cultural and political work which 
was needed from 1946 to ideologically separate Réunion from the rest of the Indian 
Ocean, to further France’s political goal of maintaining loyalty with France. In addition 
my dissertation shows that Réunion was in many ways much more linked to Madagascar 
than to France until the late 1950s when France was created as a natural destination and 
focus for Réunion. 
Réunion Island has always been set in the context of other people’s knowledge 
about France, the French Empire, and Indian Ocean Africa. For much of the Anglophone 
world, the French Antilles has come to speak for what it means to be French and Creole, 
first through the Afro-centric negritude writings of Aimé Césaire, and then through 
writings of Glissant, Bernarbé and Chamoiseau who championed a view of that being 
Creole was to be hybrid.65 These intellectual programs were specific to the Caribbean. 
More recently, from Réunion Island, the scholars Françoise Vergès and Carpanin 
Marimoutou have called for an acknowledgment of specificities of Indian Ocean 
creolisation, with Réunion a crossroads of Indian Ocean cultures.66  
Yet how can we understand a crossroads of Indian Ocean cultures? Researchers 
studying African history have underlined the difficulty of trying to find true and authentic 
Africans, or knowledge of pure pasts untainted by colonialism.67 While some historians 
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sought to use oral history as a channel to a knowable past, other scholars have understood 
that oral history is also a way of recalibrating contemporary ways of relating stories and 
information. This historical problem of the location and deployment of African words 
and voices has become a central issue in Africanist historiography with many different 
ways of approaching historical statements, not all of which necessarily search for their 
historical veracity.68  
Inspired by, and respectful of, this approach, I am wary of designating what it 
means to be Creole, or to look Creole. I wish to further subject my own sources to the 
questions of their knowledge productions. Yet my dissertation concentrates specifically 
on this poor ‘mixed-race’ population: how the administration and political elites 
attempted to decide their political futures, and the types of lives and choices they were 
able to make. In this dissertation I attempt to resolve this dilemma by talking about 
Réunion Islanders’ ancestry, or personal history, rather than classify them by racial 
categories. 
III. Methodology 
My first stay in Réunion during 2000-2001 was as an undergraduate student. I had 
previously spent a year living in Metropolitan France before starting university, and when 
the obligatory junior year abroad loomed as part of my language degree, I petitioned the 
University of Birmingham not to study as an Erasmus student in Metropolitan France but 
to work for the British Council as a language assistant. Thus, I went to teach English at a 
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Réunion Island high school with the British Council. Already familiar with France, and 
determined to become bilingual in French, I shared a house with Réunion Islanders and 
French people in St Gilles les Bains and worked on my language skills. For seven months 
I avoided all English-speaking people, and spent time immersed in Metropolitan French 
culture with the easiest French people to find – Metropolitan French “Zoreys” working in 
Réunion usually on 2-year contracts as speech therapists, nurses, teachers, sales managers 
and journalists.  
Although I lived with two Réunion Islanders, and I taught in a Réunion Island 
high school, Creole culture completely eluded me, so intent was I on naïvely finding the 
authentic “French” language and culture I had studied in university and encountered in 
Metropolitan France. In the middle of the seventh month some chance encounters took 
me a mile down the road from where I was living, where I was astonished to find 
Réunion Islanders living in houses made from corrugated iron with no hot water and no 
electrical appliances. My sudden realization of a different, parallel world to the Zoreys 
and the Metropolitan French I knew me made me want to become an anthropologist. 
 Despite my familiarity with Réunion, and my numerous research trips, during my 
MA and the beginning of my PhD, ethnographic fieldwork in Réunion always proved 
mysterious and elusive. I could not understand how my other colleagues in anthropology 
were able to find NGOs to watch at work, or were able to watch grassroots neighborhood 
groups making collective claims. Whenever I attempted to affiliate myself with informal 
social organizations, there always seemed to be quid pro quos which I did not understand 
and I was never able to get a “hold” on the “social movements” which I felt should be my 
object of study when looking at the claims Réunion Islanders made about their place in 
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France. So this time, I started with archival work and eventually moved to studying 
bureaucracies, the French administration and Réunion Islanders’ individual claims on 
French state agencies like the SIDR housing agency, rather than looking for group claims 
which did not actually exist. 
 Historians of Réunion Island after 1946 have not made the fullest use of archival 
resources either in Metropolitan France or in Réunion. Most of my source material in 
Paris and in St Denis –apart from SIDR photographs, newspapers and the Debré archives 
– had not been consulted before. However, a post 1945 French archive project has some 
challenges. Political or social documents considered sensitive - such as Prefect reports or 
social services reports - are subject to a 60 year delay before being communicated. In 
Réunion it was almost impossible to get permission to consult any Prefect 
correspondence or social services data, although I was lucky to find a certain amount of 
duplicate material in Paris.  
 In the final phase of my research in Réunion I got in touch with the SIDR to see if 
they had any photograph archives. Bernard Hoarau, the PR manager of the SIDR was 
extremely welcoming and changed the direction of my project, as he put me in touch with 
SIDR social workers in the current renovation project in Petite Ile. I had been looking for 
informal social movements, but I should have been studying the French bureaucracy that 
was all around me as a site for political claims! I was invited to sit in with social work 
sessions. After obtaining Institutional Review Board approval at the University of 
Michigan I was able to attend social work meetings, and accompany the social workers 
around Petite Ile and elsewhere in St Denis, allowing me to recruit people who came to 
the SIDR office for interviews.  
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IV. Chapter summaries 
The order of the remaining chapters is as follows: 
 
Chapter Two: Challenging the landlord-tenant regime and clearing the 
debris of the cyclone in Réunion 1947-1952 examines landlord-tenant relations in the 
rural areas of Réunion and how these relations of political and social pressure affected 
local governance of the rural areas. By focusing on the early years of the SIDR, the 
French government housing agency in Réunion, the chapter demonstrates how the French 
administration successfully challenged the dominance of the Creole elites and the 
Communist Party as these groups attempted to direct early French legislation on the 
island in the wake of the 1948 cyclone.  
Chapter Three: Framing race and poverty in Réunion 1950-1955 
demonstrates how the French administration unsuccessfully attempted to tackle worker 
poverty and thus discourage workers from becoming Communist. Introducing social 
legislation had unintended political consequences, restructuring male employment in 
Réunion from agricultural work to the construction sector, where workers were recruited 
for the Communist Party. The French administration unsuccessfully attempted to 
diminish support for the Communist Party by political repression, and attempting to 
racially profile Réunion Islanders as potential Communist supporters. However, support 
for the Communist party, and the intersection of race and poverty defied these neat 
categorizations. The blurred race and class boundaries in Réunion made it difficult for the 
administration to categorize political enemies by racial origin.  
Chapter Four: Urban landholding and political loyalty in a St Denis 
shantytown 1954-1963 demonstrates how, by attempting to improve urban worker 
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housing and thus diminish support for the Communist Party, the SIDR effectively 
became an urban landlord, a role normally played by Creole landowners. By intervening 
in urban shantytown destruction, the SIDR also began to change and control the political 
allegiances between landlords and tenants. The French administration had not managed to 
fundamentally transform landlord-tenant relations in Réunion. Rather, it had started to 
take part in them. 
Chapter Five: The morality of low rents: a new French tenancy program in 
St Denis 1960-1966 describes the French state’s attempt to govern urban landholding 
relations in Réunion through changing shantytown rents. The state unintentionally 
became the mediator between landowners, tenants, and sub letters in St Denis. The 
shantytown decree enabled Réunionnais to individually claim material improvement from 
the state as a fundamental moral and legal right. Landowners and landlords were now the 
object of control, rather than the tenants. The entire relationship between Réunion Island 
tenants, landlords, landowners and the state was being transformed, and a new idiom of 
making citizenship claims linked to French state welfare had been created. 
Chapter Six: Making France in the Indian Ocean 1963-2006 explores how 
Michel Debré and Paul Vergès’ attempted to polarize political and cultural discourse on 
the island as a choice either for Réunion or for France. Yet by the 1970s in Réunion it 
was impossible to define the island as either French or Creole. This chapter demonstrates 
how young urban Réunion Islanders in St Denis appropriated and made their own ideas 
about being French in the Indian Ocean, interpreting in their own fashion the pro- and 
anti- French ideologies which saturated political life on the island. Unlike the prevailing 
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political discourse, Islanders did not need to choose either Réunion or France to 
understand what it meant to be French in the Indian Ocean.  
The 1960-1966 administrative success in the St Denis shantytowns was short-
lived. From 1966 locally elected elites regained control of the SIDR, and began a new 
form of governing welfare distribution in urban neighborhoods, explored in Chapter 
Seven: Transforming class relations and landholding through French social 
legislation 1967-1981.  Elected officials in the city councils were able to use the 
resources of the French administration, giving them much more financial and political 
power than ever before.  This fundamentally transformed traditional class divisions 
between the extremely poor majority and the landowning minority by creating a new 
middle class. However, just as landowners had previously been the source of material 
wealth, many people now considered that material welfare and employment came directly 
from the Mayors.  
Chapter Eight: “They claim stronger rights than property owners’ rights”: 
inverting landlord – tenant relations in SIDR Petite Ile 1998-2009 brings the 
governance of social legislation to the last ten years in Réunion. Social tensions over 
opposing moral judgments of the “right” way to live in social housing have set the 
principally Réunionnais employees in French welfare agencies against SIDR residents 
and their families who maintain the view that they have moral rights to purchase housing. 
These conflicts have delayed the completion of the Petite Ile program by several years.  
From the 1960s, locally elected elites appropriated the means of distributing welfare in 
order to further their political projects. Social housing residents have now also 
appropriated and instrumentalized French welfare allocations and houses. Rather than 
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being submissive to landholders, some urban residents in social housing have been able 
to invert landlord-tenant relations. Tenants are now able to use different tactics – 
helplessness, stubborn resistance, hustling, family pressure – to put pressure on the 
French administration, and French landholders such as the SIDR, to claim rights to better 





CHAPTER 2 CHALLENGING THE LANDLORD-TENANT 
REGIME AND CLEARING THE DEBRIS OF THE CYCLONE 
IN RÉUNION 1947-1952 
I. Introduction  
The political future of Réunion and France’s other Old colonies was decided on the 14th 
of March 1946. Deputies in the French National Assembly voted unanimously for a 
project to politically and socially integrate Réunion, Guadeloupe, Martinique and Guyana 
with Metropolitan France.1 The political moment was favorable. The new post-war 4th 
French Republic was on the point of redefining the political relationship between France 
and its empire, which would be renamed the French Union in October 1946. Réunion and 
the other old colonies would become French Overseas Departments (DOMs) legally and 
politically assimilated with France. The DOMs were the vanguard for a new idea of 
colonial citizenship: a multinational French citizenship where citizens of France’s 
colonies and citizens of the French Metropole would be politically, even socially, equal.2 
For Réunion, becoming a French department signaled the defeat of the landholding 
lobbies. It also demonstrated to the French that Réunion’s political loyalty had earnt the 
island the right to become fully French.3 Raymond Vergès and Réunion’s other left wing 
                                                 
 
1 The 46-451 law was published on 19/3/1946 in the Journal Officiel. The French government was given 
two years to accomplish full assimilation.  
2 Cooper, "From imperial inclusion to republican exclusion? France's ambiguous postwar trajectory." 
3 Vergès Monsters and Revolutionaries 1999, Françoise Vergès, La loi du 19 mars 1946, Les débats à 
l'Assemblée constituante (St Denis: Graphica, 1996). 
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deputy Leon de Lepervanche sent a telegram from Paris asking for the event to be 
marked by a “grandiose” celebration in Réunion.4  
Given the privations of everyday life in the aftermath of World War II, Réunion 
Islanders had other preoccupations. Despite the rhetoric of Réunion’s deputies, many 
Réunion Islanders had very limited ideas about what becoming part of France would 
mean for them. There was no large-scale celebration on the island. Nor, indeed, was there 
any immediate change. The island still had a French colonial governor and elite Creole 
landholders continued to structure life for the majority of Réunion Island’s poverty-
stricken workers. Life continued as before.5  
Whatever the promises of the 1946 assimilation law, French social welfare was 
not immediately applied in Réunion or the other DOMs. By 1947 newspaper critiques 
abounded. Why had assimilation not occurred? Le Progrès, a centrist Réunion newspaper 
lamented that Réunion was only a French department by name. Being called a French 
department may have satisfied “the national susceptibilities of ... this amalgam of races 
which makes up the entity of Réunion. If that’s what we were looking for, the goal has 
been achieved. No more. As far as all the other dreamed-of improvements, they have 
been confirmed as puerile and farcical.”6  
1947 saw the handover from the French colonial governor of Réunion to the new 
French Prefect. This was merely ceremony. The real social power in Réunion was in the 
hands of Creole landholders who had significant influence over agricultural workers and 
sharecroppers on their land.  Landowners also had a hold on local government, although 
                                                 
 
4 Edmond Maestri and Danielle Nomdedeu-Maestri, Chronologie de la Réunion : de la 
départementalisation à la loi d'orientation, 1946-2001 (Paris: SEDES, 2001), 17. 
5 The 1946 law gave France two years to assimilate Réunion and the other Overseas Departments 
6 Le Progrès 20/01/1947 
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there was a political counter-movement from the Réunion Island Communist party which 
sought the immediate application of French social legislation in Reunion. Bureaucrats in 
Metropolitan France were far too busy thinking about France’s reconstruction after the 
Second World War, to worry about Réunion Island. It would take a devastating cyclone 
in 1948 to reshape Réunion’s material and social order and put this new, theoretically 
Metropolitan French, regime to the test.7  
The combination of the 1948 cyclone and the 1946 assimilation law forced two 
systems of governance – the Creole elites and the French administration – to confront 
each other. While the landholding Creole elites were content to maintain the status quo, 
the newly arrived French civil servants threatened their hold on government. Although by 
1952 the French administration would have control over government, they had to 
compromise with the landholding elites who managed to retain their social control over 
the lives of the majority of agricultural workers in rural Réunion and their monopoly on 
landholding.  And by 1952 the Communist party had become radicalized, now a political 







                                                 
 
7 Cyclone, hurricane and typhoon are similar sub-tropical phenomena. Different names are used in the 
Indian, Atlantic and Pacific Oceans respectively. Before 1962, cyclones were not named. 
 
  
II. La Réunion’s social and material worlds ... as seen as through a journey
 
In 1947 Raphaella left her family home near Ste Rose on the rainy eastern slopes of 
Réunion’s volcano to marry a landowner almost twice her age named Yvan Bottard who 
lived on the other side of Réunion in St Gilles les Bains.
Raphaella would take for the next fifty years. Like many children of poor French
sharecroppers in Réunion, Raphaella had only briefly attended school between the ages 
of six and seven. Afterwards, she accompanied her father to the fields to work sug
and vanilla, and cultivate other food crops, on land belonging to the rich Baronce family. 
Raphaella had caught the eye of Yvan a number of years before, when she had 
                                                
 
8 http://pedagogie2.ac-reunion.fr/anglaislp/images/Cartes/carte_reun
Figure 2.1 Map of La Réunion 
8 This was the longest journey 
 









accompanied her father delivering volcanic stone to a road project in St Gilles les Bains. 
When Raphaella was 22, Yvan Bottard had called for her to marry him.  
From her tiny village of Bois Blanc, Raphaella travelled on an open-topped bus to 
the town of St Benoît, one of the terminuses for Réunion’s only train line. The train took 
fourteen hours to run 150km counterclockwise around most of the island’s coast between 
St Benoît in the east and St Pierre in the south. Raphaella boarded one of the carriages of 
the ancient steam train, built many decades before, and it slowly and laboriously stopped 
at two dozen stations between her old and her new life. As Raphaella passed along the 
windward side of the island she saw nothing but sugar cane fields planted from the 
middle slopes of Réunion’s high mountains down to the ocean, interspersed with a few 
sugar factory chimneys near the coast. Working in those fields and factories were 
thousands of other sharecroppers and sugar factory workers who lived in very similar 
material conditions to her Petit Blanc background, even if they had come to Réunion 
from other parts of the Indian Ocean.  
If Raphaella had looked out of the dusty window at the stop near the sugar cane 
factory of La Mare near Ste Marie, she might have seen Mr. M who lived and worked 
near the factory. His father was a Muslim from the Comoros Islands who had come over 
to work the sugar fields around La Mare in the early 1900s as an indentured laborer, later 
marrying his Réunionnais Creole wife. His mother had Indian ancestors and was both 
Catholic and Hindu. Mr. M himself was a cane sharecropper, and also delivered imported 
cattle around the island on foot. In 1947 Mr. M’s wife was pregnant again and she would 
soon have to stop her work. She earned a little money by buying produce from the big St 
Denis market in La Mare and selling it in the neighborhood. As Raphaella’s train stopped 
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at La Mare, Mr. M’s wife would have walked alongside the carriages with her basket on 
her head as the locomotive hissed, to sell fruit to the tired passengers from window to 
window. 
After La Mare, Raphaella Boyer’s train would have eventually stopped at 
Réunion’s capital. St Denis, on the north of Réunion, which was built in the 18th century 
on a French colonial layout and faced the Indian Ocean. Much larger wooden or stone 
houses in a French Creole style - with long gardens, iron balconies and verandahs - 
flanked the roads in the centre of the town. African and Indian-origin chauffeurs, butlers, 
domestic servants and nannies bustled around St Denis in the day time before going back 
to their own quarters behind the main houses, or to the “camps” on the outskirts of St 
Denis. Other women spent the day at the St Denis river, scrubbing the sheets and 
tablecloths of the ‘grand families’ and laying them out to dry on the rocks.  
Just after crossing the St Denis river, the train halted at the barracks of Petite Ile, 
also known as Camp des Noirs (the black’s camp). Next to the barracks was a highly 
odorous “manure” factory. Prisoners of the St Denis jail spent their days delivering the 
takings of grand family pisspots to men from Camp des Noirs. Many of the men working 
at the factory were descendants of Malagasy indentured laborers who had come to labor 
at the Colonial public works building in Camp des Noirs, before it had been disbanded 
years before. 
Emerging from the 11km tunnel which separated St Denis from the west of the 
island, and covered in a light dusting of soot, the train and its passengers crossed the 
deserted rocky stones at the foothills of the north west’s dramatic mountainscape. They 
stopped off at Le Port, the island’s only port where hundreds of men came from all over 
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the west to work on the docks when boats came in once a week. After crossing the 300m 
long railway bridge above the stony Rivière des Galets, the train skirted the foothills of 
the western cane-growing area of St Paul. The leeward west was much drier than the east 
of the island, and the savannah grass shone yellow in the sun. Perhaps as the train slowed 
its rhythm, skirting the precipitous black volcanic cliffs of the western coast which 
dropped straight down to the ocean, Raphaella might have remembered the song that she 
and her sister had invented as adolescent girls, and often sung together, about the 
resourcefulness of Réunion Islanders during the island’s poverty stricken experience of 
World War II which had ended only two years previously. 
La guerre, c'est la misère   War, it makes us poor 
Du riz n'a plus, i mangent maïs There’s no more rice, we have to eat 
corn 
...      ... 
La guerre c'est la misère   War, it makes us poor 
Quand la toile l'avait point   When there was no more cloth 
Nous la met goni    We had to put on sacks 
Manioc avec patate    Cassava and potatoes 
Nous la debate    We argued over them 
Les dames allaient a la messe,  The women went to mass 
Les robes en fil aloes    With their woven aloe dress 
Les gros bracelets en bois   With big wood bracelets  
Et les sacs en vacoa    And bags made from pandanus 
…      … 
La guerre c'est la misère   War, it makes you poor 
Quand du sel n'avait point   When there was no more salt  
Nous la fait bouille l'eau de mer  We boiled water from the sea 
…      … 
Dans les usines i coulent   And the factories 
Plus que pistaches et bancoules  Only burn peanuts and candlenuts 
Zarabe i vend tomates   Zarabes sell tomatoes 




The train rounded finally into the station at St Gilles les Bains as Mr. Govindin the 
station master flagged it down.9 
i. Background to the train journey:  
As Raphaella Boyer was only too well aware, in 1947 the vast majority of Réunion 
Island’s population was extremely poor. Material conditions had not changed much since 
the Second World War, when Islanders had been forced to make their own clothes from 
aloes leaves, and to live off a meager diet of fruit, corn and root crops, with little or no 
meat. Réunion Islanders who generally made a living from importing goods to sell had 
been forced to change their trade as no more boats arrived on the island. Raphaella’s song 
described Zarabes, people of Muslim Indian origin who usually worked in the textile and 
hardware trades, incongruously having to sell vegetables. Similarly, Chinese-origin 
Islanders who had come to dominate the dry goods retail sector were reduced to making 
and selling wooden clogs. Rice and salt, which were imported from other French colonies 
were unavailable and had to be substituted locally by other ingenious means. 
In 1948 Réunion was the most populated of the new Overseas Departments at 
about 223,000 inhabitants.10 Workers' houses were usually thatched huts or paillottes and 
only had one or two rooms for living in. An exterior kitchen or boucan was also made of 
thatch and was separate from the main house. However these living conditions were 
precarious. The proportion of Réunionnais babies who died before their first birthday was 
approximately twice as high as the other French Overseas Departments as well as 
                                                 
 
9 Interview Raphaella Bottard 2008 
10 This is back-estimated from the INSEE census of 1954 which is more reliable than that of 1948. The 
1954 census gives DOM populations as: Réunion 274,370, Martinique 239,130, Guadeloupe 229,120 and 
Guyane 27,863. CAC 19940180/253 INSEE à M. Perillier Ingénieur Général de l'ADIN en mission 
extraordinaire pour les DOM 02/03/1955 
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Réunion Island’s neighbor, the British colony of Mauritius.11 There were only thirty 
doctors working on the island, and Islanders only had an average life expectancy of 53 
years.12 In comparison, life expectancy in Metropolitan France was 66½.13  
There had been a significant decrease in profitable agricultural production since 
the 2nd world war and Réunion’s Vichy Regime had been blockaded by the British until 
1943. Thousands of acres of sugar cane had been ripped out to produce food crops for 
subsistence.14 By 1947 Réunion’s sugar cane production still had not recovered to pre-
war levels: production had declined from 73,600 tons in 1939 to 68,000 tons in 1946.15 In 
1948 there were still fourteen sugar factories on the island, underlining the importance of 
competing economic fiefdoms in La Réunion. 
Réunion Island’s train line had been built in 1871, sixty years previously, in a 
last-gasp effort to stimulate the island’s sugar economy. Even though it was very old, it 
was an important mode of transport. The train had been built too late, however, to rescue 
Réunion’s industrial decline, caused by the price of sugar on the world market and the 
favorable treatment given to sugar beet producers in France. The later monopoly trade 
agreement between Réunion and France in 1892 had only worsened the overall export 
situation from Réunion even if it had protected the price of Réunion’s sugar.16 As the 
                                                 
 
11 Figures for beginning of 1950s in Magali Barbieri and Christine Catteau, "Changes in Infant Mortality in 
Réunion in the Last Fifty Years," Population (English Edition) 58, no. 2 (2003). 
12 CAC 19940180/240 Préfet de La Réunion Pierre Philip à M. le ministre de l'intérieur. Objet : situation de 
mon département 26/2/1954 
13 André Scherer, "La population de la Réunion," Population (French Edition), 10e Année, no. 3 (1955). 
14 ADR 57 W 33 Note de Directeur de la Caisse Centrale de la France d'Outre-mer à la Réunion. 
Confidentielle. Activité dans le domaine de l'habitat. Expériences de constructions de logements d'urgence 
(type F2 Bossu) 09/03/1955  
15 CAC 19940180/9 Documentation sur le Département de La Réunion et la ville de Saint-Denis à 
l'occasion du voyage du Général de Gaulle juillet 1959. Les opérations du FIDOM et de la Caisse Centrale 
à La Réunion  
16 CAC 19840179/70 Henri Cornu à Bourillon, Direction des Affaires Economiques, 28/12/1951 ; SP 9 DE 
1 Henri Cornu à Michel Debré Confidentiel: introduction à la vie réunionnaise 11/04/1963 
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profitability of sugar declined, smaller landowners had found themselves increasingly in 
debt. Raphaella’s Petit Blanc family had probably, like many others, ended up as 
sharecroppers on their old land.  
In 2008 I visited Mme Raphaella Bottard, now in her late eighties but very alert 
and still taking time to sing, in her house in St Gilles les Bains. I asked her to explain 
what she thought of France at the time of the 1946 law  
Heloise Finch: Did you ever think of France when you were young? 
… 
Raphaella Bottard: Yes, I had heard of France but we didn’t give it any 
importance [nous la pas fait trop un compte avec ça]. They talked about France, I 
sang the Marseillaise, there was the French flag, but whether I knew anything … 
in Bois Blanc, there was nobody to give us an education, nothing at all! There we 
were, over there in Bois Blanc, over there in our little hole [notre petit trou].17 
 
Even if Raphaella Bottard knew she was French, and had voted for the first time in the 
1945 elections like most other French women, she had grown up in a very rural part of 
Réunion, and French education was not freely available to all. Her knowledge of France 
did not extend much further than recognition of the flag, and ability to sing the national 
anthem. 
The way Mme Bottard thought about France and French state actors during her 
childhood is highly reminiscent of stories that historians have gathered elsewhere in 
colonial Africa. Mme Bottard told me how she used to fear the gendarmes, the French 
colonial policemen who would occasionally patrol in her rural village during the 1930s. 
We were afraid of the gendarmes, we were kids! Ah, ah! If the police came, if we 
just heard the motorbike … I ran to hide! Sometimes I would be gathering wood 
for cooking the food, and I carried my wood pile on my head, and if I heard a 
motorbike “po po po po” … I’d throw the wood on the ground and run off and 
                                                 
 
17 I used a French-style orthography for Creole transcriptions 
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hide, I wouldn’t move a muscle! I was scared … scared, I tell you! I’d come out 
when I heard the gendarme going back off to Sainte Rose!  
 
And of course we’d all heard of the red car that came to take the kids, and when 
we heard a red car… hidden! Didn’t move, because there was the car that came to 
take the kids, and it would take us!18 
 
As a child in Bois Blanc, Mme Bottard had heard that a red car came to take the children 
away.19 She was afraid of the soldiers, and of the police. She couldn’t explain her fear of 
the police, but said it was partly because she didn’t know what police questioning (un 
procès verbal) was and she was scared of it.20 Other Réunion Islanders who had already 
spent time in school, or who lived nearer the seat of colonial government in St Denis 
were more used to the idea of France, and had met colonial officials. We should not 
devalue Mme Bottard’s account of a very real childhood fear, as some kind of make-
believe, something that never happened.21 Her youthful certainty that a child-eating red 
car existed, and her fear of French colonial officials who could wield untold power with 
unknown words underlines the many different systems of knowledge circulating in La 
Réunion about France and its intentions on the island. On the eve of the French 
assimilation of Réunion Island in 1946, some Réunion Islanders understood French 
colonial power as terrifying and unknown.  
 In this way, Réunion Islanders had a very different social and economic 
experience of France than that of French peasants in Metropolitan France between 1870 
and 1914 who became assimilated into a national French community through education, 
                                                 
 
18 Interview Mme Raphaella Bottard 18/9/2008 
19 Many other Réunion Islanders I interviewed also knew about or had heard of the nefarious “l’auto rouge” 
20 The Procès-Verbal is a detailed authenticated account which can be drawn up by a police officer, 
magistrate or other authority, and can involve questioning 
21 White, Speaking with vampires : rumor and history in colonial Africa. 
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and the arrival of modern infrastructure.22 It was legally possible for all Réunionnais 
whatever their racial origins, to purchase land, work in the civil service, or vote. 
Nevertheless, the plantation system of production had created historical social 
inequalities and racial barriers which were deeply enshrined in practice, if not in law. 
Only 1 % of the population of Réunion Island had a secondary-level education or higher. 
Just over half of Réunion’s population was totally illiterate, 35% knew how to read and 
write and a mere 9% had completed primary school level studies.23 
Yet it would be incorrect to assume that Réunion in 1946 was directly comparable 
to rural Metropolitan France before the Revolution or in 1870.24 Although Republican 
education had not been universally and freely available to Réunion Islanders, by 1946 
Réunion had similar, if more outdated, industrial and technical infrastructure as 
Metropolitan France. Many Réunion Islanders had also fought in the First and Second 
World Wars. Most of Réunion’s populations had radically different cultural origins and 
social experiences than Metropolitan French peasants, which were further shaped by the 
areas they lived in Réunion and the type of work they undertook. These factors would 
ensure that Réunion’s assimilation into Metropolitan France would not prove to be a copy 




                                                 
 
22 Eugen Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen : the modernization of rural France, 1870-1914 (Stanford, 
Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1976). 
23 CAC 19940180/9 Préfecture de La Réunion, Situation démographique de La Réunion, 01/06/1957 
24 Johannes Fabian, Time and the other : how anthropology makes its object (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1983). 
 
  54
III. Governance by the Creole landholding elite in Réunion 
Most Réunion Islanders were extremely poor agricultural workers in 1947. Either they 
did seasonal agricultural work, or they lived on the landowners’ land and farmed as 
sharecroppers. Sharecroppers gave 1/3 of the harvest to their landowner and they were 
paid annually for the rest. Either way most Réunion Islanders did not own the land they 
worked on. This put them in relations of debt and obligation to property owners and 
landlords.  
Creole elites were mostly large landowners, many of whom were involved in 
governing Réunion. Large landowners and business elites wished for politicians who 
would maintain the status quo favoring economic development over social legislation. 
They did not welcome the idea of French social legislation in Réunion. Because of their 
economic power, property owners and landlords were able to pressure desperately poor 
Réunion Islanders to vote for their political choices. They had significant social influence 
and economic power over these extremely poor Réunion Islanders because they owned 
the land, and the possibility of employment in rural areas. The power of the landowning 
elites meant that workers were beholden to them for their material needs. Landowners 
could also favor certain families over others. This ensured that agricultural workers did 
not group together to improve their conditions collectively. These rural social relations 
can be seen in the types of housing that people lived in. Scattered, self-sufficient 
homesteads were the most common rural form of housing.  
i. Rural housing design  
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The labor conditions of the majority of rural Réunionnais agricultural workers and 
sharecroppers were very similar. Their living conditions differed considerably depending 
on the solidity of their houses. House construction varied according to the building 
materials which were available in the region. They also depended on the resources of the 
householder, and the availability of wood or other solid building materials. The spatial 
arrangements of Réunionnais worker houses points to their desire for domestic privacy. 
The design of the houses often included garden walls to mark the private domestic 
sphere, and each house had its own animal shelter and kitchen. Unless the members of 
the same family lived in a courtyard, groups of houses almost never faced each other. 
Rather, houses were scattered across rural areas with each house in its own space.  
The spatial arrangement of the houses and homesteads underlines the self-
sufficiency of rural Réunion Islanders. Islanders were more reliant on landowners and 
politicians than on neighbors for the resolution of differences. Neighborhoods were 






1) Paillottes with thatched 
2) Paillottes with wooden walls and thatched roofs
3) Paillottes with thatched roofs and calumet [woven bamboo] walls
4) Paillottes with earth walls
5) Houses with vacoa roofs
6) Houses with earth walls and cane leaf roofs
7) African-type villages
8) Shantytowns and miserable paillottes
9) Residential houses in wood and wood shingles
10) Houses with wood and wood shingles with vetiver [thatched] roofs
11) Residential houses with red [metal] roofs
12) Residential villas
13) Residential villas with red 
14) Uninhabited region 
Table 2.1 
 























The numbers above correspond to the numbered patterns on Figure 2.1, indicating the 
building materials of houses in different areas of Réunion.25 As Figure 2.1 shows, the 
building materials for houses varied depending on the region. The map was completed by 
a Metropolitan French geographer named Jean Defos du Rau who came to Réunion in the 
mid 1950s to write a PhD on the human geography of Réunion. He mapped and 
photographed many types of houses on the island. Many of the following photographs 
were taken by Defos du Rau for his study of human geography in Réunion or by Jean-
Claude Allaire, the first Metropolitan French urban planner and architect to write a 
regional study of Réunion in 1964.26  
The poorest workers in Réunion lived in cramped collective housing or calbanons 
built by the landowner or factory owner.  Such collective housing was a legacy from 19th 
century housing made for slaves or indentured laborers.27  Families often only had one 
room each. In Figure 2.2 below, each window corresponds to a one-room house in a 
calbanon.28 Each family has fenced off their section of the house with bamboo or grasses, 
to make some privacy. The householder on the left of the photo has created more privacy 
by making a solid garden gate, from a flattened tin barrel. The women and girls outside 
the calbanons are barefoot, indicating their poverty. The household behind the women 
and girls in the middle has constructed what appears to be a thatched paillotte in the front 
garden to create more space for the family, probably to house a young couple. 
                                                 
 
25 Jean Defos du Rau, L'île de la Réunion Etude de géographie humaine (Bordeaux: Inst. de Géographie, 
1960). 
26 See ADR 447 W 90 La Réunion, Enquête Monographique Régionale 1964 and Jean-Claude Allaire and 
Françoise Allaire, La Réunion (1967). 
27 Conseil d'architecture d'urbanisme et d'environnement de La Réunion and Compain, 350 ans 
d'architecture à l'île de la Réunion : un panorama réalisé par le CAUE. 




Figure 2.3 Collective housing near Le Gol sugar factory c1956 
 
Although calbanons existed all over Réunion in urban and rural areas, the majority of the 
poorest Réunion Islanders were not housed collectively, but lived in individual paillottes, 
houses made entirely out of local thatch, sometimes with wooden walls. In 1948 
landowners considered that these types of houses were the most suited for the 
Réunionnais working population, even if they were fragile and susceptible to high winds. 
Grass houses (paillottes) create astonishment, indignation even, from visiting 
Metropolitans [yet they are] far and away the best adapted constructions for the 
country’s climatic conditions. Given the small temperature differences … the 
grass houses with the overhanging sloping roofs on earth walls keep coolest in the 
day … the management have however given up with these types of construction 
which have to be rebuilt almost every year and end up being costly.29  
 
The landowners admitted that Metropolitan French visitors regarded the presence of grass 
houses or paillottes as scandalous in Réunion. Indeed, a decade later when Defos du Rau 
visited Réunion for his study, he classified the villages where the majority of houses were 
paillottes as “African-type villages” (see Map Key for Figure 2.1). Implicitly he did not 
                                                 
 
29 AESD 24BVI/1 Notes sur les problèmes sociaux dans les usines de la Mare, de Savannah et de Grand 
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consider them as being French or even Creole, but very poor and thus “African”, or 
backward (Defos du Rau also created another category for “shantytowns and miserable 
paillottes” which occurred in urban areas of La Réunion. Representations of urban 
housing will be discussed in Chapter 3). 
Defos du Rau’s map and the landowners’ discussions highlight the differences 
between Réunionnais and Metropolitan French housing norms in 1948, and also their 
contrasting attitudes towards worker comfort. Creole elites considered that the paillotte 
was sufficient shelter for workers, although they lived in considerably more luxurious 
houses. Metropolitans were shocked by the social and material differences between the 
landowning class and the working classes in Réunion a difference which Creole elites 
took for granted.  
 
 




Figure 2.4 shows a paillotte built from bushes of vetiver grass tied on to a wood frame 
typical of lowland, coastal Réunion.30 The paillotte is situated on the stony, dry savannah 
of Pierrefonds, in the southwest of the island. It has a little white curtain in the doorway, 
a touch of domestic pride. Behind the paillotte are banana trees and probably other fruit 
trees. To the left of the house is a sugar cane cart made to be drawn by oxen or zebu, 
suggesting that the occupier is a cane sharecropper. Large rocks have been used to make 
a natural barrier around the occupier’s house.  
Rural Réunion homes were usually built on similar homestead models. Almost all 
houses had a separate kitchen or boucan to avoid cooking fires setting the house alight, 
and as a place to smoke meat. Figure 2.54 below shows a highland paillotte and its 
adjacent, smaller boucan in the foreground.31 The householder has demarcated part of the 
courtyard with rocks, underneath the trees in the middle of the picture. The house is 
constructed far from its nearest neighbor, and facing a different direction, underlining the 
Réunionnais preference for living privately, far from neighbors. 
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Figure 2.5 Highland paillotte with adjoining boucan 
 
The majority of poor Réunionnais lived in these types of paillottes in 1947. 
Comparatively richer workers constructed some or all of their houses with wood. These 
people often fenced off their gardens with aloes, bamboo, or stone. Figures 2.5 through 
2.9 below show the wooden paillottes of more affluent rural householders. All the 
paillottes have solid walls made of wood shingle, packed earth or a native Réunionnais 
bamboo known as calumet (nastus borbonicus).  
 
  
Figure 2.6 Thatched house with wood shingle walls 
 
Although they are not clearly shown on these photographs, e
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Figure 2.8 Thatched 
 
Figure 2.8 Thatched house with woven 
constructed a thatched kitchen or 
animal shelter in the right of 
bamboo. The additional barbed wire fence on the right of the photo suggests that the 
householder was rich enough to purchase this, rather than use 
Figure 2.8 below shows a house made of sugar cane thatch and earth walls in Champ
Borne in northeastern Reunion. The trees behind the house are vacoas. Opposite the 
house is another structure which could be the boucan.  The photog
people lived in the house. 
 
house with woven calumet walls on the west coast
calumet walls on . The householder 
boucan in the far left of the photo, and probably 
the photo. The boundary of the house is partly 
local building materials.













Figure 2.9 Sugar cane thatched house with earth walls in northeastern lowlands 
 
Wood was more expensive, and shows that the householder had more money to spend on 
building materials.33 Richer rural Réunionnais who owned their own plots of land were 
often able to afford an entire house made of wood shingles, or wood planks, set on a 
stone base. In Figure 2.10.9 below the thatched house has been constructed over wood 
plank walls. The barriers of the garden are made from kader a local aloes. Figure 2.11 
Small landowner’s house, Etang Salé les Hauts in southwest Réunion, surrounded by 
sugar cane.34 The landowner has added a small lean-to extension to the back of the house, 
suggesting that the family has grown since the original house was built. 
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Figure 2.10 Thatched house with wood plank walls and kader garden barrier 
 
 
Figure 2.11 Small landowner’s house, Etang Salé les Hauts  
 
In Figure 2.9 below the landowner in Cilaos, highland Réunion has combined two types 
of building styles – square and pointed roofs – in an entirely wooden house. It was easier 
to build in wood in the highlands of Réunion, and residents of the Cilaos cirque had 
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easier access to remaining forests. Building adjoining extensions to the house was 
common when householders needed to enlarge their house for a growing family. Here the 
landowner’s house is surrounded by vines – Cilaos is the only region in Réunion where it 
is possible to make wine.  
 
 
Figure 2.12 Small landowner’s house, Cilaos 
 
In contrast the richest landowners were able to build their houses entirely from tropical 
hardwoods. From the late 19th century, Creole elites had to import tropical hardwoods to 
Réunion from Madagascar to build their houses, as Réunion’s stocks were depleted. In 
Figure 2.12 the rural house of the landowner is built around a central four-sloped roof in 
a similar style to in Figure 2.9. Extensions were subsequently added to the sides of the 
house and possibly to the back of the house.35 
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Figure 2.13 Large landowner’s rural house 
 
Figure 2.13 below was taken around 1962, when most of the paillottes had started to be 
replaced by corrugated iron houses. However the photograph shows how settlements in 
rural Réunion were laid out.36 The houses in Bellemène are constructed on uncultivable 
rocky savannah, above the coastal sugar cane and coconut plantations of St Paul. All the 
houses are arranged facing east and west, to gain the maximum ventilation from the 
western sea breeze during the day, and the eastern land breeze during the night. 
Significantly, none of the houses face each other, even if they are in a family 
cluster. Rather, they are all facing the same way, and spread out from each other. 
Although types of house varied in Réunion these photographs demonstrate that Réunion 
Islanders all built their houses on the homestead model. Even if they were joined in 
collective housing, homesteads were independent units, fenced off from neighbors, or at 
least not facing them, even if family members lived in a cluster. This demonstrates that 
Réunion Islanders were protective of their privacy and their domestic lives.  
                                                 
 




Figure 2.14 View of St Paul from the hamlet of Bellemène, c1962 
 
Although rural Islanders preferred to live independently, the collective labor imposed by 
their living conditions required sociability during the day. Many Réunionnais women 
were obliged to collect drinking water from outdoor fountains, or met at the river to wash 
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clothes. As Figures 2.14 and 2.15 show, the women pictured were extremely poor, 
carrying water in tin barrels. None of them could afford to buy shoes, leaving them 
susceptible to foot-borne parasites.37 
 
Figure 2.15 Washing clothes at Le Gol, western Réunion 
  
 
Figure 2.16 The water chore in La Saline 
 
Figure 2.16 shows a long line of men and ox-drawn carts with wooden wheels waiting for 
their contents of sugar cane to be weighed at Le Gol sugar factory. Only 23km of about 
1,800 km of roads were asphalted in 1948, so lorries were not generally used. Much was 
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still transported by head. Not only were cane sharecroppers and farmers paid at the end of 
the year, forcing them to live on credit, but sugar prices were set by the factory owners 
without negotiation.  
 
Figure 2.17 Ox-carts full of sugar cane waiting to be weighed in Le Gol 
 
 
Figure 2.18 Bringing in the boats in St Gilles les Bains 
 
Figure 2.17 shows a fishing boat brought up the beach in St Gilles les Bains.38 The 
photograph was used for an early tourist brochure in the 1960s. However the picturesque 
scene does not explain that most fishermen in St Gilles did not own the boats they 
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worked on. The fishing boats were owned by a local Indian-origin shopkeeper who also 
sold the catch. The fishermen were paid poorly and spent their wages on daily necessities 
in their boss’s shop, living on credit for the rest of the month. This system enabled the 
shopkeeper to gradually become the largest landowner in St Gilles les Bains as he 
accepted small plots of land in return for debts incurred in his shop. His workers thus 
gradually also became his tenants, underlining the fundamental importance of landlord 
and tenant obligation in rural Réunion. 
Whether sharecroppers, agricultural workers, day laborers or fishermen the 
majority of poor rural Réunion Islanders were tenants. They relied on their landowner’s 
goodwill to keep their livelihood, and to stay in their houses. They were often forced to 
live off credit, because they were paid poorly or infrequently. The most important 
landowners expected tenants and employees to vote for their choice at election time. 
Rural relations of governance were thus structured around labor constraints, lack 
of financial resources, and political pressure. Although African, European, Chinese and 
Indian-origin Réunionnais lived and worked side by side, all Réunionnais preferred to 
live in individual, independent homesteads, often with other family members. This 
preference influenced the relations between landlords and tenants. In the rural areas, rural 
governance was based on landlord-tenant paternalism which was a much stronger 
political force than group organizations such as political parties or trade unions.  
ii. Politics in the rural areas 
In the 1950s, a Prefect described rural governance in Réunion to the Minister of the 
Interior in the following terms. “Properly speaking, there are no formed political parties 
(parties politiques constitués) apart from the Communist Party. We are in the presence of 
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clan warfare where the followers go from one [clan] to the other depending on the 
influence of the local personalities and the interests at stake.”39 The use of “clan” is 
typical in colonial arguments where administrators sought to de-value and de-legitimize 
the use of politics in the colonies. However the large landowners enabled had significant 
power over their workers, effectively creating clan followings based on landholding.  
In the lowlands of Reunion, where the climate supported the cultivation of sugar 
cane, agricultural life was structured around large plantations and smaller land where 
sharecroppers worked. As a Prefect noted in 1951, “the latifundia [i.e. the landowners] 
share out the land …. The poor worker cannot nourish the hope of owning his domicile 
because the land does not belong to him and the price of a tin barrel [for building his 
house] represents the equivalent of half a day’s work.”40 Only the rich could buy land. 
The poorest workers could only hope to acquire land through the patronage of 
landowners.  
Sharecropping or working in a factory constrained workers to live as tenants on 
land belonging to someone else. Workers and sharecroppers had the right to erect a house 
on their employer’s land and to cultivate their own food crops. In return, they were paid 
weekly if they were workers. If they were sharecroppers, they were not paid until the end 
of the year, after they had given one third of the harvest to their landowners. All tenants 
and sharecroppers were expected to vote for the political choice of the landowner. The 
grandson of Mr. M (the Comorian described in Raphaella Boyer’s train journey) 
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remembered how voting was strongly linked to land tenancy and employment for sugar 
cane workers around the La Mare sugar factory in Ste Marie during the 1950s. 
You didn’t pay any rent or anything, but the house belonged to La Mare. If your 
kids needed a house later, the owner would give you a house, but you had to [vote 
for his choice] whether you wanted to or not, you had to [politically support] him. 
If you didn’t want to, he would sack you and then tell you to find another house 
away from the factory. Ou paye pas ni le loyer ni rien, ça c'est la case La Mare, 
ça … le z'enfants, té rode un ti case, i donne aou un ti case, té oblige mars pou li, 
si ou veu, ou ve pas, té oblige mars pou li … ou té obligé … si ou vé pas, i renvoye 
aou plus i di aou sort de l'etablisman.41 
 
Remuneration for workers at La Mare or other large properties consisted of the 
right to have a house, and sometimes included food allocations for the week – perhaps 
five kilos of rice per person in the house, two kilograms of peas, dried fish, oil and lard. 
In addition there was a small amount of cash.42 However sharecroppers were not paid 
until the harvest at the end of the year. Many people lived on credit throughout the year, 
buying their daily necessities in tiny amounts from the plantation shop, or local grocery 
store. This system of deferred payment ensured that workers were tied into debt towards 
shop owners and towards landowners for any needs they might have during the year.  
In addition, landowners considered that they had the right to direct the voting 
choices of the workers who lived on their land to ensure social and political stability. In a 
1948 memorandum, a group of large landowners discussed the best ways of controlling 
the political opinions of the laborers on their land. The landowners linked political 
control to the types of houses people lived in, and their proximity to the factory. They 
considered that the ideal, politically passive worker lived around the Grand Bois factory 
in southern Réunion. The landowners had given the workers of Grand Bois the right to 
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set up their houses in a group near the factory – they had given their workers land. The 
workers had not had to purchase it.  
As they lived nearby, the landowners judged that the political opinions of the 
workers were easier to control. “The large majority of the workers live in neat wooden 
houses, surrounded by a garden which they own … for the last fifty years there have been 
no [political] difficulties from this” said the landowners.  
The landowners contrasted the politically stable atmosphere of the workers in 
Grand Bois with Eperon near St Paul in the west of the island and at La Mare near Ste 
Marie. Workers in these areas supported the Communist party. The landowners 
correlated their political views with their residence. These workers’ houses were 
dispersed amongst the cane fields. The workers were not owners of the land their houses 
were built on. The landowners judged that if they could regroup the Eperon workers in a 
3km circle around the factory, and then allow them to own their plots of land, worker 
support for the Communist party would diminish. “The construction of a workers’ town 
unfortunately seems to be [politically] necessary for the personnel and their families, 
about 800 to 1,000 people” concluded the landowners.43  
The land and factory owners thus had significant social and political influence 
over many poor, illiterate and economically exploited Islanders. This became even more 
important when landowners and factory owners entered into local politics. Their workers 
were under even more pressure to politically support them, and vote for them, as Mr. M 
remembered.  
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My family didn’t [take a public stand] in politics, not even my old man, not even 
my granddad ... you were obliged [to vote for the factory owner]! Everyone on the 
place had to vote for him … or you acted like you voted for him ... in that way no-
one knew ... Pas de politique, même pas mon vieux, même pas mon grand père … 
- té oblige [voter pour le propriétaire]! Tout de moun sur le tablisman, tout le 
monde té oblige vote pou li, ou vote pou li … ou fait comme si ou vote pou li ... 
comme ça, personne i conné pas.44 
The important thing to do was to pretend to have voted for the boss, and not to mention 
the Communists. Communist meetings were held outside the factory (l’etablisman) and 
people attended in secret.  
When the Communist party had meetings, no one would have attended if they 
were held on the factory land. They had to hold the meetings elsewhere, you see, 
in more hidden places.  On the factory land, the Communists weren’t [even] 
allowed to hold meetings. Quand ca té fait la réunion communiste, personne té 
vient pas, faut pas faire la réunion dans l'etablisman, i fé en dehors, ou wa, dans 
des endroits retirés, mais dans l’etablisman, les communistes ont pas le droit ça.45 
 
The slowly growing Communist party was not welcomed in the factory of La Mare in the 
1950s and had to hold meetings elsewhere. The Communist party directly threatened the 
landed interests by supporting the application of French social legislation to Réunion. 
iii.  Alternatives to governance by landholding in Réunion 
Although systems of governance in Réunion were strongly based around landholding, the 
1946 assimilation law offered a new alternative: the possibility of applying French social 
legislation to Réunion. The left wing political group in Réunion championed this option, 
but was opposed by the landholders and by the Catholic Church. 
 The left-wing political group in Réunion was not closely represented by 
landholding elites but it had won elections in 1945, and its two deputies represented 
Réunion in the 1946 debates in the French Constituent Assembly. The left wing 
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supported the assimilation of Réunion to France and the rights of working Réunionnais to 
immediately benefit from French social legislation. This was optimistic. The French 
administration in Réunion was only a tiny presence from the end of 1947 and had limited 
influence on policy and finances in Metropolitan France at that time. 
 The left wing in Réunion was led by Dr Raymond Vergès, the deputy who had 
voted for the island’s assimilation in 1946. He was a white Creole born in Réunion Island 
from an educated urban family, without the landed power base of most politicians on the 
island. After being educated in Réunion, Vergès left the island to train as an engineer in 
Paris. He worked for the French colonial administration in Indochina. After his first wife 
died of malaria there, he cohabited with a woman from Annam. They had two children 
together, Jacques and Paul Vergès who were born around 1922. In keeping with colonial 
anxieties about local female companions of colonial employees and fears of métissage or 
mixed race children, Raymond Vergès was widely criticized for living with his 
companion. This led to his dismissal from his colonial post in Indochina in 1929.46 
 Returning to Réunion in the early 1930s Raymond Vergès practiced as a doctor. 
His political thinking about the influence of France in the colonies was influenced not 
only by his dismissal from the French colonial service, but also by two prominent anti-
colonial leaders who had been exiled from their homelands by the French and lived in 
Réunion. Raymond Vergès frequented both Abd El Krim and the Prince of Annam who 
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both lived in exile in St Denis.47 Abd El Krim was leader of a wide-scale armed 
resistance movement against French and Spanish colonial rule in North Africa. He was 
exiled in Réunion from 1926 to 1947, before escaping to Egypt on his way from Réunion 
to the Metropole. Raymond Vergès and his sons frequently visited the house of Abd El 
Krim in Réunion during the 1930s, and Jacques and Paul Vergès attended school with 
Abd El Krim’s son. Contact with Abd El Krim was a major influence on the political 
education of Raymond Vergès’ sons and also influenced Dr Vergès himself.48  
Living in Réunion at the same time was Prince Nguyễn Phúc Vĩnh San. He had 
been crowned Emperor Duy Tan of Indochina in 1907 but thanks to his anti-French 
sentiments, he was deposed, reduced in rank, and exiled to Reunion in 1916 by the 
French. He was a symbol of the Vietnamese anticolonialist movement against the French 
before and during World War I. Although under house arrest in St Denis, he was a 
member of St Denis bourgeois society, and knew Raymond Vergès. Although Prince 
Vĩnh San died in 1945 in an airplane accident, his descendants in St Denis also privately 
supported anti-French movements in Indochina.49 
Vergès was not solely influenced by Metropolitan French politics; he took part in 
the French Front Populaire movement in Réunion during the 1930s, but was also aware 
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of worldwide anticolonial movements against the French, thanks to his experience in 
Indochina and the presence of anticolonial exiles in Réunion. 50 
After World War II Vergès co-founded a new political party called the Comité 
Républicain d’Action Démocratique et Sociale (CRADS) which supported the legal 
assimilation of Réunion to France and the extension of French social legislation to 
Réunion. Despite the fact that the landowners feared that French social legislation would 
spell economic disaster for the island, in 1945 CRADS still won a landslide victory in 
city council and General Council elections. CRADS also won Réunion’s only two seats 
for the National Assembly.  As Mayor of St Denis in 1946, Vergès made the radical 
proposal that the sugar and rum industries be nationalized.51 A few weeks later Vergès 
and Leon de Lepervanche, the other Réunionnais deputy, voted for Réunion’s 
assimilation to France in March 1946 (see Introduction). However Vergès was quickly 
disenchanted.  Metropolitan France did not consider that Réunion was a priority. Events 
in 1946 would add to his disenchantment and motivated him to create a radical left-wing 
party. 
These events created a political chasm between the landholding interests and the 
supporters of French social legislation in Réunion. In 1946 the landholder’s candidate for 
a National Assembly seat, Alexis de Villeneuve, was assassinated. His murder became a 
political running sore in Réunion. Dr Vergès’ son Paul was the prime suspect. The link 
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was never proved yet Paul Vergès still received a suspended sentence.52 The shooting of 
de Villeneuve divided the political scene in Réunion in to two bitterly opposing groups.  
The opposition to Verges’ CRADS party was composed of the urban economic 
elites and the landowners. Their party was the RPF (Rassemblement du Peuple Français) 
headed by Jean Chatel, a landowner, and Jules Olivier, a Metropolitan Frenchman who 
had emigrated to Réunion. They opposed assimilation with France. Urban middle classes 
in Réunion were a small minority and did not have a specific political party that 
represented their interests.  
In 1947 Vergès’ CRADS party lost five of its twelve city councils in the elections. 
Vergès claimed that full assimilation with France was not going quickly enough and was 
being “sabotaged” by the Metropole. Indeed, by 1947 no French social legislation had 
been applied in Réunion and the Metropole seemed disinterested in promoting social 
equality there. By the end of 1947 Vergès disbanded CRADS. He decided to create a 
political group in Réunion which could align with the French Communist Party (PCF), at 
a moment when the PCF was at the height of its political power in the French National 
Assembly.  
However, members of Réunion’s center-left who had supported the CRADS were 
less keen to be connected to the explicitly Communist ideas of the PCF. Many bourgeois 
Catholic moderates who had supported CRADS and Vergès were now uncomfortable 
with the party’s radical new label of Communist.53 With the loss of his moderate 
educated backing, Vergès had to recruit support from sharecroppers, dockers, railway 
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workers and public works employees. In contrast to the CRADS, the Communists’ 
political base was increasingly formed of people who did not directly work for 
landowners who opposed the Communists.  
The chasm between Communists and the anti-Communists (i.e. landowners and 
economic elites) grew deeper in Réunion. It also affected rural life, as demonstrated 
through the following account of Nelson Dijoux’s family. Nelson Dijoux was 12 in 1947 
and lived with his sharecropping family in a paillotte in Ouaki near St Louis in the 
southwest of Réunion. His ancestors were mostly African-origin, although he had a 
Corsican grandfather. His father’s family had been sharecropping for three generations in 
Ouaki, and his mother’s family had always worked for the Catholic Church in the village 
of Tampon. However his mother’s family stopped working in the Church after joining 
Réunion’s Communist Party in 1947.  
Like Raphaella Boyer, Nelson Dijoux had started his working life at seven years 
of age looking after cattle. His parents tried sending him to school when he was nine, but 
he missed tending his animals and only lasted two days. He was mocked by the other 
boys in the school for being older than them and for being poor: he only had a calabash to 
carry his food. The other boys had tin pots, given to their parents as electoral sweeteners 
by the right wing political party in St Louis. For Nelson Dijoux, racial inequality between 
white Creoles and people with his Kaf, or African, ancestry was blatant in 1948, and it 
motivated his parents’ support of the Communist Party and their agenda of social change. 
Popular entertainment was segregated in Nelson Dijoux’s village between the black 
people’s dance bal pour les noirs and the white people’s dances bal pour les blancs. A 
Kaf could only go to a white dance if he was working there as a waiter or a musician, and 
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was not to chat or look at women, only to serve “like the slave ... That hurts, because we 
are all equal”, he remembered. Dijoux’s experience of political and racial segregation in 
the countryside explains why his parents joined the Communist Party which offered a 
new hope for working people in Réunion. 
In Réunion supporting the Communist Party meant making a break with the 
political choices of the landowners. A journalist for Le Monde described the fundamental 
social divisions between Communist and landowner political parties as votes were 
counted in the St Denis election office in November 1948. 
They were more than rivals [they were] hostile. … [there were no electoral 
candidates] other than communist or anticommunist … the delegates … place[d] 
themselves on either side of an invisible line, more [tightly controlled] than a 
border, because no-one crossed the line during the [2 hour] count. Two camps, 
two entrenched camps, in which there were, however, equal numbers of blacks 
and in which there were men who resembled each other, real peasants [like in 
Metropolitan France]… in flannel or cotton drill jackets, which nothing 
presupposed for one side or the other. 54 
 
Although there were two entrenched political camps, the journalist noted that poor black 
Réunion Islanders were as likely to support the landowners as they were the Communist 
Party. This shows that even though the Communist Party had support and was attractive 
for poor agricultural workers, tenant-landowner relations were still very strong. They 
were as likely to influence poor voters’ choices as the promises of the Communist Party, 
and this hampered the growth of the Communist Party.  
Although Vergès’ sons took part in successful Communist activism in Paris, back 
in Réunion Dr Vergès’ aims seemed impossible to attain, given the power of Réunion’s 
landowning and economic elites to defend their interests, and the Metropole’s 
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indifference to Réunion. Vergès sons were actively involved in the Communist Party in 
Metropolitan France. Dr Vergès’ son Paul worked in the Front Uni des Etudiants in 
Paris, and at the Section Coloniale of the French Communist Party a special office which 
coordinated communist activities in the French colonies.55 Jacques Vergès, the other son, 
was also in Paris, and launched the newspaper Etudiants anticolonialistes with a team of 
African, Vietnamese and North African students. Dr Vergès, however, seemed destined 
to fail. The head of Réunion’s gendarmerie observed that “Dr Vergès is driving a paper 
cart against a 60 ton armor-plated tank.”56 Despite the policeman’s doubts, the 
Communist party was destined to become much stronger.  
There were only a handful of Creole elites who did not take an active side in this 
political division between Communists and landowners in 1948. One of these was Henri 
Cornu. Cornu was skeptical about the abilities of the French administration to improve 
the governance of Réunion, but he would be intimately involved in one of the 
administration’s projects in Réunion, the creation of a housing agency in 1949. Cornu 
was a member of Réunion’s urban high society and like Vergès he did not come from a 
landed family. He was not a member of a political party nor was he interested in political 
allegiances. Although he worked for a landowner he was a public figure interested in the 
good governance of Réunion. Unusually he was considered not to be corrupt. He was 
described in Ministry of Finance correspondence as “one of the most efficient and highly-
considered personalities of this Department.”57  
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Cornu had received a French education and like Vergès he had graduated from the 
Ecole Coloniale in Paris, and worked in Congo-Brazzaville, Madagascar and Mayotte 
before returning to Réunion in the 1930s.  He liked the French and was a fervent believer 
in the French civilizing mission. He also supported the goals of the landed interests in 
Réunion which were economic development. 58 Cornu was certainly aware of the poverty 
surrounding him and concerned about the working poor in a paternalistic way.59 Yet 
Cornu doubted that assimilation with France would radically improve Réunion's 
economy. Assimilation did not only mean French social rights. Assimilation would also 
mean fiscal assimilation: the introduction of property tax, import taxes and employer 
contributions for Réunion’s economic elite.  
A final opponent of the Communist Party was the Catholic Church which took a 
virulently anti-Communist political stand after Jacques Foccart visited La Réunion in 
1949. Foccart hastened the diocese’s application of the 1949 Papal decree 
excommunicating Catholics who supported the Communists.60 Foccart was a shadowy 
gangster during the Resistance, and a high Gaullist official with intelligence ties 
throughout Africa for his entire career. He visited Réunion with the intention of 
minimizing Communist influence on the island.61 To the fury of the Communists Foccart 
was instrumental in pushing the bishop of Réunion to publicize this Papal decree. Foccart 
described that “in this extremely religious country ... the effects of the [decree] were 
considerable ... people were asking [mayors] for certificates attesting that they were not 
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Communists, in order to participate in baptisms. ... the bishop’s condemnation of the 
[Communist] newspaper Témoignages reduced the sales considerably.”62 The Church 
influenced local political attitudes towards Communism, but did not, of itself, directly 
influence the election results in the following decade. 
iv. The arrival of the French administration 
After Réunion became a French Overseas Department in 1946 the entire Metropolitan 
French bureaucracy would be recreated in Réunion. This would not occur until 1947. The 
arrival of the French administration threatened the landholding and economic elites, as 
well as the increasingly disenchanted Communist Party. Thus, eighteen months after 
Réunion became a French Overseas Department in 1946 the French administration took 
over from the French colonial governor, in August 1947.63 La Réunion’s last colonial 
governor André Capagorry optimistically described the island as “the torchbearer for the 
great French Union in the Indian Ocean” in a ceremony handing power over to the new 
French Prefect. The new Prefect of La Réunion, Paul Demange took over on the same 
day, 17th August 1947. The French colonial presence on the island had not been 
significant. The influence of the new French bureaucracy in Réunion, headed by the 
Prefect, would be much greater from now on.  
The major issue facing Prefect Demange was how Réunion could suddenly be 
assimilated with the Metropole. 64 Demange recognized the cultural chasm between 
French and Réunionnais ways of living, earning money and dealing in politics. In 
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Réunion economic life revolved around landlord – tenant relations and political life was 
divided between landlord-tenant relations and the Communists. Demange saw that 
assimilation would be difficult, given the two opposing political camps.  
Assimilation [for Réunion would mean] … to create a real civic spirit here … in a 
population steeped in such a partisan spirit that … they cannot accept the presence 
of political enemies in a funeral cortège.65 
 
Demange also felt that the landowners only cared about what France could offer Réunion 
and did not want to make any economic sacrifices in the island’s assimilation with the 
Metropole.66 Demange was especially shocked at the level of poverty in Réunion in 1947 
and considered that Réunion was very unlike Metropolitan France. “It was clear to me 
straightaway that the territory I was sent to administer was at least fifty years behind a 
Metropolitan department” wrote Demange in his first dispatches. “I was heartbroken to 
see puny, badly-clothed school-age children … I found no hospitals, no dispensaries 
worth talking about in a country where numerous diseases – malaria, tuberculosis and 
syphilis - do such terrible devastation.”67 This indifference to the material conditions of 
the majority of Réunion Islanders struck the Prefect. He mused that Creole elites saw 
themselves as French, and were attached to events in the Metropole, because they 
completely ignored the poverty that surrounded them.68   
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It was impossible for Demange to even consider confronting this poverty through 
the immediate application of French social rights to Réunion. On his arrival in 1947, 
Réunion was facing famine. “The island lives at the rhythm of a feverish man, whose 
heart beats in time with the irregular boat arrivals” Demange noted. 69 The island did not 
and could not feed itself. Deliveries by boat had increased since 1945, but there was 
about one boat a week in 1946 and a total of 72 boats in 1947.70 Staple foods such as 
beef, lard, oil, salt cod and rice were imported by boat.71 The landowners monopolized 
land use to grown cash crops like sugar cane. The business elites monopolized imports, 
and controlled food prices and speculated on the price of rice by not importing enough to 
go round.  
In late 1947 rice was rationed at 300g per person per day and even the sale of 
cassava, grown locally, was regulated. Salt cod was rare.72 In December 1947 Prefect 
Demange reported to Paris that there were almost no stocks of rice or corn for the island, 
even though 97% of people ate them as a basic nutrient.73 The new Franco-Indochinese 
war prevented Réunion’s importers from buying adequate stocks of rice from Saigon. 
12,000 tons of Indochinese rice had been ordered since the beginning of the year, of 
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which only 1,500 tons had been delivered. The Prefect was so worried about the lack of 
food stocks that he travelled personally to Madagascar to purchase supplies of rice.74 
Prefect Demange also aimed to further French links with Madagascar, and hoped 
to strengthen France’s presence in the Indian Ocean through his influence in Réunion.75 
The importance of Réunion for France’s reputation, and France’s reforming role in 
Réunion was clear. The new Prefect wrote to Paris: “Opposite Madagascar, French India 
and Indochina, where French sovereignty is questioned, France must keep [a stronghold 
in Réunion] which regroups the most diverse races … To achieve this, the grand reform 
must be a success.”76 
Thus in December 1947 the Creole elite’s monopoly on governance in Réunion 
was threatened, not only by the ambitions of the new Communist Party, but also by the 
French administration which wanted to prove that France could still have a political 
influence overseas. 
IV. The 1948 cyclone  
“[The 1948 cyclone] was … a diabolic cyclone … there were balls of fire … it wasn’t a 
cyclone like other cyclones … it was … devastating” remembered Nelson Dijoux.  
65,000 Réunion Islanders were seriously affected by the 1948 cyclone. 21,248 people 
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were without any possessions at all, losing “even their clothes”. 15,296 people were 
without shelter.77 165 people died during the cyclone.78 At the height of the cyclone, 
many poor people were sheltered by their landowners, in a moment of solidarity between 
rich and poor in Réunion. However, after the cyclone, poor Réunionnais were left to their 
own resources to survive. The administration did not encourage the poor to claim relief. 
The Church told them to consider the disaster as God’s will, rather than as a result of 
their meager resources and poverty. The Communist Party mobilized Réunionnais to 
make claims on the authorities for disaster relief, but Réunionnais elites felt threatened by 
the poor demanding aid.  
In the wake of the cyclone all local politicians demanded aid from France to pay 
for new infrastructure, but the cyclone exposed further divisions between the 
Communists on one side, and the landholders and the administration on the other. The 
divisions between Communists and landowners became clearer as the landowners 
attempted to weaken the Communists by disbanding the train line, whose workers were a 
core support base for the Communists. The French administration also sought to weaken 
the Communist party by taking the side of the landowners and supporting the destruction 
of the trains. To achieve this, the French administration and the landowners presented the 
cyclone as a purely natural disaster which had made the train line obsolete. 
i. The night of the cyclone 
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The cyclone’s devastating wind blew away innumerable houses made of materials such 
as thatch, and even stronger houses of wood, if they were exposed. It destroyed parts of 
the railway line. Many of the different environments on the west of the island were 
utterly transformed by the incomprehensible and amazing force of the cyclone.  
As day turned to evening on January 26 1948, the ocean swell grew and the 
barometer dropped to 967Mb, indicating the extreme low pressure and stormy 
conditions.79 During the night the wind speeds gusted to 300 km/h, over Beaufort force 
twelve, the highest possible wind measure. The cyclone winds also brought enormous 
amounts of rain. Réunion’s hundreds of ravines and river beds coursed with wide, 
torrential rivers of filthy run-off water drawn from the mountain tops, carrying everything 
in their flow: rocks, trees and dead animals. Eddy Juillerot who lived alongside the St 
Denis river in Bas de la Rivière remembered the flood waters rising into his family house 
and swilling around the floor.  
All night … we sat on our bed … we prayed … the wind blew “bobobobo 
grrr” until six o’clock in the morning [when]…the wind suddenly stopped … we 
knew it was six because [the church of] La Délivrance sounded the Angelus and 
suddenly the wind veered to the south and lifted the roof completely off! Gone!80  
 
The ocean swept away the Robert family’s thatched house in nearby Ste Clotilde. “The 
ocean foam blew everywhere ... and the ocean flowed over our house, the wind picked up 
the roof and the pig died. There it lay with its four legs in the air! Ah, the ’48 cyclone was 
a dangerous one, that! La mer l'a grainé ... la mer rent dans la case, le vent té i tir le toit, 
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et le cochon té mort, té la ek les quat’ pattes dans l'air! ... ah cyclone 48 té un cyclone 
dangereux ça!”81 A family of sharecroppers and their ten children in the remote mountain 
village of Entre-Deux woke up to find that in the area where they had planted their maize, 
a ravine had appeared, fifty meters wide.82 They had not only lost their house, their 
furniture and their clothes, but also their land.  
It was like magic … you’ll never believe me, (the young never believe me when I 
tell them this) but just when the ocean calmed down [after it had been crashing 
into the mouth of the St Denis river] the water was sucked out suddenly and it left 
shrimp, eels, all the things you find in the river, they were flapping around in our 
back yard!83 
 
With holes appearing in the fields, and fish flapping in the yard, the cyclone had inverted 
the normal material order of Réunion. 
 The force of the waters even destroyed railway bridges and road sections which 
had stood up to previous cyclones. The 300 meter long bridge along the Rivière des 
Galets near Le Port was washed away.84 Parts of St Paul were flooded with four meters of 
water. St Leu was covered with thick black mud; and rocks up to three meters high were 
strewn all over the town like marbles having been brought down the ravines with the 
flood waters. The wind blew off the roofs of even strong buildings such as churches, 
schools and warehouses, as well as a radio antenna in St Denis which had been built to 
stand up to winds of 250km/hour. The island was cut off from international 
communications for two days.85 However, the cyclone did not end on the morning of the 
26th of January, after the storm had passed by the island. It rained for eight days straight 
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in the remote interior village of Cilaos, destroying the road linking it to the coast and 
destroying the thermal spas which had been enjoyed by the international French colonial 
set before the Second World War. Three new sources were created however.86  
The corpses of fifteen people killed by a landslide in Cilaos had to be pulled 
across a flooding river in order to bury them in the cemetery on the other side. “The poor 
corpses fell in the drink from time to time” a villager recounted.87 For days, fresh water 
was impossible to obtain in the lowlands because the rivers were dirty from all the dead 
animals which had been brought down in the flood waters. People who lived in Ouaki 
buried their animals near the mouth of the Rivière St Louis. Even weeks after, Nelson 
Dijoux’s zebus refused to go near the area because of the smell of rotting animals. The 
lack of drinking water created an outbreak of dysentery in the village of Champ-Borne in 
northeastern Réunion, with two fatalities a fortnight after the cyclone had passed.88 
During the year of the cyclone, infant mortality rose to 2.3% of all births: 70% higher 
than previous and subsequent year averages.89 
ii. Moments of solidarity 
The cyclone briefly forced populations that were socially separated by class differences 
to help each other. For some Réunion Islanders, the landowning elites became their 
protectors during the night of the cyclone. In Ouaki, Nelson Dijoux’s family knew that 
their house, thatched with sugar cane stalks, would not stand up to the wind, and they had 
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nothing to protect their animals. The family let all their animals loose in the yard and 
went to seek protection from their landowner. During the cyclone the eleven members of 
the Dijoux family, along with other sharecroppers, sheltered in their landowners’ strong 
wooden house. “People had solidarity, and [the landowners] welcomed us with love, I 
must be frank … but they were also happy because if a window worked loose, or a door 
flew open we were all on hand.” In St Gilles les Bains, Raphaella and Yvan Bottard spent 
the afternoon tying down their roof with handmade ropes, and it did not fly off. As they 
were moderately well-off landowners, they also sheltered their sharecroppers after the 
roof of their sharecroppers’ house flew into the St Gilles ravine.  
Many people needed to fall on the charity of their landowner. Mr. M, the 
Comorian laborer asked his employer at the La Mare sugar factory in Ste Marie for help, 
after his house near the beach at Maperine was swept away by the ocean, during the 
cyclone.90 This was the benefit of working in a factory and acting like he voted for the 
boss’s choice. All this was part of the local system of material aid that landowners gave 
to their workers in return for their loyalty. 
The urban Creole elites also sheltered their neighbors. Henri Cornu’s wife had 
been safe in their country house in Le Brûlé, located in the hills above St Denis. Their 
house was sheltered by a hill and remained unscathed but Mme Cornu saw her neighbor’s 
roof land in her back yard. Henri Cornu had stayed down in St Denis during the cyclone. 
As he walked back up to Le Brûlé the following morning he came across a Réunionnais 
sharecropper. The man appeared to be cuddling a pig in his arms. “What are you doing 
there?” asked Mr. Cornu. “Monsieur” the man replied “the water has carried away all my 
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papers, the little money I had, all my animals and I have nothing left. All I have is this 
pig. And my pig is in shock! li la gagne saisissement!” Mme Cornu laughed as she 
imagined the man cuddling the overwhelmed pig. “There are always funny things in 
cyclones. We laugh about them, but they’re terrible” she added. In their safe, well-
situated houses, the Creole elites had different experiences of the cyclone, and different 
explanations of its importance.  
What pity the state of these [damaged] houses inspires, especially the poor 
peoples’ houses ... what future do these disaster victims have? [The cyclone of] 26 
January will mark the darkest day in the history of our disasters. We more or less 
have no idea about these poor people living in the rural interior of our island. 91 
Despite the plaintive tone of this editorial, after the cyclone there was no organized 
system of welfare for all neighborhoods in Réunion.  People living near urban centers 
such as St Denis or St Paul benefitted from a limited amount of Church aid, or help from 
the administration.  The Prefect made food handouts in some neighborhoods and set up a 
disaster committee with the Mayors of each commune, to give financial assistance to 
those who had lost everything. French government intervention was also needed in the 
following month to parachute supplies to the mountain villages.92 However, the Prefect’s 
disaster committee had a limited effect in rural neighborhoods, and some Réunionnais 
never realized that the disaster commission even existed.  
“We ask you, M. le Prefect, to intercede in our favor because in Réunion we think 
of you as a good father figure who looks after his children.” A newspaper subscriber 
wrote to the Prefect in a Réunion newspaper requesting help for people in the rural Plaine 
des Cafres region who had received no help.93  Calling the Prefect a benevolent father 
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echoed the rural practice of considering landowners as powerful people to turn to for 
material help in a crisis. This letter was written by a literate person who had enough 
money to subscribe to a newspaper, rather than an agricultural worker who was likely to 
be illiterate. Réunion Islanders living areas such as Plaine des Cafres would have had a 
very vague idea of the Prefect in 1948.94 Tens of thousands of Réunion’s disaster victims 
were merely left to their own resources to rebuild their house, and their lives, relying 
solely on neighborly solidarity.  
There was an enormous threat of famine when basic foodstuffs such as rice, beans 
and cooking oil were already rationed.95 The day after the cyclone, the Dijoux family 
came back to their farm to find all their chickens, ducks and most of their goats had gone. 
They only had one zebu left and their house had been knocked flat. Réunion Islanders 
were obliged to resort to neighborly solidarity. “We bartered, we ate cassava, sweet 
potato, taro; we ate whatever we could find!”96 Reciprocity helped people survive after 
the cyclone ripped out almost all food crops in the west of Réunion.97 “There was nothing 
left in the vegetable garden, we had no more plants, nothing at all, we had planted taro, it 
was ripped out, bananas, everything ripped out and blown off together.” 
The biggest problem [after the cyclone] was for food. For the food that we had 
grown, the fruit trees, it was “zero”, nothing, … skeletons, not one leaf, not one 
fruit, nothing, in the vegetable garden there was nothing, completely destroyed. 
… It was atrocious, it was pitiful … it was complete destitution (la misère 
noire).98  
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In the highland village of Dos d’Ane a resident wrote to a local newspaper that the village 
had lost most of their animals and even the local grocery store, had been destroyed. There 
were no more cabbages, sweet potato or chocho and most of the thatched houses had 
been blown away. 99 
The cyclone provided an excuse for supporters of the right wing in Réunion to 
make political critiques about the Communist Party, through the idiom of food shortage. 
In the weeks after the cyclone, right-wing newspapers used ideas about smell and rotting 
to criticize the Communist Mayor of St Paul, Raoul Lucas.100 Some newspapers claimed 
that St Paul was overwhelmed with the putrid smell of rotting animals, or even more 
shockingly, rotting food such as rice and corn. The anti-Communist newspapers criticized 
the Communist Mayor of St Paul for abandoning the town. These newspapers praised the 
solidarity of Reunion Islanders, and attacked the Communist city government for not 
helping the people in the villages.101 
Despite these political jibes between elites, poor Réunionnais had no other choice 
but to rebuild their lives with the materials at hand, showing independence and resilience. 
They were not dependent on landowners or the Communists to rebuild their lives. If they 
were lucky, neighborly solidarity would extend to lending a few wood shingles or a bit of 
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sheet metal to tide them over.102 Material possessions were very scarce but housing was 
basic and recyclable. Réunionnais re-used the wood from their fallen thatched houses, 
and collected wood from fallen trees or brought down by water in the ravines. Some 
Réunionnais fetched wood from the high forest.103 They were able to rebuild thatch 
houses quickly. Even if they only constructed shelters, these were good for few months as 
they waited for thatch materials to regrow.104  
The Robert family, whose beachside house was swept away by the ocean, had 
pulled their mother and new baby sister in a handcart through the rain to reach the nuns in 
the village of Ste Clotilde during the night of the cyclone.105 They were taken in by the 
nuns with 200 or 300 other people. The St. Denis municipal government provided them 
with food after the cyclone. 106 Despite losing their house, the Roberts were expected to 
find somewhere else to live ten days afterwards. There had been a brief moment of 
paternalistic solidarity when elites sheltered agricultural workers during the cyclone. The 
administration and the Church also provided aid for some people in urban areas. Shortly 
after the cyclone, however, poor Réunion Islanders were merely expected to fall back on 
their own resources and to rebuild their lives as best they could. Yet for Réunion 
                                                 
 
102 Interview Mme Hoarau 26/9/2008 
103 Some of this was in control of the government and was officially authorized to people, especially in 
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Islanders who supported the Communist Party, the cyclone threw into sharp relief that 
French social rights had not been applied to Réunion.  
iii. Cyclone relief and a “natural” disaster 
Réunion had suffered hundreds of cyclones in the past, including in 1944 and 1945. 
However the 1948 cyclone was an especially devastating one, the strongest in living 
memory. The cyclone occurred just as Réunion was supposedly being assimilated into 
France. All Réunionnais politicians now claimed the French state should fund rebuilding 
of Réunion’s infrastructure. The Prefect and the landowners considered that Port, 
electricity production, better water supply and better roads were the priority.107 The 
communists favored the application of French social legislation, and encouraged poor 
Réunion Islanders to seek cyclone relief from the authorities.  
After the cyclone, the Communist party created a new strategy. They mobilized 
poor populations in St Denis to request cyclone relief from the government.  
In September 1948, people who had lost everything in St Denis still had not been 
compensated. The city government announced that payments would once again be 
rescheduled. The next day the Communists organized a hundred women to march down 
Avenue de la Victoire, one of the main streets in St Denis, and demonstrated outside the 
Prefecture to demand payment. Mindful of the potential disturbance only weeks before 
the local government elections, the Prefect met with a delegation of four women, and 
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cyclone charity payments were scheduled for the following Saturday.108 This was a 
victory for the Communist party. 
The centrist La Démocratie newspaper criticized this Communist activism. Rather 
than admitting the severe problems of poverty and malnutrition in St Denis, the 
newspaper accused the Communists of “taking advantage” of the disaster for political 
gain. The right wing elites feared that if the poor claimed state aid, mass discontent might 
ensue. The newspaper accused the Communists of having “stormed” the Town Hall and 
demanded food. They claimed that the following day the Communists even tried to 
“incite” poor people in St Denis to rebel against the city government, and alleged that the 
Communist prison guards were fomenting rebellion among the prisoners. The 
exaggerated reports threw in to sharp focus the unease of middle and upper class Réunion 
Islanders regarding the claims of the poor, even after such a disaster.109 
The Catholics presented the cyclone’s destruction as a natural disaster. Calling the 
cyclone natural glossed over the fact that the disaster was also caused by social 
inequalities in Réunion that left poor populations vulnerable. “It seems that God is 
showing Réunion that we must live here like sick people who wait from one moment to 
the next to leave the earth and all their worldly goods” wrote a journalist in Réunion’s 
conservative Catholic newspaper Dieu et Patrie. 110 Thus, the journalist expected poor 
people to be passive in the face of hardship, rather than claim disaster relief.  
                                                 
 
108 AMSD 3 I 17 Commissaire de Police à M. le Directeur Départemental des Services de Police 
15/09/1948 
109 ADR 1 PER 84/6 La Démocratie. Un désastre/Ceux qu'on devait fusiller ou pendre/Les rapaces qui 
vivent sur les cadavres 29/01/1948 
110 ADR 1 PER 83/1 Dieu et Patrie. Prière pour éloigner les cyclones 15/2/1948 
 
  99
Although the poor were not expected to ask for aid, since colonial times 
Réunionnais politicians had often demanded cyclone relief for the island from the French 
National Assembly.111 Now that Réunion was assimilated with France, cyclone relief 
could be framed as relief for French people rather than for a colonial population. Réunion 
should thus benefit from more money than in previous decades. The Prefect estimated the 
cyclone damage at 4 ½ billion Metropolitan Francs and wrote to Paris asking France to 
make an effort for Réunion and reminding him that French contributions to the colony 
after the 1944 and 1945 cyclones had been “ridiculously small.”112  
Even if the Prefect and local elites considered that France should send relief, the 
first country to offer help to Réunion was another Overseas Department, Guadeloupe.113 
The French High Commissioner of Madagascar also sent money, with a message that 
European, Réunionnais and Malagasy would feel the “reality of the French Union” 
through this donation.114 Donations also came in from Senegal as well as neighboring 
French and British Indian Ocean colonies: the Comoros Islands, the Seychelles and 
Mauritius.115 This funding underlines that Réunion was also part of a broader colonial 
world, now called the French Union. However, Réunionnais politicians attempted to 
frame Réunion as exclusively French, with problems that could only be resolved by a 
comprehensive plan for reconstruction in Réunion paid for by France.  
                                                 
 
111 For example in 1914 aid was specifically demanded for disaster victims and was then spent by the 
colony on infrastructure renewal to the complaints of French deputies ADR 41 W 6 / 1M4083 Lettre 
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Central French government was unenthusiastic. It took almost a month for a 
funding proposal to be put in front of deputies of the French Assembly.116 It was not 
passed until the 17th of March 1948, two months after the cyclone. The sum allocated by 
the Metropole was only a quarter of the total needed - 100 million Francs - much to the 
disgust of the deputies for Réunion, Dr Vergès and Leon de Lepervanche.  
Repairing 30% sugar cane and 80% essential oil plants: 760 million CFA 
Forest damage: 120 million CFA  
Roads: 125 million CFA  
Railway: 95 million CFA 
Schools: 113 million CFA 
Churches 85 millions: CFA 117 
 
Table 2.2 Claims for refunding infrastructure in Réunion 1948 
 
Environmental upheaval in Réunion, and new funding from Metropolitan France, had 
created the financial conditions for making changes to infrastructure in Réunion. 
However the French administration, the Communists and the landowners would argue 
about the shape and direction of these changes. 
iv. The radicalization of the Communists 
The cyclone had caused many roads and bridges to be swept away, including the railway 
bridge at Rivière des Galets. The material ruin of the railway line allowed both rightwing 
politicians and the French administration to use the natural disaster as an excuse to 
remedy a political problem. They deployed ideas about nature, obsolescence, and 
                                                 
 
116 The proposal was tabled in the National Assembly on the 18/2/1948. On 1/8/1949 the French 
government finally promised 315 million F to repair cyclone damage in La Réunion  




inefficiency in order to cast the railway as a technically backward part of the island’s 
infrastructure, whose destruction should be welcomed.  
Just after the cyclone, Le Progrès wrote that the disbanding of Réunion’s railway 
was inevitable. “We had decided to disband the railway on paper, and then nature brought 
it the final blow. Poor railway. Everything has turned against it – inefficiency, 
indiscipline, government relentlessness to destroy it, management reshuffle, and finally, 
coup de grace, an atomic cyclone” 118 Talk of indiscipline, inefficiency and inevitability 
were euphemisms for the well-known fact that the railway had a very large number of 
publicly employed railway workers, or cheminots, most of whom were unionized and 
supported the Communist Party. The Communist deputy Leon de Lepervanche was the 
head of the railway and dismantling the train would reduce his political support.  
There was no inevitability about the railway’s demise. In Henri Cornu’s more 
moderate opinion, the future of Réunion Island’s economy depended on French 
commitment to infrastructure renewal, including the railway.”119 However the French 
administration and the landowners both labeled the railway infrastructure as “superseded” 
technology in order to cast a political blow on the Communist party. This deepened the 
political divide between Communists and anti-Communists. 
In 1951 the Communists created a new tactic to bolster support for their party. 
Rather than calling for Réunion’s immediate assimilation with France, the Communists 
argued that France was acting like a colonial power in Réunion, in spite of 
departmentalization. In the 1951 legislative elections in Réunion, the Communist Party 
declared itself as “anticolonial and antifascist.” Their list carried the slogan “vote against 
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colonialism for your mouthful of rice, your right to live.”120 The Communist Party 
attempted to create discontent by blaming the food problems on the French 
administration although the import cartels run by Réunion’s economic elites were really 
responsible for food shortages and the high price of rice.  
In 1952 Prefect Béchoff sacked many railway workers. In public, he claimed to be 
efficiently reorganizing colonial-era government services which did not exist in French 
Departments. However in private correspondence the Prefect saw the disbanding of the 
public works and railway workers as a political “clean up”, to get rid of Communist 
support. He intended that the ex-railway workers would be split up and employed in the 
growing French-funded construction industry, specifically in urban renovation and 
housing construction. 121  
Thanks to the alliance between the landowners and the French administration over 
the disbanding of Réunion’s train line, the cyclone had the ultimate effect of radicalizing 
the Communist Party. From being a political party which supported immediate 
assimilation with France in 1947, by 1952 the Communist party had cast itself as an anti-
colonial party, and positioned itself against the French administration in Réunion. The ex-
railway workers would be re-employed in the construction industry, which would become 
the new site for Communist influence.  
The creation of the new French-funded construction industry in Réunion was also 
an effect of the cyclone which had destroyed so many houses. Part of this would be the 
founding of the state first housing agency in Réunion. Although this would only concern 
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the landowners and the French administration in 1949, by 1956 the administration and 
landowners would attempt to finally quash political support for Communists by using the 
housing agency to build urban housing for workers (see chapter 3).  
V. Clashing views of governance: the creation of the SIDR 
In the first General Council meeting after the cyclone in March 1948, Léon de 
Lepervanche, the other Communist deputy for Réunion, laid out his vision for tackling 
the seriousness of the housing problem in Réunion. “We have to apply urban planning in 
Réunion. The cyclone has complicated the problem of housing. Instead of paillottes we 
should construct modern housing which the owner could [pay off] over a number of 
years.”122 Other members of the ruling class in Réunion were more concerned to kick-
start agricultural production and improve the quantity of the sugar cane harvest, rather 
than create politically independent workers living in their own houses.123  Yet the Prefect 
agreed that something needed to be done about housing in Réunion. Writing to central 
government in Paris later that year, he observed, 
The lack of housing in the island is of unprecedented seriousness … the 
population of the island is growing by 5,000 people a year; and the existing 
constructions, already insufficient, are periodically destroyed by the cyclones 
which devastate Réunion. The crisis of housing presents the hallmarks of a social 
problem which can only be resolved in the framework of an equipment plan for 
the department.124 
 
                                                 
 
122 ADR 1158 W 97 procès-verbal Conseil Général de La Réunion séance d'après-midi 18/2/1948 
123 CAC 19940180/240, Paul Demange, Préfet de La Réunion à M. le ministre de l'intérieur. 
Transformation de la colonie en département, 12/19/1947, ADR 1158 W 97 procès-verbal Conseil Général 
de La Réunion séance d'après-midi 18/2/1948 
124 CAC 19840179/70 Préfet de La Réunion à M. le Secrétaire d'État aux Affaires Economiques, Direction 
des Affaires d'Outre-mer. Objet: Société Immobilière de La Réunion; Arrêté 1946. 12/11/1948 
 
  104
In Réunion’s General Council session of September 29 1948, the motion was carried to 
make a mixed economy housing company funded by France.125 This housing company 
would build better houses than the paillottes that had been destroyed by the cyclone and it 
would be part of France’s reconstruction plan in Réunion.  
A housing company was linked to landholding, and this was of special interest to 
landed elites. The creation of the housing company in the wake of the cyclone was one of 
the earliest moments that French administrators and Creole elites worked together 
attempting to shape policy and impose their views about the right way to govern 
Réunion. However, the French administration was not interested in Creole views of how 
houses should be built in Réunion. French decisions would be made in Paris and 
landowners would be excluded from decision-making. However, the French 
administration was not able to control the landholders’ speculation on rents and land 
prices, in the same way as it had not managed to control the import cartel’s price fixing 
for rice. Although the French administration would gain control of the housing agency, it 
was forced to work around the Creole elites’ continuing monopoly over land. 
i. Who to build for? 
In December 1949 the Société Immobilière du Department de la Réunion (SIDR) was 
created by agreement with the Minister of Overseas France, the Minister of Economy, the 
General Council of Réunion and the FIDES.126 Réunion’s General Council had originally 
hoped that the SIDR would just be funded by the state, but the state wanted a contribution 
from private capital in Réunion. This combination of private and public capital made the 
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SIDR a mixed-economy entity.127 The SIDR was naturally the focus of high expectations. 
The Réunion ruling elite hoped to take advantage of government money and join in the 
decision-making processes for reconstruction in Réunion: they hoped the housing agency 
would create another source of social power for them.  
The members of the SIDR board were local representatives from the Prefecture, 
Réunion’s local government (General Council); the Overseas Bank, the Ministry of 
Housing and Reconstruction, and the Ministry of Equipment. It also had three prominent 
members of Réunion’s economic and social elite representing the private shareholders. 
There were no Communists on the board. The private interests were Henri Cornu, land 
administrator for the powerful landholding and newly constituted sugar company 
Sucreries de Bourbon,128 Kichenin, an administrator for another housing project called Le 
Foyer Bourbonnais, and Jean Pinguet, an important landowner in St Benoit. These men 
were experienced, high-profile figures in Réunion; they were either landowners or their 
agents. They were pro-French, but shared prejudices about the effectiveness of French 
government in Réunion.  
The recruitment of Metropolitan civil servants to undertake reconstruction in 
Réunion had not gone unnoticed by Creole elites who regarded this influx of 
Metropolitan French experts with irony and suspicion. Metropolitan civil servants also 
                                                 
 
127 Before 1946 infrastructure renewal had to be funded by the colonies themselves. The 1946 law for the 
Overseas Departments provided, for the first time, a metropolitan contribution to the budget of the ex-
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came to Réunion with preconceived ideas about colonial populations and their lack of 
expertise, or worse, viewed Réunion Islanders either as scheming, provincial despots, or 
only interested in personal gain and small-town feuding.129  
Although the 1949 General Council resolution proposed that the SIDR build 
housing for workers, the SIDR’s mission was quickly reframed to be a solution for the 
housing problems of Metropolitan French civil servants. Le Monde visiting Réunion in 
1949 considered the housing situation was terrible, although only from the angle of what 
would be adequate for Metropolitan French people, rather than as a problem for all 
Réunion Islanders. “[civil servants] sent to Réunion would find miserable conditions of 
existence there and would look in vain for housing that the administration is incapable of 
providing.”130 In the eyes of the Metropolitans, even Réunion’s middle class houses for 
rent were only barely adequate, and were outrageously overpriced, as property-owning 
Réunion Islanders had increased the cost of renting to profit from the arrival of the civil 
servants.131  Prefect Béchoff highlighted the problems faced by Metropolitan civil 
servants who attempted to find lodgings in Réunion, and who were obliged to pay ten 
times more for rent than they would in a provincial town in Metropolitan France.132 The 
Prefecture hoped that building government-funded housing for civil servants would 
alleviate this extortionate rent speculation, and attract more technicians to Reunion.133  
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So, the first question for the SIDR agenda in 1950 was whether to build houses 
for French civil servants or for the working Réunion Island majority, referred to as “the 
masses” by both civil servants and local elites.134 A third option was to run the SIDR as a 
company offering low-interest loans for private entrepreneurs interested in getting good 
terms from the state. This had been proposed as an encouragement for further investment 
from business in Réunion. The first SIDR President Mr. Gaultier, a civil servant from the 
Metropole, rejected this proposal to offer loans as too blatantly self-serving on the part of 
elites.135  
The SIDR President did not think that granting individual loans was appropriate 
for a business that should concentrate on building for the public good. This public good 
would be defined by central government representatives, rather than Réunion Island 
businessmen who Metropolitans considered as lacking in concerns for the social welfare 
of Réunion’s population.136 However, the French administration also ignored the problem 
of the ‘poor workers’ and proposed that the SIDR construct houses for Metropolitan civil 
servants. The SIDR board members claimed it would be far too costly to clean up the 
“notoriously insalubrious” urban neighborhoods of St Denis,137 thus using the poverty of 
Réunion Islanders as a reason to construct houses for Metropolitan civil servants rather 
than for the Réunionnais poor.138 Therefore the SIDR would build houses for civil 
servants, rather than for poor Réunionnais. It would not serve as a low-interest loan 
company to allow rich Creoles to build houses paid for by the government. 
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The rich Creoles hoped to maintain their influence in the housing agency, even if 
they were only going to build houses for civil servants. They hoped to use their technical 
expertise and knowledge about Réunion Island housing, to build houses with French 
money. The French administration saw them as a bunch of corrupt crooks because 
“Whenever anything happens, a coalition of [Creole] private interests [impedes] all work 
of common good” the Metropolitan French SIDR President complained.139 The following 
exchange which occurred during a 1950 SIDR board meeting reveals the prejudices each 
group held of the other.  
Henri Cornu [talking to the Metropolitan French]: … you have formidable 
perseverance, but you must understand that in [Réunion] we have a certain 
mistrust of the Administration, and anything pertaining to government directives. 
It’s understandable, because the [French] public powers have never done anything 
[here].  
Marx [a Metropolitan French administrator]: And the private [Creole] interests; 
what have they done? 
Rabot [a Réunion Islander]: They created the sugar industry, the only thing that 
works in this country. But back to the matter in hand.”140 
 
As this exchange shows, although Henri Cornu was an effective mediator between local 
business interests and Metropolitan civil servants, the French administration mistrusted 
Creoles and their ideas. 
Cornu’s boss, Emile Hugot was the powerful director of Sucreries de Bourbon 
and one of the most important local business figures on the island. Hugot was a 
shareholder in the SIDR and complained that the administration ignored the local elites’ 
expertise about “climate, the preferences of residents in Réunion, hygiene [needs] or the 
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action of elements on the climate.141 Réunion Islanders on the board wanted to encourage 
housing construction in the hills of Brûlé above the capital St Denis. The higher altitude 
and cooler climate meant that there was no risk of malaria. Yet Creole building 
techniques and knowledge of the environment was systematically ignored by the 
Metropolitan representatives, because they assumed the Creoles knew little about modern 
housing.142  
The Creole shareholders became disgruntled: “The [French] administration seems 
to think we are used to building houses upside down, but in 1951 there are competent 
people in Reunion” complained Jean Chatel, a powerful owner of a large rum distillery. 
The SIDR’s first President affirmed the Metropolitan view that Creole knowledge was 
outmoded and outdated. He declared that building houses in Réunion was as easy as 
building houses in France il s'agit ici de construire pour Dupont et Durand.143 He was to 
be proved sorely wrong, both in the ability of the SIDR to construct houses, and to buy 
appropriate land for them.  
Despite Henri Cornu’s diplomacy between administration and Creole private 
interests, the first years of the SIDR was a series of prolonged U-turns. No-one could 
agree on the best course to take.144 A year-long struggle between two Metropolitan civil 
servants on the board used up a lot of the SIDR’s construction budget to pay architects, 
who were contracted and then revoked causing heavy financial penalties.145  
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ii. Creole land ownership and the SIDR 
Land acquisition was also an expensive problem for the SIDR. Because of the political 
role of land in Réunion, there was no formal land registry or cadastre in Réunion during 
the early 1950s and no official island-wide repository of land ownership.146 This was a 
problem for French government because it was impossible to measure the landholdings of 
the important landowners in Réunion, and thus their tax declarations.147 It was a problem 
for the SIDR, because there were no large areas of government land already reserved for 
the housing agency’s use. Although the land owned by the French colonial government 
was transferred to Réunion’s local government in 1948, it was not allocated to the SIDR. 
The SIDR had to buy its own land with the meager government funds allocated, and it 
was often unsure of what it was buying because there was no official land registry. 
It was a seller’s market in 1951. Precisely because of the influx of French money, 
every landowner in Réunion wanted to start selling to the SIDR and set the price.148 
Creole landowners of all racial origins with medium-sized land holdings in urban areas 
were most keen to sell their land. Land prices quickly increased. For example, in 1952 the 
SIDR had an option on the Chane Po plot in St Denis with a base price of 40 F per square 
meter. The SIDR did not follow through. Seven years later in 1959 the Chane Po 
descendants were asking for 2000 F per square meter for the same plot.149  
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In 1950 Bertrand Rivière wanted to sell what he claimed was a 10 hectare plot. It 
was actually just over 5 hectares when the SIDR measured it. Rivière then merely 
increased the price per hectare once the fault was discovered. The result was profit for 
landowners who were starting a new business of property speculation with the 
government. Seeing the appearance on French money on the horizon, some Réunionnais 
attempted to act as middlemen, reselling land to the SIDR at inflated prices.150 A SIDR 
annual report later admitted that in the early 1950s “just mentioning the SIDR was to 
invite ironic sneers” because the housing agency was ineffective, had not built any houses 
and was forced to buy land at inflated prices.151 
Differences of opinion between Creole elites and Metropolitan officials over 
reconstructing houses after the cyclone slowed down progress in the SIDR. The French 
administration finally gained control of SIDR policy, and ignored elite Creole expertise. 
Yet Creoles continued to monopolize landholding and set the prices for land bought by 
the SIDR. By 1954 Réunionnais land speculators had gained the upper hand on the 
SIDR’s building program by dictating the price of land.   
VI. Conclusion 
As people buried their dead, their broken possessions and rebuilt their houses after the 
1948 cyclone, the landowners, the Prefecture and the Communist party fought over how 
to deal with the general poverty of the Réunionnais population. All groups claimed that 
France should help with the reconstruction effort, yet they sought to put the money to 
different use: the administration and landholders sought to improve infrastructure, and the 
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Communist Party sought to build worker houses and encourage the application of French 
social legislation. 
The French administration attempted to out-maneuver Creole elites by talking 
control of the SIDR management in Réunion. However, ongoing conflicts between the 
civil servants themselves until 1952 stalled any progress in housing construction. The 
first houses were not built in Le Port by the SIDR until 1954. Despite the self-conceived 
expertise of French civil servants and the Prefects, they made errors over reconstruction. 
The administration could not control speculative landowners. By 1952 the Creole elites 
still maintained political control over rural areas and monopolized landholding and the 
import-export trades. This was despite early electoral successes of the Communist Party, 
the arrival of the French administration and a devastating cyclone in 1948. 
 In 1952 Réunion was a beacon for France’s influence in the Indian Ocean - 
according to the French administration. Yet the reality was that the French authorities 
were unable to make their influence felt in Réunion. They did not resolve the inequalities 
in Réunion or the problems of the environment, and they were not helped by central 
government in Paris. 152 The Prefect of Réunion complained to that letters from Paris 
addressed to Réunion were often addressed to ‘the colony’ because no-one in Paris had 
noticed that Réunion was now an Overseas Department.153  
In 1952 the island still bore traces of the 1948 cyclone, and was still controlled by 
Creole elites. Two hundred thousand people still lived in abject poverty, with no 
participation in the governance of the island. Even though the Communist Party now had 
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fewer supporters than in 1947, it no longer called for immediate assimilation with France. 
By 1952 it frequently criticized France’s regime in Réunion. The Communist Party’s 
growing anticolonial movement and support of workers’ rights posed a new danger for 
the French position, and the power of the Creole elites in the island.   
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The French administration was not only faced with the problem of infrastructure 
after the 1948 cyclone. The most pressing concern was that the majority of Réunion 
Islanders were extremely poor. The aim was to tackle worker poverty and discourage 
workers from becoming Communist. The administration attempted to solve rural poverty 
in two ways: sending people to farm in Madagascar, and introducing French social 
legislation to agricultural workers in Réunion. While the Madagascar idea briefly 
appeared to work, introducing social legislation had unintended political consequences, 
restructuring male employment in Réunion from agricultural work to the construction 
sector, who were recruited for the Communist Party in the cities. The French 
administration unsuccessfully attempted and diminish support for the Communist Party 
by attempting to racially profile Réunion Islanders. However Réunion and Réunion 
Islanders continually demonstrated that a French model would never fit Réunion exactly. 
There was no easy way of defining which groups were and were not loyal to France. 
While the administration assumed that support for the Communist party ran along racial 
lines, the blurred race and class boundaries in Réunion made it difficult for the 
administration to categorize political enemies by racial origin.  
Anti-communist policies in the era of French decolonization in both West Africa 
and French Overseas Departments have been understudied. In Sub-Saharan Africa and 
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French Polynesia, the French administration attempted to assimilate Communist leaders 
into the French administration. Anti-Communist policies in Réunion differed strongly in 
this regard. The French administration was as equally suspicious of the Communist party 
in Réunion as elsewhere in the French Union, and feared a takeover by Moscow. Yet in 
Réunion the French administration did everything to exclude the Communist party from 
having any administrative or political power on the Island.1 
Gary Wilder has suggested that France was “never not an imperial nation-state”, 
meaning that scholars must always consider the back and forth relationship between 
France and its colonies, rather than considering either in isolation.2 This chapter 
demonstrates that during the 1950s the close relationship between Metropolitan France 
and Réunion was not natural but had to be manufactured through political repression. 
Rather than thinking only in terms of Réunion Island’s reciprocal relationship with the 
Metropole, this chapter shows that Réunion was located in wider imperial and Indian 
Ocean networks. Réunion defied the Metropolitan administration’s desire for neat 
political boundaries and racial classifications.  
II. Solutions to poverty: France or Madagascar? 
There were two directions for early social welfare projects in Réunion. One looked 
towards France and the other looked towards Madagascar. From 1948, the French 
ministry of Agriculture studied the possible creation of a new Réunionnais colony in the 
Sakay river valley in Madagascar. Poor Réunion Islanders – especially the Petit Blancs 
without agricultural land – could be sent to Madagascar and work cultivating the land. 
                                                 
 
1 Alexander Keese, "A culture of panic. 'Communist' scapegoats and decolonization in French West Africa 
and French Polynesia (1945-1957)," French colonial history 9(2008). 
2 Wilder, The French imperial nation-state : negritude & colonial humanism between the two world wars. 
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This would solve the problem of ‘overpopulation’ which Metropolitan French studies 
feared would make life unsustainable in Réunion. Additionally in 1949 France instituted 
a very limited range of social laws which were not applied until 1952. This legislation 
was unpopular and forced the workers to the cities because the elites were not prepared to 
pay the employer contributions.   
i. Is Madagascar a solution to Réunion’s poverty? 
Letter from Réunion 
 
A French village, far away, out of sight, a mountain village like any other with 
clog makers, lace makers, and kids, blond like yours or like mine. Not all blond it 
is true … others black, more or less, and most often, one or the other, dirty and 
ragged.  
 
Because: this part of old France is in the middle of the Indian Ocean. [In] 
Bourbon Island, today the department of Réunion … one encounters images of 
poverty that Mr. Cartier Bresson goes to China to find. Poverty that is growing, 
despite appearances, at 3% a year. The population [of Réunion] is 300,000, closed 
off on an island 60km square, ¾ of which is mountainous. Five people per 
cultivable hectare. Ten in thirty years’ time.  
 
One must not underestimate the efforts accomplished by a small elite, 
Metropolitan and Creole, for increasing, improving, balancing the resources of the 
island, until now only reliant on sugar cane … But the only solution is migration, 
a massive emigration, absorbing the annual surplus ... to the only logical and 
possible Promised Land: Madagascar.3 
 
The above letter, with its discussion of looming overpopulation in Réunion, and its 
description of population per cultivable hectare, was typical of concerns about Réunion’s 
future in the 1950s. It had become accepted wisdom for the French administration and 
Metropolitan French commentators that if Réunion’s population grew any more, the 
island would no longer be able to feed itself, and that the only solution to this problem 
was migration. This ignored the fact that much of Réunion’s food was already imported. 
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The letter demonstrates that during the 1950s Réunion’s political link to France was not 
the only natural one. Rather, some Réunion Islanders envisaged that the enormous 
neighboring island of Madagascar could become, once again, a destination for poor 
Réunion Islanders.  
Réunion Islanders had lived in Madagascar since the 18th century and the time of 
the slave trade. From the end of the 19th century Creole elites saw Madagascar as an ideal 
destination for the growing numbers of poor Petit Blancs: socially white Réunion 
Islanders who, after the end of slavery in 1848, had no racial advantage over the freed 
slaves but also did not want to sell their labor on the plantations.4 These populations had 
retreated into the rural interior of the island, where cultivation was difficult. At the end of 
the 19th century, the Réunion Island General Council encouraged Petit Blanc migration to 
Madagascar. It was a way of ridding the island of poor whites whose poverty underlined 
the social inequalities in Réunion and provided a constant reminder that white Creoles 
were not naturally racially superior to the other populations of Réunion.5  
 After 1946 the French administration in Réunion again worried about the future of 
the Petit Blanc population. They were offended that the Petit Blancs, a white French 
population, was poor. They were more worried about Petit Blancs than they were about 
other social groups which they considered were more “naturally” poor, because they were 
not white. Metropolitan French were shocked that poor Petit Blancs lived in similar 
conditions to African-origin Islanders. 
                                                 
 
4 Bourquin and Gerbeau, Histoire des Petits-Blancs de La Réunion : XIXè-début XXe siècle : aux confins de 
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Across the countryside there are straw huts … in front of which one feels ashamed 
to think that they shelter French citizens, white and black, electors for the last 100 
years; it reminds you more about the housing of black people in Brazil, the 
“shanty town” dwellers in South Africa. The Bantus stifled in the large cities in 
the Transvaal would hardly envy [the Réunion Islanders].6 
 
A civil servant visiting Réunion in 1953 considered the economic and social “decline” of 
the white population in Réunion was painful to see.7 Another noted that “nothing could 
be more afflicting than these Petit Blancs in rags, often skeletal, with their eyes sunk in 
their sockets, numerous in the coastal towns, and even more numerous in the interior, in 
the hills.”8 The well-known French author Roger Vailland gave the following description 
of the Petit Blancs in Réunion after visiting in 1959. The title of his article was “In 
Reunion Island, more wretched than the poorest of Blacks, the descendants of former 
colonists live from the memory of a better past.” Vailland’s description emphasized how 
white poverty reversed the island's “natural” racial hierarchies 
In contrast to the colored minorities in the towns of the United States, the Petit 
Blancs of La Réunion do not live in groups. They are dispersed throughout the 
island. Many go begging. … Scenes of the following kind on busy roads are 
frequent: the Petit Blancs send their children to sell things to the drivers (Blacks) 
who might stop and buy the varied objects, especially their basketwork.9 
 
The illustration to the newspaper article (Figure 3.1 below) shows Petit Blanc children 
selling basketwork to people in a car, a Petit Blanc man sitting on the street selling fruit 
wrapped in newspaper, and Mr. and Mme Paul, an old Petit Blanc couple outside their 
                                                 
 
6 Le Monde André Blanchet 25/1/1949 
7 CARAN F/1cI/238 rapport de M. Pierre Montel, secrétaire de l’état à l'AIR sur son voyage d'étude et 
inspection en Afrique du 16 au 31 Mars 1953 n.d. 
8 Le Monde Terres oubliés de l'Océan Indien. 1. La Réunion - département français abandonné à lui-même 
18/8/1959 
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 ADR 380 W 240 L'illustré 48 Roger Vailland ‘La Grande Misère des Petits-Blancs’ 26/11/1964 although 
the article is dated 1964, it is drawn from Roger Vailland, La Réunion ed. Charles-Henri Favrod, L'Atlas 
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thatched house in the remote highland village of Marla, in the Mafate cirque. In the 
article Vailland described his stay in Marla, in the remote interior of the island. His host’s 
son was his mountain guide for reaching Marla on foot, because there were no roads to 
the village. Their son described how he had never “believed” in France as a child. He 
assumed it was just an invention of his teachers. It was not until he went to Madagascar 
on military service that he realized there actually was a world outside Réunion. Although 
Vailland deployed this story to emphasize the backwardness and poverty of the Petits 
Blancs in Réunion, it also underlines the importance of Madagascar for Réunion 
Islanders, and the fact that, despite the 1946 department law, France still seemed 
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3.1The terrible poverty of the Petit Blancs10 
 






The solution to the poverty of the Petit Blancs appeared to be emigration to Madagascar, 
because the historic links between Réunion and Madagascar had not yet been suppressed 
by the increasing Metropolitan control over Réunion. Raphael Babet, a Réunion Island 
deputy born in Madagascar was favorable to the project of sending Petit Blancs to 
Madagascar. In 1950 a mixed-economy agricultural company was created for the new 
project of sending Réunionnais to Madagascar: le Bureau d’études pour la production 
agricole (BDPA) whose president was the powerful French colonial administrator Robert 
Delavignette. The BDPA chose the Sakay region in Madagascar, 140 kilometers west of 
the capital Tananarive as the solution for the poverty of the Petit Blancs. 
The region was deserted and was reputed to have uncultivable land. However, the 
BPDA set up a project to fertilize the soil, and bring Réunion Islanders to Madagascar. 
Metropolitan French, Reunion Islanders and Malagasy would work together to set up an 
economically viable farm project which, if successful, could be reproduced elsewhere in 
Madagascar. The Sakay project had the hallmarks of the traditional French civilizing 
mission, but also a new idea of French assimilation. Réunion Islanders would work 
alongside Malagasy, teaching them about new agricultural techniques, which they would 
then use themselves.  
Most importantly the project would ‘save’ the Petit Blancs in Reunion who were 
presented as degenerate and inbred because of their frightening white poverty. 11 It also 
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gave France another possibility for affirming its presence in both Madagascar and 
Réunion.  
The colonization began in 1952. The BDPA rebuilt a hamlet named Babetville (in 
honor of Raphael Babet, the Reunion Island deputy born in Madagascar) near a ruined 
Malagasy village named Ankadinondry. The hamlet had houses, schools, a post office, a 
city hall, a youth club and a church as well as a production center. The Réunion Island 
families who migrated followed a training course for a year, and then went to one of the 
outlying farms where basic buildings were provided, and they were associated with the 
BDPA cooperative.12 
In the 1950s, both rural Réunion Islanders and those in the French administration 
invested hope and admiration for the Sakay project. In a context where Metropolitan 
France had not equally applied social laws in Reunion, some considered that Madagascar 
offered more possibilities for Réunion Islanders’ social and material improvement than 
Réunion. A study of relative calorie intake revealed that Réunion Islanders in Sakay ate 
more than rural Réunion Islanders in Réunion.13 In 1956, the Prefect of Réunion qualified 
the Sakay experiment as an operation which guaranteed “a rosy future not only for the 
French presence in Madagascar, and the development of the Big Island [i.e. Madagascar] 
but also for the future of Reunion and its social peace.”  
Emigration could be a panacea for the social ills in Réunion and also for its 
“social peace”. One journalist felt that poor people, even if they were white, were likely 
to subscribe to the Communist party if they stayed in Réunion. He had a radical vision of 
Réunion’s future: either the island made the effort to increase emigration and local 
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standards of living, or “in 15 years, the methodical work of the Communist Party in 
Réunion will bear its fruit of blood and anger, harvested by thousands of sugar cane 
knives.14 Le Monde, visiting Réunion in 1959, reiterated these fears. The Petit Blanc 
population was poor and “poverty makes a bad advisor”: the result would surely be that 
the Communist Party would follow the Antillean example, and declare Réunion should 
become autonomous from France.  
At its height, there were 2,000 Réunion Island migrants on the Madagascar farm. 
Despite its location in Madagascar, it was reliant on heavy subsidies from France to 
function. In 1959, the Prefecture of Réunion had already concluded that it was not viable 
as a larger model. There were 260 families in Sakay, and it cost 680 million French 
Francs to run, amounting to 5 million French Francs for each family.15 Réunion Islanders 
left the island in the 1950s with the idea of starting a new life. Whilst the pro-French 
President Tsiranana was in place, the Sakay project remained. However, when the regime 
changed in 1975 and the 2nd Malagasy Republic was declared, Réunion Islanders were 
forced to leave and lost everything they had built.  
The Sakay project was never more than experimental, and did not solve the social 
problems of Réunion Island. Emigration would, however, continue to be seen as a 
solution for Réunion Island; however, in the following decade, emigration would be to 
Metropolitan France, rather than elsewhere. By the 1960s Réunion Island would be much 
more tightly linked to Metropolitan France through Michel Debré’s migration bureau to 
Metropolitan France, the BUMIDOM (see chapter 4). The history of the Réunionnais 
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colonization of Sakay is a fascinating addition to the story of the French colonization of 
Madagascar. It challenges conventional histories of French decolonization in Madagascar 
and in the Indian Ocean more generally. While French decolonization is usually assumed 
to have been completed by 1962, Réunionnais colonization of Madagascar continued 
until 1977. 
ii. Unemployment: the unintended consequence of introducing French social 
legislation 
In the 1950s, Madagascar was one potential solution to the poverty of Réunion Island. 
Another choice was to import French social legislation to improve conditions in Réunion. 
Social legislation pertaining to worker rights was introduced in Reunion in 1949, but this 
was not enforced until 1952.  
In 1952 Réunion’s social legislation was vastly inferior to Metropolitan France. 
Although contributions and income brackets for eligibility were the same as in 
Metropolitan France, in Réunion payouts were inferior. Family allocations in Réunion 
were also inferior to Metropolitan levels, even though contributions were the same. In 
contrast to the rest of the workforce, Réunionnais or Metropolitan French civil servants in 
Réunion received the same social benefits and payouts as in Metropolitan France. This 
created a highly unequal two-tier employment system. 
From 1952, eligible salaried workers were allowed to receive an old age pension 
on retirement. They were in the minority, as the majority of workers were seasonal 
laborers or sharecroppers. In 1954 the Prefect reported that this small group of retired 
salaried workers was very pleased with their benefits and their new buying power. 
Although the old age pension benefits appeared to be successful, the Prefect was not 
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pleased. The institution of employer contributions had led to mass unemployment and 
“previously unknown levels of poverty.”  
The problem was that employers also had to contribute to social welfare programs 
when they paid their employees. Inspectors came round to employers and backdated dues 
to the law’s inception in 1949. These employer contributions added to the economic 
elite’s unsympathetic view about applying Metropolitan laws in Réunion. The Prefect 
noted that the elites were “hostile to the application of social security … the fear of 
including sickness coverage [to contributions] has pushed employers to sack their 
[domestic workers and sharecroppers].”16 The Prefect cited an employer who had been 
inspected and who had then immediately sacked 150 workers. Numerous landowners 
sacked their sharecroppers in order to invest in tractors and other mechanization. 
Sharecroppers who were out of work could not, in turn, hire seasonal or day labor. 
Agricultural unemployment grew at an alarming rate.17  
Thus, the introduction of social laws in 1952 created a perverse situation where 
the administration then had to pay for public works (chantiers de chômage) to employ 
people who could not feed their families because they had been sacked from their 
agricultural jobs, on account of the new employer charges. In 1954 Mayors in Réunion 
were allowed employ destitute workers in their communes on public works programs. 
The Mayors were exonerated from paying employer contributions for the workers. Thus 
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mai 1954 05/06/1954 
 
  126
they avoided paying the same charges which were supposed to protect the workers but 
had led to their unemployment.18  
In 1954, the Prefect of Reunion claimed that France’s social allocations in 
Réunion had created a new caste system. At the top of the scale were the rich landowners 
and factory owners who lived “in luxury which has become rare in the Metropole.” Then 
there were the civil servants paid by France, and paid over double French rates (2.2 times 
more than civil servants Metropolitan France). They benefitted from the Metropolitan 
regime of social security, and family benefits. On the next level down were the workers 
and employees of all racial origins who worked on a monthly salary and got some social 
security benefits. Workers in commerce had similar social protection.  
Then, much lower, were the workers who could not benefit from social 
protection; in fact the majority of Réunion Islanders. Sharecroppers cultivating sugar 
cane were not eligible for social security coverage. Seasonal laborers and day laborers 
were also not eligible for social security coverage either. According to the Prefect, this 
last category “lives in inexpressible poverty. The children are hardly dressed, or fed, and 
rickets and tuberculosis ravages these families.”19 
At the same time as the crisis of agricultural employment, the French 
administration increased funding for new building projects in Réunion, as part of the 
reconstruction plans to rebuild Réunion after the 1948 cyclone. Central government and 
the French Overseas Bank (CCFOM) funded the construction of schools, hospitals and 
public administrative buildings. The French Overseas Bank also gave financial incentives 
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such as low interest loans and subsidies for private companies to renew their built 
environments.20 This funded a construction boom all over Réunion, especially in St 
Denis.  
New jobs in construction seemed to be the obvious solution to agricultural 
unemployment.21 Many agricultural workers migrated to St Denis to work in 
construction. As the number of urban migrants to St Denis increased throughout the 
1950s the Communists sought to recruit new political supporters who had freed 
themselves of the rural political obligations to property owners. Communist Party gained 
strong political support in St Denis, and shantytowns grew further thanks to urban 
migration. The administration was wary of the Communist Party’s increasingly anti-
French stance, and set out to repress its popularity with two strategies. The administration 
sought to silence any anti-French dissent and started to monitor all suspected enemies of 
the administration. The administration then attempted to tackle the problem of urban 
worker housing by building social housing with the SIDR, in an attempt to push people 
away from Communism by improving their material conditions.22  
III. Interpreting race in Réunion  
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By 1953 the PCF structure in Réunion was weak. There was no obvious political 
successor to the ageing Raymond Vergès and grassroots organization was losing 
momentum. Despite appearances, the party was extremely weak and the coffers were 
empty. Although the French administration had blacklisted the party newspaper 
Témoignages as “receiving orders direct from the Komintern” and no longer published 
official notices in it, the newspaper was now published only very infrequently.23  
Dr Vergès’ son, Paul Vergès, returned to Réunion in 1953. Prefect Philippe considered 
Paul Vergès’ return was a glimmer of hope for the Communist Party in Réunion, which 
had been riven with internal battles. The Prefect saw that Paul Vergès would provide the 
“necessary Creole element” for federating Réunionnais electors around him.24 However, 
the Prefect worried about the type of political struggles Vergès would be organizing in 
the name of the Réunion Communist Party. He predicted “a long period of agitation 
which could go as far as serious unrest.”25 
In 1954 the specter of decolonization was raised violently and irreversibly for 
France. Despite the loss of Syria and Lebanon in 1946, and the violent uprising in 
Madagascar in 1947, France’s resounding loss of the French fort at Dien Bien Phu was 
highly significant after a war lasting seven years. For millions of people worldwide, Dien 
Bien Phu was the proof that there was another viable option to suffering European 
colonization, and the Vietnamese had just proved it. Just months afterwards, in 
November 1954, the Algerian revolt was launched.  
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The French administration saw Réunion as part of the colonial world which it 
wanted to retain. “I attach special importance to …the defense of our territories in the 
Indian Ocean” emphasized Prefect Philip.26 In the context of Indochina and Algeria, 
criticism of the French regime in Réunion was potentially an attack on French power in 
the Indian Ocean. The Prefecture was particularly sensitive to any political allegiances 
which appeared to be based on ethnic affiliation with Chinese or Vietnamese 
Communism, Indian nationalism or Pan-Arabism. However, this racialized view of 
anticolonial threats missed the reasons for the growing popularity of the PCF in Réunion, 
which claimed autonomy for Réunion in order to end an inequality in Réunion which was 
not based on racial distinctions.  
i. Reinventing loyal Réunionnais as white 
The new Prefect of Réunion Pierre Philip attempted to cast the “true” inhabitants of 
Réunion as white French (including the ex-slave populations) all others being “foreign”. 
However Réunion was not racially readable along these lines and the attempt proved 
futile. Paul Vergès more successfully recalibrated PCF strategy along race lines. He 
claimed that Metropolitan French bureaucrats in Réunion were foreigners, rather than 
fellow French citizens.  
In the new racial vision of Réunion Island’s inhabitants, the French loyalty of the 
landowning Creole elites was not questioned. Even if they did not agree with the 
application of French social laws in Réunion, and they distrusted the French 
administration, the Creole elites were opposed to the Communist party. They were 
                                                 
 




broadly supportive of France’s presence in Réunion even if they argued about how that 
should occur. They were also socially white, which made it easier to cast them as French. 
The loyalty of poor African and French-origin Réunion Islanders was not doubted either 
by the French administration: they appeared to be dominated by the economic elites, and 
the African-origin Réunion Islanders did not appear maintain any political ties with their 
homelands.  
However, the French administration was suspicious of Paul Vergès’ activities in 
Madagascar and from this time the administration portrayed Paul Vergès as a disloyal, 
non-French Communist. In addition to his Communist campaign in Réunion, Paul 
Vergès was also suspected of helping with the Malagasy independence movements in the 
name of the Communist Party. The Prefect of Réunion asked the French High 
Commissioner of Madagascar to survey Paul Vergès’ activities there and send the secret 
police to follow him.27   
Paul Vergès was cast as a racially suspicious Frenchman because his mother was 
from Indochina.28 The fear of the “half-blood” had not been a part of Réunion Island 
political culture for decades because the elite colored population had achieved a modicum 
of social acceptance.29 The French administration deployed images of Vergès’ origins as 
“Asian” and his political culture as untrustworthy and non-French.  
The dangerous influence of other Indian Ocean polities on Réunion also worried 
the Prefect. He attempted to recast Réunion as part of France, and block any political or 
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cultural influences from the exterior. Not all recent Chinese and Muslim Indian 
immigrants to Réunion from the 1920s and 1930s had become French citizens. Their 
children could be naturalized as French.  This worried the Prefect because in his view, 
these children could never be real French citizens. “The application of the [Metropolitan 
French] ordinance on nationality … is heretical in this overpopulated department... 
because it permits the francisation of definitively inassimilable elements in contrast to 
Spanish and Italians …that come to France and integrate our customs in the second 
generation.”30  
The French administration wanted to be assured of unshakeable French loyalty in 
Réunion and began surveillance of potentially disloyal ethnic groups. The Prefect ordered 
the police to be vigilant about the Indian-origin populations. The police followed Muslim 
Réunion Islanders to meetings to check for signs of dissent to French authority.31 Prefect 
Philip was also worried about the growing economic power of these non-white groups.  
“The problem of foreigners, which has been resolved in a liberal fashion in 
Metropolitan France, should be envisaged cautiously [in Réunion]. The Asians, 
Pakistanis and Chinese have a practical monopoly over retail and bulk sales, and have 
large amounts of capital at their disposal in this territory where the availability of credit is 
rare.” 32 The Prefect worried that “[Muslim groups]…own entire streets to the detriment 
of Creoles”33 He accused Muslims of having too much financial capital. “The [Réunion] 
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import trade is going to second-generation foreigners who an overgenerous law makes 
French. The Prefect also worried whether Chinese-origin Réunion Islanders would 
support French interests, or Chinese ones.34 
 The Prefect’s worried about the potential political influence of nearby Mauritius 
which had a majority Hindu population with Indian origins. He feared that if Mauritius 
became independent from Britain, Mauritius might fall into the hands of Indian 
nationalists, and become a satellite state of India. “To avoid a similar fate befalling 
Réunion … I have immediately stopped all Indian immigration.”35 He considered that the 
‘Indians’ “were singularly turbulent on a political level … and make a hostile campaign 
against our country.”36 Administrative fear of these groups grew when it transpired that 
some Indian-origin groups were holding meetings and publishing newspapers which were 
openly critical of the French regime. The real danger was that this dissent, led by 
educated groups, would spread to the workers.  
It has been noted that … at the end of the day, in front of the mosque of St Denis, 
groups of Muslims are deep in discussion for hours at a stretch. In addition, in the 
area of [Camp] Lataniers, some of them go from house to house and talk late into 
the night with their coreligionnaires who are less lucky than they are… This 
propaganda has been disseminated since seven Indians coming from Mombasa 
transited in La Reunion on the 28th May. These fanatics trouble minds by 
associating Islam with the Arab League.37 
 
When some Muslims in St Denis dared to go and talk to people in the Camps of St Denis, 
the Prefect feared popular uprising. This was the same fear of urban workers which had 
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had led the Police to survey Dr Raymond Vergès’ 1948 march through the St Denis 
Camps.  
The Prefect accused the Réunion Island Muslim groups of having been 
historically disloyal to France. However, Abd El Krim had probably been more 
influential for the Vergès family who had frequently visited the house of Abd El Krim in 
Réunion during the 1930s.  
 These political contacts – from travelers on boats from East Africa, to the 
influence of various Indian Ocean nationalisms underlines that Réunion could not be held 
into a singular model with the Metropole. Réunion was located in the Indian Ocean. Both 
its geography and Réunion Islanders themselves resisted attempts to designate Réunion 
Island’s ideological location. 
ii. Attempts to define Communist supporters  
One of the reasons that Paul Vergès had returned to Réunion was to attempt to take back 
Communist control of the city government of St Denis in the April 1953 elections.  
In the event, the Communist Party won a significant number of seats, but not enough for 
them to secure the majority. Paul Vergès won 13 seats, Raphael Babet won 7 seats, and 
Jules Olivier won 11 seats, and was voted as Mayor. 38 Raphael Babet portrayed himself 
as the champion of the large landowners and factory owners of the island; Jules Olivier, 
voted as Mayor, presented himself as the champion of the small planters.39  
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The Communist Party attempted to attract the small planters through two new 
strategies: agrarian reform, and anti-French feeling. Agrarian reform was an obvious 
claim, since a small number of landowners held the majority of cultivable land in 
Réunion.40 French critique was a new idea, but tapped into popular feelings of jealousy 
and mistrust of the increasing number of Metropolitan French (or Zorey) civil servants 
working in Réunion’s administration. From 1953 the Communists focused on criticizing 
the Zorey population and the disproportionately large salaries they earned in the civil 
service. Zoreys were considered to be whites from France although they were not all 
Metropolitan French. A growing number were middle-class Pieds Noirs, white people 
who had left Algeria and come to settle in Réunion.41Although Zoreys were a tiny part of 
Réunion’s population, they were overrepresented in the French administration, especially 
at managerial level.42  
The Communist Party had earlier sought for Réunion Islanders to have the same 
rights as people in Metropolitan France. Here they upturned the definition of French 
rights in Réunion. Now, they proposed that Metropolitan French should not have the right 
to come to Réunion as civil servants and earn money. The PCF hid the fact that Réunion 
Islanders working with the same qualifications in the civil service received the same 
salary as these Zoreys, including prominent members of the Communist party. The PCF 
party disingenuously and successfully mobilized popular discontent at the Zoreys, as if it 
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were the Metropolitan French civil servants who were responsible for the poverty of 
Réunion Islanders, instead of the elite Creoles.  
Paul Vergès spent much of 1955 decrying the poverty of Réunion Islanders, the 
rising unemployment, the insufficient development of Réunion, increased layoffs, and the 
continued lack of parity between Réunion and Metropolitan French social welfare. 
Against a fragmented right wing, the Communist Party’s activities in Réunion produced 
clear results. The Communist Party won two out of Réunion’s three available seats for 
the French National Assembly in 1956. In that year they also held 11 General Council 
seats out of 36 and controlled 7 of Réunion’s 23 municipal governments. This year was 
the height of their electoral success and the French administration saw these results as 
worrying.43 It now believed that in Réunion “[French] authority should have absolutely 
no opposition” in Réunion.44 
In the same year as the Communist Party won election victories, Prefect Perreau-
Pradier arrived. He viewed the Communist Party as dangerously anti-French and 
recognized that they were the most powerful political group, much more effective than 
the politicians supported by the landowners. “Opposite the extremist action developed by 
Paul Vergès, there is only a very limited, undynamic and badly coordinated 
opposition.”45  
Perreau-Pradier now sought to discredit the Communists and decided that the 
French administration should help the landowners regain their political control of 
Réunion. The Prefect encouraged the mass resignations of city councils: when Dr 
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Raymond Vergès died in 1957, the Prefect encouraged eight of the other councilors to 
resign. New elections were then needed in the city council of St André. During these 
elections, the Prefect officially sanctioned electoral fraud against the communist Party. 
Voters were denied electoral cards and the boundaries of voting districts were changed, to 
ensure that Paul Vergès only got just over 2% of the vote in his father’s district.46  
Thanks to these tactics, by 1959 the Communists had been squeezed out of their 
two seats in the National Assembly, and they lost had their majority in all but one of 
Réunion’s city councils, thanks to the French administration’s sanctioning of electoral 
fraud.47  
In the same year the Communist Party in Réunion decided split from the French 
Communist Party. Although Vergès was still the head of the party, it was now the 
Réunion Communist Party (PCR), independent from Metropolitan France. This followed 
the Antilles’ break with the French Communist Party in 1956. The Réunion Communist 
Party developed a new program, which broke with any remaining support for the idea of 
Réunion’s total assimilation with France. The Communist Party now claimed the right for 
Réunion’s self-determination, the right to manage its own affairs independently from the 
foreign French colonial power.  
The Réunion Communist Party now cast Réunionnais as the oppressed colonial 
people, who sought autonomy and a locally elected legislative assembly. They declared 
that Réunionnais Creole was a separate language (a radical proposition in the political 
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context). They proved their commitment to the “Réunionnais people” by inaugurating 
their first meeting by a public performance of maloya by a musician named Firmin Viry. 
Maloya is a Reunion Island musical form associated with African-origin peoples which 
was not part of public French culture. Thus the new Communist Party underlined its 
commitment to cultural forms associated with slavery.48 
 
When the Communist Party declared its new program in 1959 the Prefecture 
attempted to identify who supported the Communists in Réunion, in order to discredit 
political mobilization by the Communist Party. The Prefecture created a list of potential 
attributes of Communist Party supporters: religion, skin color, literacy, “insular 
mentality”, attachment to France and poverty. However none of these characteristics 
were self-explanatory in Réunion. They did not allow the French administration to 
understand support for the Communist Party any more easily. Rather they revealed more 
about the French administration’s assumptions about Réunion Island society. 
The first attribute of Communist Party supporters was that they were suspected of 
being “profoundly Catholic”, in other words that they were credulous. Regarding skin 
color, the Prefect’s report suggested that although the Réunion Island population was 
very mixed, Communist party meetings “attracted more dark skinned people than a 
moderate meeting.” Yet as the following photographs of the creation of the left-wing 
Union of French Women in 1958 and the PCR in 1959 show that members with diverse 
ancestries represented in the photographs.  
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Figure 3.2 Creation of Union des Femmes Réunionnaises 1958 
 
 
Figure 3.3 Creation of PCR 1959  
 
Figure 3.2 shows the creation of the Union des Femmes Réunionnaises in 
September 1958 by Isnelle Amelin, a General Councilor, and longstanding friend of 
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Raymond Vergès.49 The photograph underlines the broad racial and class support for 
women’s rights in Réunion, with some of the women wearing the white uniforms of 
domestic servants and others in more bourgeois clothing. There is a similar diversity of 
racial origins and also a significant female presence at the 1959 meeting to create the new 
Réunion Communist Party in Le Port.50 In the background of this photo are paintings of 
two members who had been killed in electoral violence in 1958 and 1959 in Réunion.  
As the Le Monde journalist had underlined in 1949, support for the Communists 
or the right wing could not be divided along racial lines. Part of the attraction of the PCR 
was hope for social and material improvement in a time when the majority of Réunion’s 
population was still living in significant poverty. The Prefect’s analytical grille was racial 
fantasy, mapping Metropolitan prejudices on to Réunion.  
Illiteracy and support of the Communist were also linked for the Prefect who 
considered that “the masses are interested more in the man than in the doctrine. It is 
doubtful whether the PCR, the only to have made efforts in this direction, has formed 
more than 50 conscious and enlightened Marxists.” In addition to the elitist assumption 
that people could not understand their own situations of poverty, or the message produced 
by any political group, the vast majority of Réunion Islanders were illiterate, whatever 
their political leanings. This is proved by the Réunion Island national service selection 
only two years later in 1961. Only half of the total cohort of young men was physically 
able to serve. Out of this half a mere 3 % had a high school diploma, 13 % had followed 
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some high school studies, 26 % had a primary school education, 32 % claimed they could 
read and write, and 26 % were illiterate.51  
More revealing of the Metropolitan French stereotyping of Réunion Islanders’ 
desires and actions, the Prefect also thought Communist supporters were more likely to 
have an “insular mentality”. They supported the Communist Party because they were 
attached to “their little country which they consider the center of the world… thus the 
anti-Metropolitan contestations have met with so much success.” In conclusion, the 
Prefect noted “the extreme poverty of a part of the mass [of Réunion Islanders] where 
unemployment is chronic … [this] makes the electorate sensitive to the pressures and 
promises in relation to its material existence (distributions of rice before the elections for 
example).”52 Although the Prefect claimed to understand why people might support the 
Communist Party, he was actually describing Réunion Island’s working class society in 
general, and the landlord-tenant relations which structured economic and political life, 
especially at election time.  
The Prefecture’s description of Communist supporters as incapable of 
understanding their material situation, as driven only by material gain, as illiterate and 
“dark skinned” revealed more about the racial and class assumptions of a Metropolitan 
administrator in a French colony than it did about the real hopes and fears of Réunion 
Islanders, as the following example of Nelson Dijoux, a Communist supporter, 
demonstrates. 
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iii. A militant Communist supporter: the example of Nelson Dijoux 
Nelson Dijoux and his family lived in Ouaki near St Louis in the southwest of Réunion. 
In 1958 they were thrown off the land they had worked as sharecroppers. The Payets, 
their landowners, had decided that it was no longer economically viable to have 
sharecroppers work their land. Nelson Dijoux had recently married. He and his wife left 
the plot his family had worked in Ouaki. They took the bus to St Denis where there were 
jobs on the growing number of construction sites, funded by French money. 
Nelson found a job as a stonemason on a construction site of the new Ecole 
Normale. He went to live in Camp Ozoux, a growing neighborhood of poor workers just 
outside the center of St Denis. Camp Ozoux housed many workers in thatched houses 
patched up with wood and corrugated iron, such as Figure 3.4. below.53  
After the original creation of the Communist Party in 1947, Nelson Dijoux’s 
family had been profoundly and personally affected by the violent opposition between 
Communists and anticommunists in the rural areas of St Louis. The combination of rural 
poverty, strong political difference and the institution of employer contributions all 
seriously affected Nelson Dijoux and his family.  
Nelson Dijoux’s father had joined the PCF in 1947 and had publicly supported 
Claudine Saramito, the Metropolitan French Communist Party Secretary in Réunion. 
During the 1948 General Council elections Nelson Dijoux’s father had acted as 
Saramito’s bodyguard. Neither by the police nor by the anticommunist opposition 
approved of Nelson Dijoux’s father.  
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[Rivière St Louis was notorious for electoral violence] … the rich spent money on 
buying off the poor. They would give them money. Sometimes alcohol. They also 
paid thugs to support them, and they were helped by … the police, the gendarmes. 
You couldn’t open your mouth. It was impossible to talk about the Left … there 
was too much revenge in Rivière St Louis. 
 
After the 1948 elections, Nelson’s father had fled the family home in fear of reprisals. 
His father hid in a ravine and with friends in the town of Le Tampon. Nelson vividly 
remembered how the Mayor of St Louis paid thugs to camp outside the Dijoux family 
house for a month. He claimed that the police had even come to search the family house 
looking for his father and Saramito. This incident made a huge impression on the 13 year 
old boy. From that moment Nelson Dijoux started to become angry and yearn for a “total 
liberation” of Réunion from corrupt political power.  
As a youth, Nelson played the trumpet in the St Louis brass band which was 
funded by the right wing city council. Nelson was the only member of the band who was 
from an overtly Communist family. One evening, after returning from playing in La 
Montagne, Nelson got off the bus in St Louis and his fellow band members attacked him 
from behind, knocking him out. Political opposition and violence, even inside a brass 
band which played together, was unfortunately normal in the divided political atmosphere 
of St Louis in the 1950s.  
On his arrival in St Denis in 1958 Nelson Dijoux quickly became a CGTR trade 
union leader for the construction workers and an active member of the Communist Party. 
“I was … ready to physically smash things up … on the construction sites if I saw 
someone mistreating a bloke I’d run after him, I was ready to give him some … I was 
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furious, furious, furious! I was always furious with people who exploited the poor 
underdog (le petit malheureux), I was always against that.” 54  
Conditions on the construction sites could be as socially oppressive as in the rural 
areas, and the work was physically demanding. Figure 3.4 shows the unequal working 
conditions on a construction site in St Denis. Workers were rechanneling a stream named 
Ruisseau des Noirs in preparation for building a SIDR social housing project called La 
Source. Many of the workers who appear to be of African ancestry are barefoot, and 
carry individual rocks on their head, to fill the concrete canal. The overseers standing on 
the rocks in the canal are wearing stout boots and socks.55 
 
 
Figure 3.4 Construction workers in St Denis c1961 
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The importance of Nelson Dijoux’s political attitude and his Communist activism in the 
St Denis camps and on the construction sites can be measured by the lengths that the 
French administration took to silence him. A few months after his arrival in St Denis, 
Nelson Dijoux claims that the extremely right-wing Mayor of St Denis, Gabriel Macé, 
offered him a job as a guardian of the St Denis cemetery. As the job was in the city 
government, it was paid at the Metropolitan rate, with overseas weighting - more than the 
double of a civil servant in Metropolitan France.56 The job was worth 40,000CFA per 
month, an enormous increase from Nelson Dijoux’s 3,500CFA monthly wage as a 
stonemason. In addition Macé offered Nelson Dijoux a house, a driving license and a car 
as long as he became a member of the right wing, and stopped his Communist Party 
activities. “But I wasn’t interested in riches mais la richesse, mi cherchait pas ça”, 
Nelson Dijoux commented to me, fifty years later. Although Nelson Dijoux claimed to 
remain true to his Communist convictions, many other Communist activists would have 
been, and probably were, tempted by the material comforts offered by working in Macé’s 
city council. 
 Gabriel Macé’s flagrantly illegal electoral practices in 1962 created the re-election 
which enabled ex-Prime Minister Michel Debré to gain a National Assembly seat in 
Réunion (see chapter 4). Macé’s attempt to buy off Nelson Dijoux demonstrates the 
threat that an angry Communist agitator posed to the political and social order of St 
Denis. It also emphasizes the increasing financial power of elected leaders people at 
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vastly higher salaries than private-sector workers. These elected leaders would become 
politically and economically important from the 1960s as they took over positions in the 
French administration (see Chapter 5).  
Despite the growing rural unemployment which led agricultural workers to seek 
construction jobs in St Denis, and which enabled angry men like Nelson Dijoux to seek 
social justice through Communism, the majority of the landowners, other right-wing 
supporters and the French administration completely ignored the claims of the poor in 
Réunion to French social legislation until the Communist Party appeared to pose a threat 
to the established social order. In 1956 Prefect Philip left Réunion. In his final dispatches 
to Paris he emphasized his fear that the poverty of the Réunionnais population would 
prove fertile ground for Paul Vergès and the Communist Party. Worse, Paul Vergès and 
the Communist Party might even have valid criticisms against the French 
administration’s handling of the poverty in Réunion. The Prefect claimed that it would be 
impossible to make changes in Réunion while the French administration in Réunion was 
forced to have every policy approved by different ministries in Paris.  
I hope that my successor obtains the devolution of powers which I have vainly 
asked for.  
Without those, Paul Vergès will be right when he said last May, making 
parallels between Algeria and Réunion [that] ‘there is no reason for the Creole 
people not to demand its independence, in order to [also] escape slavery and 
capitalist exploitation’57 
 
From 1956 the French administration would attempt to apply a new version of French 
welfare: social housing to improve worker’s material conditions and thus their political 
views.  
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The Communists claimed that France’s administration of Réunion was 
inadequate, and increasingly motioned that Réunion Islanders should have the power to 
govern themselves autonomously. In the face of these Communist claims for French 
social justice in Réunion, and in the context of the growing anticolonial movements in the 
Indian Ocean and in the French Empire, the French administration in Réunion attempted 
to recalibrate French citizenship as white. It put populations that it considered to be “non-
French” under surveillance.  
Similarly the administration’s attempts to place Réunion in a singular relationship 
between the Metropole and the Colony were defied- by Réunion Islanders and their 
diverse racial origins, by their political contacts and affiliations, and by the 
administration’s own brief colonial project in Madagascar. 
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CHAPTER 4 URBAN LANDHOLDING AND POLITICAL 
LOYALTY IN A ST DENIS SHANTYTOWN 1954-1963 
 
 
In 1952 the Prefect noted that “there is poverty [in La Réunion] which completely 
surpasses what one is used to noticing in the suburbs of the big Metropolitan [French] 
towns.” 1 In the same year the SIDR housing agency decided to pay speculating Creole 
landowners high prices for land to build houses for Metropolitan civil servants. The SIDR 
judged that paying extortionate land prices would be more be more cost-effective than 
building worker housing which would need “a costly cleanup operation [either] in an 
unventilated piece of government land behind the colonial gardens in the place known as 
“Shit Ravine” or in “the stinking plots of land in Camp Ozoux which are covered with 
filth.”2 Réunion elites and French administrators in the SIDR had a public mission to 
improve housing but they considered themselves financially incapable of cleaning up 
Réunion’s Camps or shantytowns and providing urban infrastructure for poor workers in 
St Denis.  
The SIDR’s willful disdain for the living conditions of poor Réunion Islanders – 
symptomatic of the indifference of the Creole landowners and the French administration - 
enabled the PCF to gain strong and effective political support in the Camps of St Denis. 
When the SIDR and the French administration finally decided that the Communist Party 
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was a political threat to the social order of Réunion in 1956, SIDR housing policy 
changed. The SIDR decided to build social housing to create political allegiance to the 
French administration in the neighborhood of Petite Ile-Camp des Noirs, a shantytown in 
St Denis.  
 The SIDR did not merely provide worker housing in Petite Ile. By rehousing poor 
workers in SIDR accommodation, the SIDR took on the role of a landlord, a role 
normally played by Creole landowners. Housing poor workers was more than providing 
them with running water, a cyclone-resistant house and getting them to pay regular rent. 
If the SIDR was to house poor workers it meant that a government-funded agency was 
going to intervene in the Réunionnais system of tenant-landlord relations. The stakes of 
shantytown destruction were also the stakes of changing and controlling the political 
allegiances between landlords and tenants. From 1947 the Communist Party had 
consolidated political support in urban areas through control of shantytown land. The 
growing migration to St Denis had brought a new base of political support. The SIDR’s 
new social housing policy would upset the conflict between the Communists and the 
landowners by becoming another landholder. In the midst of this conflict, the poor 
residents of Petite Ile sought a way of buying their own houses from the SIDR to be free 
of landlord-tenant political obligations.  
Interest in bidonvilles or shantytowns has resurged in French history in the 
context of the Franco-Algerian conflict of the 1954-1962.3 Historians have also focused 
on the way this conflict simultaneously played out in the shantytowns of Paris. From 
merely being seen as spaces of chaos, historians have examined the urban forms of the 
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shantytowns.4 In the context of the Algerian conflict, French shantytowns have become 
almost synonymous with broader police repression and violence – and resistance and 
confrontation.5  
This chapter examines the social arrangements of a Camp, or shantytown in St 
Denis which became a site of contestation between the SIDR, the Communist party and 
local residents. This shantytown was not part of violent police conflicts or subject to 
dawn raids, as Paris shantytowns were. In the context of France’s attempt to maintain 
political control over Réunion this first shantytown operation reveals how the French 
administration attempted to gain political control over poor Réunionnais in urban areas. 
By doing so the French administration actually became a player in the landholding 
conflicts which had governed social life in Réunion. The French administration had not 
managed to fundamentally change landlord-tenant relations in Réunion. Rather, it had 
started to take part in them.  
I. Urban landlord-tenant relations in Petite Ile/Camp des Noirs 
 
The city of St Denis was founded in 1669 by the first governor of Réunion Island. In 
1738 St Denis became the capital of Réunion, replacing St Paul. Only a few decades after 
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tenants of the colonial administration in Réunion. These government workers did not pay 
rent, and the map marks that their “residence is tolerated in Petite Ile.”12 Although the 
land was owned by the government, this rent arrangement is similar to the rural landlord-
tenant relations described in Chapter Two. The poorest workers were allocated land to 
live on according to their employer’s goodwill – in this case the colonial government of 
Réunion. The poorest workers could only hope to acquire land through the patronage of 
landowners. 
 Between 1850 and 1936 Réunion became the destination of many indentured 
laborers, first from India and other parts of the Indian Ocean world, and from Madagascar 
through 1936. Some of these Malagasy indentured laborers worked on the colonial 
government land in Petite Ile, and Malagasy troops were also stationed in Camp des 
Noirs during the Second World War.13  By the 1950s Camp des Noirs was also frequently 
known as Petite Ile (I will refer to the area as Petite Ile for the rest of the chapter). By the 
1950s, many residents in Petite Ile had Malagasy surnames or Malagasy-speaking 
grandparents and some were the descendents of indentured laborers, such as the Perny 
family.14  
Grandmother Perny had come over to Réunion as a child from Madagascar to join 
a relative already living on the island.15 Grandfather Perny had possibly been an 
indentured laborer or was the son of a Malagasy-speaking indentured laborer. Both spoke 
Malagasy. Grandfather Perny worked from a handcart delivering barrels from the 
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distillery in Bas de la Rivière to the Chinese shopkeepers all over St Denis. By 1958 three 
householders named Perny lived in Petite Ile.16 Grandfather Perny also had seven 
daughters, who had all married into other families in Petite Ile. As a child in the 1960s, 
Philippe Perny would run behind Grandfather Perny’s handcart with all the other Perny 
grandchildren, while his grandfather did his rounds and occasionally threw the 
grandchildren bananas to catch.  
i. Communist control in St Denis 
In the 1950s both the Creole and French administrations viewed Petite Ile as one of the 
poorest areas of St Denis. The St Denis city council’s list of people who received poor 
relief included a number of Petite Ile widows on it in 1955.17 People living in Petite Ile 
would have been attracted to the Communist party because of their poverty and the 
proximity of the Communist Party headquarters: only ten minutes’ walk on the other side 
of the St Denis River (see Figure 4.3, below).18 In addition, the Communist Party was a 
landholder in Petite Ile. 
In 1948 the old colonial government land of Petite Ile was transferred to the 
Réunion Island General Council. The Communist Party had a majority in the General 
Council at that time and used the General Council land to help supporters of the 
Communist Party. The Communist Party replicated rural tenant-landlord relations by 
allowing political supporters to pay low rent. This enabled the Communist Party to gain a 
core of political followers in Petite Ile who organized neighborhood support for the party, 
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and could make money themselves by charging rent on the land they leased for free from 
the Communist Party.  
 
 
Figure 4.3 Aerial view of Petite Ile and Bas de la Rivière, western St Denis, 1951  
 
Petite Ile was not the only place in St Denis where the Communist Party had a strong 
base of support. Other worker neighborhoods in St Denis were also bases of political 
support for the Communist Party, such as Camp Ozoux where the Communist Party also 
used land held by the General Council. As urban workers became tenants of the 
Communist Party they were encouraged to be politically active for the Communist 
party.19  
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From its creation, the Communist Party used the Camps to organize political 
meetings and demonstrations. In October 1948 the St Denis Police Commissioner went to 
investigate noise outside the Communist headquarters in St Denis, just ten minutes’ walk 
away from Camp Ozoux and Petite Ile. About thirty men were outside on the street, 
waiting to enter a party meeting. Political tensions between Communists and anti-
Communists were strong in St Denis. The day before, the PCF had lost a number of seats 
in the General Council election and the Prefect had banned any political gatherings. Dr 
Vergès, leader of the PCF, and Mme Isnelle Amelin, an important Communist elected 
leader came outside. They explained to the police that the Communist Party gathering 
was not a political meeting as such, it was merely being held to thank their electors. The 
Police Commissioner reported this to the Prefect, who allowed the meeting to take place.  
During the meeting, Mr. Thevenin vehemently accused the French administration 
in Réunion of colluding with the Creole right wing to stop the Communists from winning 
the elections in the violent electoral district of St Louis. After the meeting, and closely 
supervised by the Police, four hundred Communists walked through the St Denis Camps: 
Camp Ozoux, Camp Lataniers and then on to Butor, another poor neighborhood where 
Dr Vergès lived nearby. The supporters marched through the camps and grew in number 
until they stopped outside Dr Vergès’ house where he thanked them, saying that they 
should forget about “past slights” but only think actively of the Communists who were 
increasing in number all over the world. After inviting them to sing the Communist 
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International, Dr Vergès asked the crowd to go back home calmly. Five minutes later, 
about one thousand people dispersed peacefully into the adjoining streets of St Denis.20 
In this demonstration, the PCF deliberately marched through many of the St Denis 
Camps with the explicit aim of giving a visible party presence to areas which the 
bourgeoisie usually preferred not to visit. The PCF underlined the opposition between 
Communists and anticommunists, and critiqued the French administration in Réunion and 
its sanctioning of corruption. Their march was closely supervised by the police who were 
not afraid to control the Camps.  
The Communist Party also ran a small business to rent low cost social housing 
(HBM or habitations à bon marché) to workers in Camp Ozoux and Petite Ile. This gave 
the Communist party a political base for neighborhood canvassing in Petite Ile. It also 
conferred undeniable financial advantages for these tenants who sublet the plots and 
charged rents for people living on them. These houses were even more politically 
important when the General Council majority changed in 1948. 
On the same day as Raymond Vergès marched through the Camps of St Denis in 
October 1948, the St Denis Police Commissioner also went to calm a political quarrel 
between two women in Petite Ile. Madame Itare supported the landowner’s party, the 
RPF. Her neighbor Madame Tabère was a Communist who had close links to Dr Vergès’ 
Communist Party. Mme Tabère also sublet a number of the General Council HBM 
houses in Petite Ile thanks to these political connections.  
Mme Tabère went to the police and complained that Madame Itare had slapped 
her and threatened that the new RPF General Councilor for the district Mr. Vallon-
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Hoareau would force Mme Tabère and the other Communists to leave their HBM homes 
in Petite Ile.21 Mme Itare effectively threatened her neighbor that she had a new political 
patron in Mr. Vallon-Hoareau and that landlord-tenant relations in Petite Ile should 
change. She hoped to show that her political contact could evict Mme Tabère, who sublet 
land belonging to the General Council in Petite Ile to make a profit. The General Council 
had changed political majority. As the ‘landlord’ had changed from the Communist Party 
majority to the RPF, Mme Itare considered that the tenant in Petite Ile should change too, 
and the new tenant should be a supporter of Mr. Vallon-Hoareau, who now had the 
General Council seat in Petite Ile neighborhood. Although Mme Itare does not appear to 
have been successful, it is essential to underline that the fight between these two women 
was not about political ideology. It was about the importance of political patronage and 
its link to land.  
Urban workers in St Denis were not under the same types of surveillance and 
labor constraints as rural laborers. Yet HBM houses and General Council land tenure 
were part of an urban system of political favors based on a similar system of landholding 
and political patronage. Thus Communist political control of Petite Ile mirrored rural 
landlord-tenant relations. Vergès’ HBM housing business had created a strong base of 
Communist support. Mme Tabère rented houses cheaply because of her political 
connections. In turn she was a neighborhood organizer for the PCF in Petite Ile, giving 
her significant social and political power, which she did not intend to cede to Mme Itare.  
 
II. Discovering the poverty of Petite Ile  
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The increasing rural migration to urban areas had been ignored by the SIDR and the 
French administration through the early years of the SIDR. As early as 1951 the SIDR 
board recognized that “urbanism is a capital question which is linked to the social 
question.” In reality most of its managers did not consider poor, urban, Réunion Islanders 
as French people with social rights.22 Rather, in their board meetings, most SIDR 
managers described them as a homogeneous “mass”, undesirable and unknowable. They 
lived in “foul” Camps, which a SIDR board member loudly claimed “not to be in the 
habit of frequenting” in a 1950 meeting.23  
Yet by 1955 even the right wing press started to comment on the living conditions 
of the Camps of St Denis. The Catholic weekly Dieu et Patrie suggested that housing was 
the basic condition of the “social and religious promotion of the popular masses.” The 
journalist noted that while the SIDR and other organizations had started building houses 
for salaried workers, “the impoverished do not yet benefit from the ingenious 
[technicians] … who improve the living conditions of the middle and upper classes.”24  
This renewed interest in Petite Ile and the other Camps in St Denis was surely not 
coincidental. After all, Petite Ile had been a poor neighborhood near the center of St 
Denis since the 18th century. Creole elites had been used to seeing poverty around them 
for centuries and had remained indifferent to it. What had suddenly made the elites 
concerned about their fellow Réunion Islanders? 
 After the Second World War, France undertook a program of urban 
reconstruction, to rebuild its cities. These had suffered both from the ravages of war, and 
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from the longer-term effects of rent freezes which had discouraged investment in housing 
renovation, and scant investment in new construction. France sought to build cheap social 
housing in urban areas to alleviate the growing problems of shantytowns in the capital. 
Between four and five million homes were needed. Economic reforms and financial 
incentives were made during this period to encourage investment in social housing. 
However, although the state considered housing and urban planning primary social 
problems, the Algerian war meant that the major construction period in Metropolitan 
France occurred after the war’s end.25 
The Algerian conflict also led France to commit significant resources to alleviate 
dangerous ‘overcrowding’ in urban shantytowns and to ‘uplift’ rural peasants from their 
adobe homes or gourbis in the name of modernization. By 1953 the French government 
had built 10,000 new urban homes in the three Algerian communes.26 After 1958, French 
investment in Algeria continued on a massive scale in an attempt to find an economic 
solution to the troubles, and would include massive urban housing initiatives.27 This was 
known as the ‘Constantine’ plan - a mass modernization and infrastructure program to 
win hearts and minds. 
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Although Réunion had none of the legally entrenched social divisions of Algeria, 
the French administration and the Réunionnais Creole elites were certainly determined 
that the Communist Party would not gain power. The Communist Party’s continual calls 
for French social legislation, worker equality and land reform in Réunion had made the 
poverty of Réunion Islanders politically dangerous for the Creole elites, and for the 
French administration.  
In 1956 the same Catholic newspaper Dieu et Patrie warned that if everyone 
continued to ignore the poor (and by extension the claims of the Communist party) the 
poor would have cause to rise up. If they did not get “help” to get out of their 
impoverished state, there might be dangerous consequences. “One only has to open their 
eyes to note the imposing number of paillottes without comfort, which exist, with poor, 
pale, suffering people who live without color and naturally are not always [resigned to 
their fate] … we let them live and die in dirt and bitterness. 28 Thus, the French 
administration and the SIDR developed a new interest in the urban housing and Camps of 
St Denis, starting with Petite Ile.  
i. Investigating Petite Ile 
The SIDR had to go and investigate Petite Ile, to understand who lived there, and what 
their housing needs would be. Unlike housing policy in Algeria or the policies of housing 
immigrants in Metropolitan France, there was never any concern with the Réunionnais’ 
capacity for adaption to modern French-style living. French Algerian housing policy in 
the 1950s had rated Algerians on their capacity to assimilate – peasants, urban workers 
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and middle class had different housing built for them. The same was true for Algerian 
migrants to Metropolitan France. They were classified by social workers as to their 
degree of integration to Metropolitan French life. According to this rating in Metropolitan 
France, migrants would be allowed to move into French-style low cost housing or in a 
cité de transit to be re-educated.29 
 While housing policy and fears of a political enemy which opposed France led to 
some similarities with the French housing policy of Algeria, the French administration in 
Réunion appears to have assumed that Réunion Islanders would immediately adapt to 
French-style low cost housing, without any period of education.30 Despite Réunion 
Islanders’ housing styles of the homestead, and their preference for animal husbandry, 
and groups of family houses, the SIDR and the survey takers ignored these living 
preferences. Contemporary photographs of Petite Ile and other urban neighborhoods by 
the SIDR and the metropolitan French administration reveal much more concern over the 
building materials and the urban forms used by Réunionnais, which were considered 
unsightly by richer people. While paillottes were certainly scandalously poor housing for 
French citizens, at least they were picturesque. Urban neighborhoods where paillottes 
were often replaced by a mixture of corrugated iron and wood (such as Figure 4.4 below) 
were merely an eyesore.31 
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Figure 4.4 House in Camp Butor, St Denis c1964 
 
Le Progrès, a Reunion Island rightwing newspaper, criticized Petite Ile for being an 
ensemble of rubbish, “barrels and boxes all covered in dirty dust, which pretends to be a 
residential neighborhood in St Denis.”32 The tone of this editorial assumes that the living 
conditions of people in Petite Ile were the fault of the residents. Yet the City government 
of St Denis had completely ignored the surrounding Camps. There was no evacuation 
system for waste. In the town center each house or shack had privy pots or tinettes which 
were collected once or twice a week by the prisoners of St Denis jail. There were no 
tinettes in the Camps. Rather, householders dug pits in their back yards, or in the ditches 
by their houses.33  
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Figure 4.5 Le Chaudron c1964 
 
In Petite Ile as in other outlying areas of St Denis such as Le Chaudron (Figure 4.6) 
rubbish and human waste sometimes collected in ditches along the side of the narrow, 
unpaved roads.34 Because there was no drainage, during the rainy season, filthy puddles 
and rivulets sprang up, sometimes running through the houses themselves. The damp was 
exacerbated by the continually trickling public fountains. People got their water free, but 
it could take up to ten minutes to fill up one metal bucket. Figure 4.5 shows women doing 
the water chore barefoot with buckets in their hand, although this was often done by 
children.  
The photographers of these poor urban houses were not concerned with capturing 
the sense of community in these urban neighborhoods, family links or the way that social 
interaction was organized. Rather, they focused more on the unevenly assembled 
corrugated iron and flattened barrels, the mix of flimsy building materials: bamboo, 
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cardboard, corrugated iron, a flattened barrel and wood all for the boucan or kitchen in 
Figure 4.6.35 
 
Figure 4.6 Kitchen in Beaufonds c1974 
 
While the photographers’ visual representations of the Camps focused on architecture, 
the SIDR also interviewed people in the neighborhood of Petite Ile, in view of an 
eventual removal. These interviews were not always successful. When some residents 
were interviewed, they gave false names, one even claimed to be called ‘Indingue’ 
meaning mad.  
Nevertheless, the SIDR employees listed who was living in the houses, how many 
their children and what their income was. They then mapped out the location and housing 
material of all 190 families in the neighborhood of Petite Ile (see Figure 4.7).  
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The SIDR aerial map of Petite Ile (Figure 4.7, above) in October 1957 marks houses 
made of wood with an X, and paillottes have P on them (north is at the bottom of the 
map). The square houses drawn in bold at the very center of the map are the remains of 
the Communist party HBM houses. Although many of them were destroyed in the 1948 
cyclone, soon after their construction, the map details that many families had built 
wooden houses among the ruins.36 
The SIDR appears to have undertaken two different neighborhood studies, 
because two maps exist for Petite Ile, drawn in December 1955 and October 1957. 
Comparing the area of the Gentile Ravine in the top right hand corner of the 1957 map 
demonstrates that even in two years, the number of houses had increased, pointing to the 
growing urban migration to the neighborhood, and to St Denis in general (Figure 4.8 and 
4.9, above).The above maps show the V-shaped Gentille Ravine area of Petite Ile in 1955 
and 1957.37 The houses marked on the 1957 map (figure 4.9) are numbered 119-125 
corresponding to the SIDR household study.38  
119. Paillotte   Widow Albert Itare, 4 children 
120. Wooden house  Mr. and Mme Roger Isana, 3 children 
121. Wooden house Mr. and Mme Cecilien Boyer, 5 children 
122. Paillotte   Mr. and Mme Roger Montfort, 4 children, 1 other adult 
123. Paillotte  Mr. Emile Montfort and female companion, 3 children 
   Mr. and Mme Alfred Monfort, 2 children 
124. Wooden house Mr. and Mme Tram Van Hai, 2 children 
125. Paillotte  Mr. and Mme Réné Grondin, 3 children 
 
Table 4.1 Inhabitants of Gentille Ravine, Petite Ile 1957 
 
The maps show that even between 1955 and 1957 the people letting the land from the 
Communist Party had divided the land and further sublet it to make way for more houses. 
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This suggests an increasing population. In 1957 in the middle of Gentille Ravine, 
numbers 124 and 120 were new wooden houses which were not present in 1955. The new 
residents - Mme Isana and Tram Van Hai - were not named members of the Montfort 
family who were the majority family in Gentille Ravine. This confirms that there was a 
growing need for housing in St Denis, and tenants were amenable to subletting small 
parcels to new arrivals.  
The plot of the Boyer Family, number 121, also grew to two houses between 1955 
and 1957 suggesting a similar subletting arrangement, or that the family had grown large 
enough to need two houses. All the new houses were partly made of wood. This 
underlines the broader move in the 1950s away from constructing paillottes in urban 
areas to using pieces of wood and other materials, a trend which was noted by the French 
administration in St Denis.“Entirely wooden houses are a luxury; the house made of 
flattened barrels or even a paillotte covered with corrugated iron are signs of social 
advancement.”39 
In addition to building materials, this map also shows the diverse origins of 
Réunion Islanders living in Petite Ile. Three of the groups living near each other are 
members of the Montfort family, a French-origin name, but which also could have 
origins in post-1848 emancipation names of freedmen. The names Itare and Isana are 
Malagasy-origin names, suggesting that these people’s ancestors were indentured 
laborers. Tram Van Hai is probably Indochinese.  It is also important to note that all the 
families in this part of Petite Ile used the natural boundary of the Ravine Gentille to site 
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their houses, showing a respect for the annual flooding of the usually small ravine (hence 
its name Gentille, or kind).   
In 1956 SIDR report, a health official claimed that Petite Ile was “the last 
kingdom of the Anopheles mosquito” – and thus malaria - in St Denis. The SIDR 
considered Petite Ile as the bottom of the social scale compared to other Camps, a 
hideaway for the unfortunates who were ashamed of their abject poverty.  “[Petite Ile] 
…in St Denis [is] the worst … habitat … The only people that live here … are … poor, 
and in the deepest moral misery; this neighborhood is [separated from the town] and is 
considered by the poor people as a sort of refuge, sheltered from the view of the rest of 
the population.”40 
Petite Ile was a prime candidate for a new social housing scheme, based on Metropolitan 
French models. 
Residents of Petite Ile and other camps did not see their neighborhoods in the 
same way as the Creole urban elites and the Metropolitan administration in Réunion. One 
said to me “My house wasn’t dirty at all, it was clean. It was small, it wasn’t painted, but 
I spent all my time making little improvements, sweeping out the yard. I think that people 
just made the best of what they had.”41  
 For Mr. Jean-Paul Carpaye’s mother, Petite Ile was a social improvement. She 
had left the town of Le Tampon in the 1950s because there was no work and moved to St 
Denis, where she was a domestic servant for the rich Mauritian Tomi family in St Denis. 
She then moved to Petite Ile in 1957 to marry someone who already lived there. Living 
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independently in a house in Petite Ile was far better than living in the calbanons, sheds 
behind the Tomi family house which were reserved for the servants. Jean-Paul Carpaye’s 
paternal grandparents earned a living in the small rum factory run by the Hoareau family 
near Petite Ile. Next to the rum factory was the “manure” factory where St Denis 
prisoners brought the domestic waste of St Denis’ bourgeois houses to be treated.  
For many people, the smell of the manure factory at the edge of Petite Ile was 
fearful.”42 Jean-Paul Carpaye was used to the smell, however, and the prisoners. His 
biggest pleasure as a boy in Petite Ile was to go on Saturdays to help at the abattoir at the 
mouth of the St Denis River. He would be able to take home some bones for his mother 
to boil up, a sign of the family’s poverty. Along with other Petite Ile families, Jean-Paul 
Carpaye’s family attended the Communist meetings in Petite Ile which were run by Mme 
Tabère, but Communist party organizers were not demanding the renovation of their 
neighborhood. It was against their interests. It appears that Mme Tabère was subletting 
part of her low cost Communist Party land to other people in Petite Ile, for a profit. 
Renovating the neighborhood would lose her income.   
One of the people Mme Tabère may have been subletting to was the Juillerot 
family, who moved to Petite Ile just after the 1948 cyclone. The Juillerots considered that 
Petite Ile was a social step up from Bas de la Rivière, where the family’s house had been 
flooded by the rising waters caused by the 1948 cyclone (see Chapter 2). Eddy’s 
Juillerots parents had also moved to St Denis in the 1930s to escape the constraining rural 
plantation relations. Mme Juillerot was Hindu, and her ancestors had been indentured 
laborers who arrived in Réunion at the end of the 19th century from Southern India. She 
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moved to St Denis to work as a washerwoman in the St Denis river, only too happy to 
have left the constraining power relations in the plantations of St André. Eddy’s father 
came to St Denis after leaving a plantation in Etang-Salé-les-Hauts in the southwest of 
the island. Eddy emphasized that his father disliked the obedience to authority which 
working on the land required. In St Denis, Eddy’s father could work independently as a 
stonemason and a fisherman. Although his parents thought that they were now renting a 
house from a landowner, they actually rented their house from a woman who had been 
allocated land from the General Council to sublet. This renting arrangement would be 
upset when the SIDR decided to bulldoze the neighborhood.  
In 1955, the SIDR proposed building houses in Camp des Noirs-Petite Ile. It 
seemed like an efficient solution to the problem of land acquisition and the threat of 
growing Communist Party support in the shantytowns.43 Half of the land in Petite Ile was 
owned by the General Council which was willing to give the land to the SIDR for free.44 
In 1956 there was also new French funding for rental-only social housing.45 The Prefect 
hoped that the political and psychological impact of social housing would be important in 
Petite Ile.  
The SIDR underestimated the difficulty of applying social housing welfare in 
Réunion. Although the tin houses and thatched huts could be bulldozed and replaced with 
SIDR housing, the residents of the neighborhood were already entangled in political 
claims which were articulated through property leases and connections with local 
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political notables. A seemingly simple housing operation to rehouse 150 families, 600 
people, would prove complex.46 Networks of personal interest in Petite Ile intersected 
with different layers of landlord-tenant relations and their associated communist party 
support.47 
ii. Changing landlord-tenant relations in Petite Ile 
 
In 1956 the General Council gave ownership of the Petite Ile plot of land to the SIDR 
with the idea that the SIDR would use the land to build new housing.48 Since there were 
already people living in Petite Ile the SIDR decided to build workers’ houses, and re-
house the old residents on site. Following the Réunionnais landlord-tenant political 
tradition, the SIDR also agreed to find space to house people who worked for the General 
Council and the Prefecture.49  
People in Petite Ile considered that since they had enjoyed the right to live on the 
land for low rent for a long time, they now had the right to own the land. Longstanding 
landlord-tenant relations had given them a property right.  This understanding of the 
process of land acquisition mirrored the rural areas when the people around the sugar 
cane factory in grand bois had been given their right to own the land for social peace. The 
very poor could sometimes acquire land through the patronage of landowners. Only the 
rich had to buy land. No-one in the SIDR considered that Petite Ile residents’ rent 
agreements with the Communist Party in Réunion now had any importance for the future 
of the neighborhood. 
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The question of Petite Ile residents’ moral right to land was raised in the General 
Council.50  However, the SIDR was not going to give the residents of Petite Ile the right 
to own the land their families lived on. The Petite Ile project would rid St Denis of one of 
the most insalubrious neighborhoods at a very low cost, because the land had been given 
to the SIDR. Yet the question of rent was problematic for the SIDR. The population of 
Petite Ile was poor. They were much poorer than the usual middle class tenants of SIDR 
housing who had regular salaries and could afford to pay rent. How was the SIDR to 
build houses which the poorest residents of St Denis would be able to rent? There were 
190 families in Petite Ile, many of whom only worked seasonally or occasionally. 40 of 
these families were without any financial resources and according to the SIDR they were 
“indigent”.51 
The SIDR was not going to give the land to people in Petite Ile, so they were 
faced with two options. Rather the new houses in Petite Ile could be rented indefinitely to 
residents, or they could be rented in view of an eventual purchase. 52 Metropolitan French 
social housing directives favored indefinite renting in 1957.53 Not allowing residents to 
eventually purchase their houses would enable the SIDR to demolish Petite Ile later 
without the problem of having small parts of the project belonging to residents. Indefinite 
renting would also permit the SIDR to control maintenance on the houses. The population 
of Petite Ile should be grateful for the opportunity to pay rent indefinitely to the SIDR for 
their cyclone-resistant houses with running water and toilets.  
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However in 1957 the SIDR was undergoing reckless management by Mr. Courtier 
the President of the SIDR.54 Even though Courtier knew that French housing policy did 
not recommend rent-to-buy housing, he promised the residents of Petite Ile that they 
would be able to buy their houses. This was an impossible promise. The SIDR did not 
have enough funding. Rather than renting houses at 1,000CFA per month which tenants 
would own after 20 years, the Petite Ile houses would be rented indefinitely to tenants at 
2,500CFA per month.55  
By 1957 the Prefect in Réunion was under pressure from Paris to start developing 
social housing in Réunion. 56 The Réunion Island press also considered that eradicating 
the “filthy” shantytown of Petite Ile and rebuilding it would be an excellent plan. 57 Yet 
once more the SIDR was in disarray, and President Courtier had to be replaced.58 The 
Prefect decided that the management of the SIDR was too important to be left in the 
hands of incompetent civil servants. It should now be taken over by the Prefecture. In 
1958 the new manager of the SIDR would be the Prefect’s closest colleague, the new 
General Secretary of the Prefecture Pierre Bolotte.59  
The SIDR was now to be used as a powerful government tool for improving the 
material conditions of working Réunion Islanders, and thus their political allegiance, in a 
minute replica of the Constantine plan in Algeria.60 The comparison between Algeria and 
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Réunion was not lost on Pierre Bolotte, who arrived in Réunion after working in two 
disastrous French colonial situations.61 Bolotte had spent twenty months in Indochina at 
the end of the French-Indochinese war, and then a few years in Constantine in Algeria, 
until the outbreak of war with the French in 1958, when he was transferred to La 
Réunion. These experiences marked Bolotte strongly and he was particularly keen to 
reduce the attraction of the Communist Party in Réunion.62 Réunion should be an 
important site for maintaining French power and influence. “I swore to myself that I 
would do everything in my power, even against the majority, to make sure that [Réunion 
did not turn out like Algeria]” Bolotte wrote to a colleague.63  
However the Prefect and Pierre Bolotte underestimated the difficulty of applying 
social housing welfare in Réunion. Although the tin houses and thatched huts could be 
bulldozed and replaced with SIDR housing, many of the residents of Petite Ile were 
entangled in landholder-tenant relations strongly linked to the Communist Party. A 
seemingly simple housing operation would prove complex.64 The much-maligned Mr. 
Courtier, ex-President of the SIDR had, however, seen the potential problems more 
clearly. “The notion of rehousing is … not the same in Paris as it is in St Denis … [there 
are] two unknown elements: the reaction of the inhabitants and the political influences.”65 
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Political allegiances and tenancy intersected in Petite Ile. The SIDR was effectively 
challenging the dominance of the Communist party land and political patronage system in 
the neighborhood.66  
III. Moving Réunionnais into French-style homes  
Before they moved in to their new concrete homes, half of the occupants of Petite Ile 
were rehoused in wooden sheds or calbanons nearby, on the old racecourse of La 
Redoute which was a football pitch in 1958. But the SIDR still had financial problems. A 
prior building project in St Benoît had not been completed. The Prefect stalled the 
construction of Petite Ile even though half of the residents of Petite Ile were now living in 
wooden sheds.67 This period of waiting would later be remembered bitterly by residents 
of Petite Ile, who had been forced out of their homes without being consulted and obliged 
to live on the old racecourse. One resident claimed to me, sadly, that he had been born in 
1958 “in the stables” of La Redoute.  
Once the first group of residents had been moved out to temporary 
accommodation in La Redoute, some refused to move back to the newly-built houses in 
Petite Ile in 1959. They were encouraged to protest by neighborhood Communist party 
representatives.68 If this first group refused to move in to their new houses, then it would 
be impossible to build the second phase of Petite Ile. “We have clearly underestimated 
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the duration, the cost and the social significance of this project” wrote Pierre Bolotte to 
Henri Cornu.69  
Once all the residents had moved in to their new homes in 1960, the problems did 
not end. Many residents were bitter about the broken 1957 promise that they would be 
able to buy their homes. A member of the Communist party set up a protest group in 
Petite Ile and declared that the tenants would no longer pay their rent until they could buy 
their homes.70 The protest group claimed that residents had been coerced into signing the 
SIDR contracts on the threat of being thrown out of Petite Ile.71  
 The French administration applied for a subsidy to lower the rents in Petite Ile. 
This very first social housing operation needed to be a “social and psychological” 
success. The SIDR also wanted to stop being publicly humiliated by the Communist 
Party.72 The French administration had successfully repressed the Communist Party in 
local government. Yet it was still capable of mobilizing people in the St Denis urban 
neighborhoods. The rightwing press claimed that the PCR had deliberately sabotaged the 
Petite Ile operation because they were threatened by the material improvements that the 
SIDR promised.73 The Communist Party claimed that they were merely defending the 
                                                 
 
69 ADR 1259 W 12 Pierre Bolotte à Henri Cornu (président du CA de la SIDR) 06/07/1959 
70 ADR 1 PER 82/38 Le Progrès. L'affaire de la SIDR à la Petite Ile 10/01/1960 ; Le Progrès. Comment le 
Parti Communiste grignote le lotissement de la Petite Ile 24/01/1960 ; Le Progrès Pourquoi la SIDR 
renonce à la formule location - vente? Les documents de l'affaire Petite Ile 07/02/1960; ADR 1 PER 82/38 
Le Progrès L'association des locataires de la SIDR fait son histoire de la question 21/02/1960 
71 ADR 1 PER 84/14 La Démocratie. L'Association des locataires de la Petite Ile St Denis communique 
15/01/1960 
72 CAC 19840179/78 Ministère de la construction Roux à Ministre de Sahara DOM-TOM Objet : Petite Ile 
Saint-Denis de La Réunion demande de subventions présentées par la SIDR 23/03/1960 
73 ADR 1 PER 84/14 La Démocratie. Le vrai scandale à la Petite Ile 02/02/1960 
 
  178
interests of the Petite Ile residents.74 Either way, the Communist Party had lost one 
method of maintaining party support through reduced rents. 
Mme Tabère, the Communist party organizer in Petite Ile, flatly refused to leave 
the home that she leased from the General Council.75 She was angry that she could no 
longer make money subletting to other people. The SIDR nearly had to build the entire 
neighborhood around her wooden home. The SIDR eventually allocated her extra land in 
Bas de La Rivière where she could continue to sublet houses, as well as giving her a 
SIDR house in Petite Ile. Thus, the SIDR, a Metropolitan French housing agency, started 




i. New houses 
From being housed in thatched cottages and wooden houses, by 1960 all the SIDR Petite 
Ile tenants lived in concrete bungalows with concrete flooring, running water, toilets and 
electricity. The new housing in Petite Ile was an economic model called type pécheur or 
“fisherman” developed by the Réunion Island architects Hébrard and Monfreid, 
following Metropolitan French models.76 The houses were known as TE - très 
économique or highly economical - and were built around a 22m2 model, in order to 
reduce costs. They were also built to ensure they withstood cyclones of up to 
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Residents needed to go outside of the house to enter the 
of Figure 4.10) which wa
installed a running water and drainage system for the entire neighborhood, part 
was paid for by the St Denis city council.
 The Metropolitan French architect clearly followed the prevailing architectural 
preferences for straight lines in low
using the modern built form of TE low
specifically investigated or commented on the cultural differences of the Réunionnais, 
this form of low-cost French
architecture was an obvious attempt to ensure that poor Réunionnais inhabit their new 
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4.10 SIDR Petite Ile housing floor plan 
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homes in an appropriate urban 
rehousing of Petite Ile residents as an issue of 
conformity. In 1959 he requested that something be done to change the way that the 
residents of Petite Ile organized their front and back yards
afternoon, I went round Petite Ile. I am shocked by the rubbish, old
junk wood … behind these new houses … pigs, chickens and dogs roam free.”
 
Figure 4.11 No more 
The SIDR attempted to socialize residents into 
SIDR discouraged the rural homestead model of animal husbandry
home-made outbuildings, and
Petite Ile residents were not allowed to keep animals
constructed in a completely different logic to the habits of poor Réunion Islanders who 
were used to keeping animals. 
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outbuilding which was either 2.5 or 4 metres diameter. These outbuildings did not have 
solid walls. rather they were built in a concrete lattice form, letting in the air. They had no 
roof or door and were unsuitable even for keeping birds (Figure 4.11).78 Given Bolotte’s 
comment that Petite Ile should have tidier front and back yards, it seems the only purpose 
of the concrete outbuilding was to hide people’s stocks of wood and other objects. 
In addition tenants were forbidden from building on extra rooms or houses in the 
backyard, a fundamental expression of growing Réunionnais families, and their desire to 
live grouped around a courtyard. The SIDR was also unwise in its building choices, 
because it ignored the course of the Gentille Ravine. Figure 4.12 shows the neighborhood 
in 1960.79 While the houses are now neatly arranged, the SIDR had also built over half of 
the Gentille Ravine on the right of the photo. The Metropolitan French architects 
constructed houses and a road over the V-shaped ravine. The road followed one side of 
the ravine, the other side of the ravine flowed through people’s back yards as soon as 
there was rain. The house windows did not have glass, either. This was also to prove 
problematic during the rainy season. 
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Figure 4.13 Monfort family outside their house in Petit
 
The SIDR wished 
houses.80 Another SIDR initiative was to 
residents in Petite Ile, to encourage them 
displays of domestic care. Figure 4.13 shows a SIDR photograph of some members of the 
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Figure 4.12 Petite Ile 1960 
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Monfort family in front of a garden which has already been planted, suggesting that they 
had had won an early gardening competition.
took pleasure in gardening
uplifting of the shantytown population. 
organization must beware of residents ere
gardens.81 
Another SIDR initiative was to construct a circular washing station to encourage 
Réunion Islanders to have a new sense of neighborly community and wash their clothes 
in the neighborhood, instead of going to the St Denis river. The 
also aimed at creating spaces of communal interaction, unlike the individual homest
model of Réunion Islanders. 
used and short-lived.  
Figure 4.14
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In short, these SIDR developments promoted open air healthiness which the French urban 
planners in Paris and in Reunion considered essential to the moral development of the 
population in its new social houses.82 
ii. Whose political victory? 
Given the Creole elites’ and the French administration’s fears of the Communists’ 
influence in the urban Camps, did the Petite Ile project actually discourage poor Réunion 
Islanders from supporting the Communist Party? In 1960 a right-wing newspaper stated 
darkly that “those who know [Petite Ile] say that it is becoming more Communist.”83  
By 1963 poorer areas of St Denis – including SIDR Petite Ile – continued to pay 
membership to the Communist party.84 
Centre Ville     10,994 
Boulevard Doret   9,735 
Belle Pierre [Camp Ozoux]    5,814 
Petite Ile [including non-SIDR]  3,623 
Bas de la Rivière    1,760 
Montagne     1,875 
Butor     330 
Rampes du Brûlé    270 
Table 4.2 Communist Party subscriptions for St Denis 1963 
 
Even though one third of the Petite Ile neighborhood, 5 hectares, was now a SIDR 
neighborhood, Petite Ile was still clearly an area with significant Communist support 
especially given its small size. Without access to a membership list from 1960 it is 
impossible to tell whether the improved material comfort of the residents in SIDR Petite 
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Ile had positively or negatively affected residents’ political choices. To be sure, 
Communist control of the neighborhood had clearly not been extinguished by 1963. Yet 
after 1963, the French administration would create a much more sustained strategy of 
winning Réunion Islanders’ political allegiance to the French administration through 
material gain. By the time the right-wing Auguste Legros became Mayor of St Denis in 
1968, residents in Petite Ile had become much more vocal supporters of the right wing 




In 1960, after the four-year long project to move unwilling Petite Ile residents into new 
accommodation the SIDR board unanimously voted not to rehouse any more poor 
Réunion Islanders.85 Yet by 1960 the direction of French administrative policy in 
Réunion had shifted. The SIDR was immediately put under more pressure to resolve the 
urban poverty elsewhere in St Denis by building more social housing, this time without 
making the same mistakes as in Petite Ile.86 The national political context had also 
changed. In 1958 De Gaulle had become President of France, with Michel Debré as his 
Prime Minister. From 1960, France’s policy for maintaining influence in Overseas France 
would skillfully combine political welfare operations such as social housing provision 
with political repression (see chapter 5).  
However, the solution for Réunion’s political future was not a simple matter of 
putting poor, grateful, Réunion Islanders in materially better conditions. The Communist 
Party’s landlord-tenant in Petite Ile had enabled the Party to maintain its support through 
                                                 
 
85 SIDR PV 16/5/1960 
86 194 W 59 Pierre Bolotte. Note pour M. Jourden Directeur Général de la SIDR 16/03/1961 
 
  186
1960. However, by rehousing the tenants of Petite Ile, the SIDR had effectively become 
their new landlord. The French administration and the SIDR housing agency had taken a 
new role in controlling social peace and administering favors, a role usually played by 
landowners and their associated political parties. It would only take one astute politician, 
Mayor Auguste Legros in 1968, to realize that gaining administrative control over the 
SIDR housing agency would allow a new set of landlord-tenant relations to develop, paid 
for and maintained by the French administration in Réunion. This new strategy of local 
elites using the French administration’s resources would fundamentally change the 
meaning of the Metropolitan French presence in Réunion, by using it to follow local 
Réunionnais political formats (Chapter 6).
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CHAPTER 5 THE MORALITY OF LOW RENTS: A NEW 
FRENCH TENANCY PROGRAM IN ST DENIS 1960-1966 
I. Introduction  
French solidarity and fraternity must have the same meaning in Réunion as in 
Marseille, Paris, Tours or Strasbourg. How can you not feel the heart of Paris beat 
profoundly on this land? How can we not evoke the magnificent conduct of 
Réunion Islanders in the successive wars for the liberation of France? ... Our 
union is eternal.1 
 
Michel Debré’s 1963 election campaign in Réunion was filled with the rhetoric of a 
passionate and patriotic French citizenship in La Réunion. French citizenship in La 
Réunion would be the same as citizenship in anywhere in Metropolitan France. French 
citizenship meant feeling the heart of Paris beat in the Indian Ocean. French citizenship 
meant military service. Real French citizenship in La Réunion would be eternal, and 
Réunion Island’s French citizens would never consider breaking away from Metropolitan 
France. 
 Ex-Prime Minister Michel Debré was elected as deputy of Réunion’s first 
electoral district in 1963, and set about reforming Réunion Islanders as French citizens, 
so that Réunion could truly be a “little France in the Indian Ocean”. Debré attempted to 
replicate the Gaullist formats of Republican citizenship and the centralizing French state 
in Réunion.2 Ensuring Réunion Islanders loved the mother country, participation in a 
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higher national ideal through military service, education and patriotic pride would be the 
surefire way to keep the heart of Paris beating in Réunion.  
Debré had been invited to participate in Réunion Island political life to beat the 
Paul Vergès, the Communist Party candidate in Réunion Island’s 1st district elections. 
Debré’s main aim once elected was to ensure that French influence was maintained in 
Réunion by repressing and defusing the claims which had made the Communist Party 
popular among poor workers in Réunion. Réunion Islanders had long awaited the full 
application of Metropolitan French social legislation. However Réunion Islanders would 
neither gain it through claims on the government, nor through negotiations between 
social groups as in the Metropole. These would not be permitted in Réunion. Rather 
Michel Debré intended that the French central government would control and distribute 
the appropriate welfare to Réunion Islanders who should merely be passively grateful.  
One of Michel Debré’s first policies as a deputy of Réunion was to reduce the 
number of Réunion’s shantytowns. He persuaded the Prefect to set a legal maximum rent, 
hoping that this would push urban landowners to finally sell their land to the SIDR. As 
this decree entered Réunion Island social life, different groups of Islanders –landowners, 
tenants, subletters, the Communist Party and the French administration – claimed the 
moral authority to interpret its meaning and intention. The state unintentionally became 
the mediator between these groups. Réunion Islanders also created new types of political 
action to support their claims which were not based on a coordinated political movement. 
Large landowners took the French state to Réunion’s civil court in order to reverse the 
shantytown decree. Small landowners individually applied to the French administration 
for financial compensation. Poor shantytown tenants individually petitioned the Prefect 
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of Réunion for welfare. The Prefect’s 1964 shantytown decree thus opened a space for a 
new kind of Réunion Island political action based on individual claims to members of the 
French administration rather than collectively-based claims on the state. By 1966 the 
relationship between these social groups in the cities had been recalibrated. As the poor 
left the shantytowns to live in social housing run by the SIDR, small landowners received 
financial compensation to live in social housing. Both groups accepted Debré’s imposed 
compromise. In return for not participating in the Communist Party’s political claims to 
French social legislation, these Réunion Islanders were rewarded with increased material 
comfort.  
Between 1954 and 1964 an estimated 47,000 people lived in terrible conditions in 
Paris and the suburbs, making up 62 % of Metropolitan France’s shantytowns. The 
PACA region had another 20% of France’s shantytowns.3 At the same time in Overseas 
France, a conservative estimate was 130,000 people living in shantytowns. In three of La 
Réunion’s towns at least 24,000 people lived in shantytowns.4 In 1966 the shanty towns 
of Réunion Island alone received 4,25 million Metropolitan Francs from the French 
administration. This sum was just under half of the housing funds allocated for all of 
Paris and its suburbs. Why did the French state devote such a large amount of money to 
eradicating Overseas French shantytowns which were not the same type of political threat 
to France as the shantytowns in the Parisian suburbs?  
The introduction of the shantytown decree and the Debré law, indeed Michel 
Debré’s participation in Réunion’s 1963 elections underlines how seriously the French 
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state took the Communist threat in Réunion after the end of the Algerian war, when 
France is usually considered to have finally decolonized and become a “post-colonial” 
state. Unlike political petitions to the Prefect (Chapter 2) or solutions to poverty through 
emigration to Madagascar (Chapter 3) the shantytown decree enabled Réunionnais to 
individually claim material improvement from the state as a fundamental moral and legal 
right. The shantytowns were being policed, but the landowners and landlords were the 
object of control, rather than the tenants. Tenants welcomed the police warmly into their 
houses. The Prefect’s decree and Debré’s proposed law would change their fortunes, by 
changing the value of their land, a clear shift away from protecting, or tolerating, the 
traditional power of the landowners in Réunion. 
Shantytowns in La Réunion were the reason for the 1964 Debré law which was 
also applied in Metropolitan shantytowns. In Metropolitan France the existence of 
shantytowns were strongly linked to earlier rent freezes and the slow start to housing 
reconstruction in France.5 Although urban shantytowns in Metropolitan France had 
French residents, they had also been settled by foreign migrants from Portugal and Italy 
as well as from immigrants from France’s ex-colonies. Even after the end of the Algerian 
war, shantytowns were feared as spaces of disorder and political opposition in the 
Metropole.  In contrast the 1960s shantytowns of the French Overseas Departments were 
populated with French citizens who voted in local elections - why Communist party 
activism in the shantytowns was considered dangerous. Instead of understanding 
Overseas French concern with poor urban neighborhoods in the context of immigration in 
Metropolitan France, it may be more accurate to compare Réunion with African colonial 
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administrators’ anxiety over the migration of rural, “traditional” populations to urban 
centers who then did not engage in the right type of regular wage labor to enable them to 
assimilate to colonial satisfaction.6  
This chapter also responds to a recent call by Chari and Verdery to re-order the 
“post colonial” and “postsocial” intellectual division. They ask how both the colonies, 
and also the existence of Soviet socialism, affected the constitution of “The West”. They 
pose a so-far unexplored question: Did competition with the “actually existing” socialist 
alternative make elites in the United States and especially Europe more amenable to the 
expansion of welfare principles in response to workers’ demands? 7 This chapter 
demonstrates that in 1960s Réunion, an imagined political threat from Russia – through 
the activism of the members of the Réunion Communist Party – did indeed make France 
more amenable to the expansion of welfare provisions in Réunion. The chapter thus 
contributes to an ongoing call to bring together intellectual work from post-socialist 
scholars with those scholars of imperialism who have so far dominated both French and 
African historiography. 
II. Political contestation in St Denis 1958 – 1963 
Between 1954 and 1961 Reunion Island’s population significantly increased from 
274,370 to 340,325 people. By 1963, there were 136 young people under 20 for every 
100 Réunionnais adults. The figure for Metropolitan France was 66 young people to 100 
adults. Almost 90 % of Reunion’s inhabitants lived near the coast, many of them in 
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Reunion’s largest city, St Denis.8 From 1954 to 1961 the St Denis area grew from 41,863 
to 65,200 people, partly owing to migration to work in the city. This 55% population 
growth in seven years threatened the French administration who feared urban 
neighborhoods becoming a hotbed of Communist activism. 
i. The growth of the Camps  
The construction industry was becoming an important economic motor for La Réunion. 
By 1962 it was the second biggest employer after agriculture and the main employer in St 
Denis; one of the chief reasons for migration to the city was the abundance of jobs on 
construction sites. French financial transfers helped the construction industry through 
subsidies, low interest loans, and public contracts. There was also private investment. 
Between 1948 and 1962, French governmental investment in the construction sector was 
7,500 million CFA, with private investment 1,800 million CFA.9 By 1963 Réunion had 
56 building companies which employed almost 10,000 workers. This number grew with 
the year-on-year increase in housing, school, hospital and infrastructure construction on 
the island. 
The SIDR was becoming an increasingly powerful landowner and stakeholder in 
St Denis, especially since it was now effectively managed by the Prefecture in Réunion. 
After building Petite Ile in 1960 the SIDR quickly completed social housing projects in 
the St Denis neighborhoods of La Source and Bois de Nèfles for 1,700 families.10 Yet 
these SIDR projects were still hopelessly oversubscribed. In 1963 there were 3,000 
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demands for only 550 houses in La Source.11 Many workers who were employed by the 
SIDR constructing social housing could not themselves live in SIDR houses, but in the 
Camps of St Denis. Urban workers had more stable living conditions than the rest of 
Réunion Islanders, 2/3 of whom still lived sharecropping in rural areas.12 Nevertheless 
they were managed by Metropolitan overseers, a source of resentment and one of the 
PCR’s critiques of the Metropolitan regime in Réunion.13  
The SIDR had been able to acquire the land for La Source and Bois de Nèfles 
because they were largely unpopulated areas of St Denis. The SIDR now wanted to 
construct more social housing in the urban periphery of St Denis. However many of the 
largest plots of land around St Denis were occupied by workers living in Camps. This 
land was suitable for social housing, but it would be expensive. Although the SIDR could 
now force landowners to sell their land (expropriating in the public interest) the housing 
agency would have to pay the landowner the market price. Given the speculation of the 
property owners in St Denis, the costs would be high.  
Building the Petite Ile housing project in 1960 revealed the complexity of 
rehousing residents in temporary accommodation whilst new housing was built for 
them.14 The Communist Party had profited from the situation and publicly humiliated the 
SIDR – and thus the French administration. Petite Ile had been a relatively small 
neighborhood. Other Camps in St Denis were much larger. Even if the SIDR purchased 
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expensive land, it would then have to deal with the political and financial consequences 
of removing the people already living on it which would make the costs prohibitive.15 
The SIDR was at an impasse. 
The standard of urban housing in Réunion’s shantytowns in Réunion was not 
materially different to rural areas – the main problem was the poverty of most of 
Réunion’s population.  In 1961the SIDR was concerned that the populations of the St 
Denis Camps did not have proper salaried work activities or appropriate class aspirations, 
in addition to the political threat they posed: “The constant state of [political] upheaval [in 
Réunion]…will not allow the brutal application of the [expropriation] law [to the Camps] 
without a surefire reaction … the most urgent is the case of [Camp] Ozoux, where a 
miserable population swarms without normal means of existence. The estimated number 
of inhabitants is 2000.”16 
The SIDR described Réunion Islanders in Camp Ozoux as if they were insects, 
“poor” and “swarming” in1961 -  revealing that the organization’s attitude towards the 
urban poor had not changed since 1950. The SIDR did not consider that inhabitants of 
Camp Ozoux had “normal means of existence”. The French administration wanted 
Réunion Islanders to improve their material conditions by regular wage labor rather than 
occasional work as day laborers or washerwomen.17 Rehousing the “swarming” 
population of Camp Ozoux had become a political imperative for the French 
administration and the SIDR.  
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Opposite the SIDR, the Communist party aimed to be allies of the people in the 
Camps. The Communist Party blamed the French administration for the poverty of and 
difficult material conditions of the Réunion Islanders. The Communist Party continued to 
maintain its grassroots network in the Camps. In early 1963 Gabriel Macé, the rightwing 
Mayor of St Denis, offered the inhabitants of a small Camp on the outskirts of St Denis 
the chance to settle on a new piece of land, so the city council could build houses on the 
original plot. The Communists accused the Mayor, their political enemy, of trying to 
“expel” poor Réunion Islanders from the Camp. The Communist Party held a meeting in 
widow Rangaman’s courtyard in the Camp to protest. They also invited the inhabitants of 
another neighboring Camp called Rivière-Viadère to their meeting. Residents of Rivière-
Viadère feared that the SIDR had its eye on developing the Camp and would displace 
expel them without warning.  
Isnelle Amelin encouraged the residents of the Camps to become members of the 
Communist Party who would defend their interests. Amelin was a prominent female 
activist in the Communist Party, a General Councilor and the President of the Union of 
Women in Réunion. She exhorted the inhabitants of the Camps to join evening classes to 
learn to read. Finally, she declared “it’s not the fault of the poor creoles if they are 
reduced to living in thatched houses and shantytowns…. It’s the fault of the colonial 
regime which keeps them in poverty.” In the political context where divisions were 
strong between pro and anti-Communist viewpoints, Amelins’s speech was considered by 
Secret Police as incendiary, worth recording. 18 
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Rivière-Viadère, two plots of land in southern St Denis epitomized the problems faced by 
the administration. The SIDR had been able to buy part of the Rivière-Viadère plot in 
1962. They had begun constructing a new type of social housing based on a modernist 
high-rise design, known in France as grandes ensemble because of the similarity of the 
units and the labor-saving method of construction. The housing project would be called 
SIDR Camelias.  
The SIDR wished to enlarge the project, but could not finish building it. 
Adjoining landowners would not sell their plots. A large, poor urban population lived on 
them. The landowners were making so much money from their hundreds of tenants that 
they had no financial motive to sell. About 900 people, not including children, lived on 
the Rivière-Viadère land behind SIDR Camelias in 1963.19 The landowners had illegally 
made rent contracts with each of their tenants. These contracts were for six to nine years 
each. It was impossible for the SIDR to expropriate the land until these rent contracts had 
been annulled.20 
In 1961 a white Creole named Edouard Rivière rented out 22 plots of bare land on 
one of the Rivière plots. The average size of each plot was 300m². Edouard Rivière 
earned 100,000 CFA per month from his rents. 21 Another white Creole, Léonce Viadère, 
owned the adjoining land and rented similar sized plots. In 1961 Léonce Viadère earned 
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40,000 CFA per month from 42 tenancy contracts. Increased migration to St Denis 
doubled Léonce Viadère’s rent takings by 1963.22 
A large urban landowner like Rivière could earn up to 120,000CFA a year per 
hectare, without having to worry about the weather. In contrast, the same hectare planted 
with sugar cane and invested with labor would only earn a planter around 40,000CFA per 
year.23 Although Edouard Rivière lived off a large family plot which he had inherited, 
many of the smaller urban landowners in St Denis were people from the countryside. 
They had money in agriculture in the rural areas of Réunion, and come to St Denis in the 
early 1950s to buy relatively cheap land, investing their savings in renting out property to 
the growing urban population.24 
The money-making by urban landholders did not stop at landowners renting 
empty plots of land to tenants. Tenants then built many small houses on their rented plots. 
They sublet these houses at high prices to workers in St Denis. The average rent for an 
empty plot of land 300m² in St Denis was 14,250 CFA per year. The average rent on one 
of these plots for a small house of 20m² was 3,500 CFA per month. Renting land and 
subletting houses was an easy way of making money in the growing city of St Denis.  
Figure 5.2 (below) shows the densely populated housing settlements around the 
Rivière-Viadère plots.25 At the bottom of the photo near the center, under the new 
housing project, the white sheets of the washerwomen can be seen drying on the banks of 
the stream. Landowners were under no obligation to invest in water or sewerage 
                                                 
 
22 ADR 57 W 37 SIDR Procès-verbal du Conseil d'Administration. Terrains. Politique foncière de la société 
à Saint-Denis 10/3/1961 
23 ADR 1158 W 118 Conseil Général de La Réunion 2e séance extraordinaire 1965 Rapports de M. Alfred 
Diefenbacher Préfet de La Réunion. Rapport No 32 DAG/2 Réglementation du prix de location des terrains 
nus et des cases dans des bidonvilles 4/1/1965 
24 Interview Mme Dany 27/5/2009 , M.Alba 5/6/2009  
25 CAC 19840179/78 SIDR photo album 1961  
 
  
infrastructure on their land, or to repair houses. The mun
water pumps in most neighborhoods of St Denis, and tenants dug their own pits for 
sewage. But there was no drainage system in St Denis. Water, household and human 
waste collected in the streets, especially in the Camps, and 
Figure 5.2 SIDR Camelias phases I through III with
 
The SIDR wanted to expropriate Rivière and Viadère
had put their names on the waiting list for SIDR 
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oversubscribed. The tenants’ presence on the plots of land in Rivière-Viadère - and the 
existence of their rent contracts - was the major barrier to the SIDR continuing its 
construction program. The SIDR could not build another housing development until the 
tenants had been removed.27 
“Poverty is spreading at a menacing speed, and with it, Communism. Everyone is 
worried” noted Henri Cornu in early 1963. 28 Creole elites and the French administration 
feared that the continued growth of the shantytowns in St Denis and the anticolonial 
political organizing of the PCR had created “an explosive situation likely to degenerate to 
extremely serious troubles.”29 But they had no way of resolving the financial and legal 
barriers to destroying the shantytowns. 
ii. General de Gaulle and Prime Minister Michel Debré in Réunion 
In June 1958 General de Gaulle had assumed full powers in France. The Algerian crisis 
had finally succeeded in destabilizing the French 4th Republic. The 4th Republic had been 
a weak political regime, overly reliant on fleeting and unstable coalitions in the French 
National Assembly. Michel Debré, trained as a lawyer, was one of General de Gaulle’s 
most committed political supporters. His first post in President de Gaulle’s government 
was as Minister of Justice, and Debré spent 1958 and 1959 rewriting the French 
constitution of the new 5th Republic.  
At the end of 1958 de Gaulle had unsuccessfully proposed a truce in Algeria, the 
fateful “paix des braves.”30 It had backfired. The Muslim Algerians were not disposed for 
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a truce. The white French Algerian minority – the Pieds Noirs - became mistrustful of de 
Gaulle’s intentions in Algeria. At the beginning of 1959 de Gaulle appointed Michel 
Debré as Prime Minister of France. The appointment of Michel Debré was a judicious 
move for de Gaulle to retain credibility with the Pieds Noirs in Algeria: Debré was well-
known partisan of the French civilizing and pacifying mission, and he wished Algeria to 
remain French. 
 In 1958 de Gaulle was also facing independence movements elsewhere in the 
French Union, now renamed the “French Community.” In May 1959 Philippe Tsirana 
was elected President of Madagascar, and he clearly supported African independence 
outside the confines of the French Community. Also in 1959, the Réunion Communist 
Party had declared its existence separate from France’s Communist Party. Thus, when de 
Gaulle travelled to Madagascar to attend the 4th executive meeting of the French 
Community he also visited Réunion Island in July 1959. 
 Between 40,000 and 50,000 Réunion Islanders flocked to hear de Gaulle speak at 
La Redoute, near Petite Ile, in July 1959. 31 Michel Debré stood next to the President and 
was highly impressed at what he interpreted as the “love of Réunion Islanders for 
France.”32 In his memoirs, Debré commented that although he had been used to “the 
popular enthusiasm which a visit of General de Gaulle would bring out all over France ... 
the welcome in Réunion Island was exceptional.”33  
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 Before de Gaulle spoke to the crowd, Roger Payet, the President of Réunion’s 
General Council gave an introductory speech. At the moment Payet stood up, a dozen 
Communist Party activists held up boards on which were written “down with [electoral] 
fraud.” Témoignages claimed that the demonstration was for the “Reunion Island people” 
to show de Gaulle that they did not want electoral fraud in Réunion and that they wanted 
to uphold universal suffrage in “their country.”34 A dozen people were immediately 
arrested in the stadium.35 A visiting Le Monde journalist who was in the stadium 
expressed surprise to his neighbor, a priest, as he saw the Communists being handcuffed 
and led out of the stadium. The journalist reported that the priest then followed him as he 
left the stadium, and later gave the riot police the journalist’s license plate number. This 
story shows that even commenting aloud on the arrest of Communists in Réunion was 
itself a subversive act.36 Yet many Communist Réunion Islanders supported de Gaulle’s 
liberating role in the Second World War and considered him a war hero, not, as Debré 
had thought, because of the Réunion Islanders loved France.37  
Following Roger Payet, Michel Debré’s speech to the Réunion Islanders hid the 
preceding decade of political contestations in Réunion. “You never doubted your 
attachment [to France]. Never, you know, did France doubt it. … Here is France. This 
first visit of a head of state is both the memory of an admirable past and the guarantee of 
the future” said Debré. General de Gaulle underlined this message “Ah! Yes you are 
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French, you are passionately French…. You play your role in the destiny of France … 
and you have an important French position in this Ocean.”38 
 De Gaulle and his advisors had been minutely prepared for the visit by Prefect 
Perreau-Pradier. He had briefed de Gaulle’s speechwriters on the important international 
context of de Gaulle’s speech in La Réunion. 39 The French presence in Overseas France 
must be maintained, along with France’s strategic place in the Indian Ocean.  
[De Gaulle] could allude to the fact that the island was absolutely deserted when 
the French arrived, and also to the French presence in the Indian Ocean; because 
we mustn’t forget that he will be a sounding board here, whose echoes will be 
diffused not only in Mauritius but in India and in [China and Taiwan], large 
countries with which, in an indirect but certain fashion, Réunion maintains 
relatively close links.40  
 
 Michel Debré was struck by the Réunion Islanders’ welcome of De Gaulle, 
especially given their diverse racial origins. “It was moving to see the impression of 
national unity across the astonishing variety of faces. A cry [of] ‘long live the motherland 
vive la patrie’ [which I heard in Réunion, something I did not frequently hear] will 
always stay engraved in my spirit, in my heart.”41 Eugène Rousse, a lifelong Communist 
Party activist who was also in St Denis that day remembered no such patriotism from 
Réunion Islanders during de Gaulle’s visit. He claimed that the only cries to be heard in 
St Denis that day were “long live de Gaulle” and “down with fraud!”42 
With echoes of the Algerian repression that appalled politicians in the National 
Assembly, in 1960 Michel Debré issued a national decree aimed at repressing any hint of 
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dissension with the French administration in the Overseas Departments.43 This decree 
particularly targeted the Communist parties of Overseas France.44 Prefects of Overseas 
France would have the power to “exile” French civil servants in Overseas France back to 
Metropolitan France if any civil servant showed signs of “troubling the public order” – 
i.e. by criticizing the French regime. In 1961 thirteen Réunion Islanders were arbitrarily 
transferred from Réunion to a post in Metropolitan France on the orders of Prefect 
Perreau-Pradier, although they had differing levels of engagement with the Communist 
Party.45  
The Prefect also secretly proposed to the Minister of Overseas France that the 
Communist Party should be abolished and made illegal in Réunion. The Prefect 
considered the Party a “subversive and separatist movement.” Couched in the language of 
urban renewal, the Prefect envisioned destroying the Communist Party “as a measure of 
public salubrity and the confirmation of the government’s desire to maintain [La 
Réunion], this old French land at the heart of the mother country.”46 The Communist 
Party was allowed to legally remain, however. It loudly denounced the exile of the 
Réunion Islanders, as further evidence of the “colonial oppression” in Réunion. To 
maintain Réunion’s political attachment to Metropolitan France, the French 
administration would have to combine political control and winning the hearts and minds 
of the Réunion Islanders back from the Communist alternative.  
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Algeria's war of liberation exacted a great toll on Michel Debré. After the Evian 
Agreements in March 1962 Michel Debré resigned, disillusioned, from his post as Prime 
Minister. Unlike President De Gaulle, Michel Debré had been personally and 
ideologically invested in maintaining Algeria as part of France and could not accept 
defeat.47 In 1962, President de Gaulle proposed a constitutional amendment by 
referendum. The French must decide whether de Gaulle could be elected as President by 
universal suffrage rather than by the National Assembly. This move challenged the 
authority of the politicians and was strongly opposed by most of the non-Gaullist 
deputies in the National Assembly. A testament to the lack of free political speech in La 
Réunion, in the week leading to the referendum the Mayors of western Réunion decided 
to officially campaign for the “yes” vote, without informing their electors of any 
possibility for voting no.48 After the referendum, the National Assembly deputies 
proposed a motion to censure Prime Minister Pompidou for his toleration of the 
referendum. De Gaulle dissolved the Parliament, and legislative elections were held in 
France in November 1962. Nationally, the Gaullists won in the large majority, sealing De 
Gaulle’s political defeat of traditional party politics. However during these elections 
Michel Debré lost his seat in Indre-et-Loire.  
iii. Vote for Debré or tomorrow you will all be Russian!  
With Algeria independent from July 1962, the November 1962 elections in La Réunion 
effectively became a local referendum about whether Réunion should become 
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autonomous from France.49 The position of the French administration and the Creole 
elites in Reunion was that the island was “historically, culturally, socially and 
sentimentally a French province.”50 A journalist from the left-wing French newspaper 
L’Humanité visiting Réunion in 1963 was amazed at this idea.  
Stating the La Réunion is a French department makes the départementalistes51 say and 
write absurd things that they do not really seem to be conscious about. La Réunion is 
France. From there all sorts of fallacies are allowed … ‘Three centuries of union, of life 
with France and Europe means that there is no difference between the Dordogne and us’ 
writes Mr. Henri Cornu. 
 
Decraene thought it was surreal to imagine that Réunion Island in the Indian Ocean could 
be compared with the Dordogne, a rural department in the southwest interior of 
Metropolitan France. Decraene judged that the elite Creoles merely wanted to be part of 
France. 52 Yet Henri Cornu did not embrace unconditional assimilation with Metropolitan 
France. Cornu considered that the fortunes of Réunion’s poor would improve with better 
conditions for economic growth. He was worried that increasing the minimum wage or 
social contributions in Réunion would have a negative effect on Réunion Island 
businesses. Cornu felt that the Metropolitan Government was blind to the real, economic, 
problems of Réunion.53 
 Growing tensions between pro-and anti-Communists erupted into political 
violence in St Louis in early 1962 after the Communist Party demonstrated against 
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Metropolitan France applying a new, lower, sugar price for Réunion sugar.54 The Prefect 
sent the CRS to break up the demonstration where, for the first time, people had burnt the 
French flag and denounced the presence of Zoreys in Réunion. One demonstrator had 
died. 
 To add to the social tension, at the end of February 1962, Cyclone Jenny had hit 
the island hard. There had been 35 deaths, 4,000 houses destroyed and most of the sugar 
planters lost between 30 and 70% of their harvest. France had not given very much 
cyclone aid to the island.  A lot of small agricultural landowners and sharecroppers faced 
severe financial hardship, leaving many to come and work in the towns.55 The Prefect 
created more tension between pro-and anti- Communists in March 1962. The last city 
government with a Communist majority, which had held off the Prefect’s repression for 
six years, was forced to resign. 
The 1962 elections for the French National Assembly in Réunion were held in an 
atmosphere of political repression and counter-repression. Much of the electoral fraud 
was committed by the French administration in Réunion to ensure that the Communist 
Party did not gain votes. The Prefect of Réunion tried to hand-pick candidates who were 
likely to beat the Communist Party. Even the Bishop of Réunion, a staunch opponent of 
Communism denounced the general climate of “immorality, of compromise, of abusive 
pressure and complicit silences”56 The right-wing Journal de l’Ile described election day 
in Réunion as “organized crime and anarchy.” Paul Vergès condemned the French 
administration’s fraud as the “organized electoral crime of the colonialists.” In the 1st 
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electoral district, which included St Denis, many of the polling stations were closed 
because of political trouble. Yet Gabriel Macé, Mayor of St Denis, was still elected as a 
deputy even though he only received 62% of the necessary 21,788 votes needed to secure 
a majority.57  
The election results were later annulled by the French constitutional court because 
the fraud and the irregularities had been so obvious. In the face of a re-election, the right-
wing was now divided. Some people still supported Gabriel Macé, and others now 
opposed his candidacy. Senator Georges Repiquet then contacted Michel Debré on behalf 
of the right wing of La Réunion.58 He was worried that in a re-election Paul Verges 
would succeed in being elected to the National Assembly on the Communist ticket.  
Senator Repiquet already knew Michel Debré personally. Repiquet proposed that Debré. 
the ex-Prime Minister, become candidate for Réunion’s first electoral district in the re-
election of May 1963. Michel Debré was in two minds about it, but after consulting 
President De Gaulle he accepted the offer in early 1963.59 
Local notables in Réunion wrote to Debré to congratulate him for accepting the 
offer, pleased that Réunion Island would be represented by such an influential and well 
known political figure.60 “With [Michel Debré], we will be able to honestly beat, without 
fraud, the Communist candidate,” wrote the Mayor of St Benoit in a letter to the 
Secretary of Overseas France. Paul Vergès’ condemnation of the French administration’s 
“organized electoral crime” may have been strongly worded, but it was to a large degree 
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accurate. The Mayor’s letter and his admission of electoral corruption demonstrate the 
complicity of the French administration in keeping the Communist Party away from 
power.61  
The atmosphere of state-sponsored coercion and corrupt local election practices in 
Réunion are captured in a short 1963 film about Debré’s election to the Réunion Island 
seat. The film shows the different tactics of Michel Debré and the Communist Party at a 
fundamental turning point in Réunion’s history, and in the career of Michel Debré. 
French film director Yann Le Masson shot a documentary of Debré’s 1963 political 
campaign in Réunion called Sucre Amer which won a Gold Prize from the Conseil 
Mondial de la Paix at the International film festival in Leipzig in 1963.62 Le Masson’s 
film seeks to portray France as a violent colonial power in Réunion, and paints a picture 
of Debré’s campaign as the state’s cynical manipulation of Réunion Islanders who were 
by no means “French” in 1963.  
As Sucre Amer opens, the camera pans Réunion’s tropical rural landscape. The 
narrator describes the monopoly of the sugar industry in Réunion: Réunion Island’s 
90,000 workers labor for only five different sugar companies. The camera then focuses 
on a queue of mostly African and Indian-origin workers lining up to go into a sugar 
factory. They wear tatty laborers’ trousers with short, wide legs and battered canvas hats. 
Some of them are barefoot. They smoke cigarettes and shuffle forward as they cast wary 
looks at the camera. Their exotic origins and poor clothing are deliberately contrasted by 
the director’s choice of voice over. A pro-Debré politician proclaims “the inestimable 
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values of the old and noble French civilization! ... You wish to stay French because 
France is the light of the world!”  
 The film emphasizes the different class registers of female political activism 
between Debré and the PCR. In a pro-Debré political meeting, an elite Creole woman, 
her cardigan demurely draped over her shoulders, hesitatingly says “You must let your 
domestic servants out to vote!” In contrast, a female Communist activist stands in the 
street and gives a sardonic and animated speech to a group of women who are crowded 
around her. In Réunionnais Creole, rather than French, she mocks the administration’s 
attempt to influence the elections in Réunion Island. “The [administration] didn’t give 
people the disaster money [from cyclone Jenny in 1962] for ages! … And then when 
Debré arrives for the electoral campaign, they hand it all out! Ah! Ah!”  
Later in the documentary the camera pans Debré attending Catholic mass in 
Réunion, placing his hands lightly on a Réunion Islanders’ head as if he was blessing 
him. At the same time an interview with a Creole worker plays on voiceover, accusing 
the landowners of coercing workers to vote for their political choice. “If the workers 
don’t come out [to march in support of Debré] they will have problems in the workplace. 
Some people are obliged to come, because of the factory owners and the work floor 
managers [commandeurs].” The film accuses the French state of using riot police to also 
influence and intimidate voters in La Réunion.  
In contrast the film ends by training the camera on Paul Vergès as he speaks to a 
large and very vocal Réunion Island crowd in the evening. The people who support him 
cheer and throw their fists in the air, although the camera focuses on some of the men 
who have dazed expressions and glassy eyes, as if they have been drinking. Paul Vergès, 
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lit up by a spotlight, is portrayed as a frenzied and passionate orator with sweat dripping 
from his shirt as he concludes his speech: “an economic crisis without precedent! A 
social crisis, a political crisis, has all come to show the urgent need to finish, as quickly 
as possible, with the colonial oppression!” The camera pans over the cheering crowd, 
with their fists in the air, as the credits roll.  
 The Communist Party’s accusation that the French administration had bolstered 
Debré’s candidacy by sending cyclone relief was correct. A month before the election, 
Prefect Diefenbacher told the Minister for Overseas France that “we must promote the 
interest of the [electors] for the candidacy of Michel Debré … [including] the attribution 
of an extra subsidy for the planters who were victims of cyclone Jenny”.63 Paul Vergès 
led a campaign which highlighted the fraud of the French administration and the Creole 
elites. He accused Debré of being the candidate of the factory owners and large 
landowners. In his manifesto Vergès carefully proposed the “decolonization” of Reunion 
through political autonomy within France, rather than Réunion’s independence. 64  
In contrast, Debré’s campaign had no such nuance. Its rhetoric was stark. “Vote 
for Debré or tomorrow you will all be Russian.”65 Debré told Réunion Islanders – and it 
was on his official campaign poster – that a vote for Debré was a vote for de Gaulle. 
Debré promised to increase French social legislation in Reunion as a political ploy to 
attract Communist voters. Debré promised that France would bring material 
improvement. Conversely, he denounced Communist claims for worker equality as 
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merely the repetition of orders from Moscow intended to separate Réunion from France. 
As Debré repeatedly said, either one was pro-French or pro-Communist. One could not 
be both.  
In stark contrast to the French administration’s policy of racially profiling loyal 
supporters in the 1950s, Debré claimed that all of Réunion Island’s multicultural 
population could be considered French citizens. That is, as long as they were loyal to the 
French administration. “Everyone, from wherever they come, whatever their origins, 
[affirms] the French character of their island” Debré said, now recasting the French 
administration as color blind. Debré told the Prefect, who was still putting Chinese and 
Indian populations under surveillance, that he wanted to concentrate on the welfare of all 
the population in Réunion without distinction of race. 66 “We are … French from 
Continental France, or French from far away islands, from the same past and … animated 
by the same faith in our national destiny” Debré asserted.67  
If everyone in La Réunion could be French then it followed that a Metropolitan 
French person could be a Réunion Island Creole. Thus Debré referred to his own 
relationship with Réunion through the aphorism “Creole once, Creole forever! Creole un 
jour, Creole toujours!” This was a direct attack on Communist Party campaigns against 
the Zoreys, the Metropolitan French who came to work in La Réunion and who were 
portrayed as colonialists. Debré casting himself as Creole was also a nod to the long-used 
rhetorical strategy of the Communists in Réunion who had often given speeches with 
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asides and jokes in Réunionnais Creole to foster complicity with the majority of Réunion 
Islanders who spoke Creole as their first language. 
Michel Debré was an extremely powerful figure, very close to President de Gaulle 
and his campaign was financially underpinned by the French administration in Réunion 
and in Paris. Ultimately Paul Vergès could not compete with the personal association that 
many people made between Debré and the much revered President de Gaulle. Debré’s 
rhetoric, his political reputation and the significant state support which shored up his 
campaign decided the election in favor of him. The Communist party was definitively 
beaten in the May 5 1963 election.68 
Number of the people on the electoral roll: 54,170 
Number of votes: 38,273 
Michel Debré: 30,908 votes (80.75%) 
Paul Vergès: 7,365 votes (15.95%) 
 
Table 5.1 Election results, 1st electoral district 1963 
 
Through his election campaign in 1963 Debré successfully and permanently transform 
the nature and idioms of France’s relationship with Réunion Island. People voted for 
Debré because he appeared politically connected, and able to materially transform 
Réunion. Debré claimed that Réunion was firmly part of France, the motherland, and was 
part of an Indian Ocean world that France had continued interest in defending. Réunion’s 
loyalty to France would be maintained by state-imposed welfare, improving the material 
conditions of Réunion Islanders in return for their political allegiance. Just after his 
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election, Debré predicted to the Prefect that “once poverty has disappeared from the 
country the Communists will lose the fundamental reason for their success.”69 
III. “We are all poor and above all equal”. Tenants, landowners and the new 
administration’s shanty town laws 
As soon as Debré was elected a deputy of La Réunion, he recast the Camps as bidonvilles 
or “shantytowns” which had to be eradicated at all costs. For Debré, the shanty towns 
were the number one social and political problem in La Réunion. Poverty in the poor 
urban areas of Réunion was linked to their residents’ support of the Communist party. 
“The total destruction of the shanty towns is extremely urgent… Without this … we can 
fear disorder in the north and north east regions of the island … a French department 
cannot display such types of human misery” Debré reported to the Prefect.70  
In late 1963 Michel Debré proposed a law in the National Assembly to deal with 
the shantytowns in Metropolitan and Overseas France.71 The law intended to financially 
penalize landowners who rented poor-quality houses. If renting land and houses in 
shantytowns was no longer financially viable, Debré reasoned, landowners would be 
willing to sell their land.72 The law further proposed that organizations such as the SIDR 
in La Réunion would no longer have to pay the market price for any land with a 
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shantytown on it. The sum of a landowner’s shantytown rent receipts from the previous 
five years would be deducted from the price that the SIDR would pay for the land. Debré 
clearly had the land of Rivière-Viadère in St Denis in mind. This law would specifically 
resolve the problem faced by the SIDR.73 
Debré’s law was drafted in order to discourage landowners from making profits. 
While waiting for it to pass in the National Assembly, Debré persuaded the Prefect of 
Réunion to issue a local decree to limit the profits that Rivière, Viadère and other 
landowners and landlords in St Denis could make renting their land, also to incite them to 
sell their land to the SIDR. 
The decree was aimed at the landowners. It had a huge financial impact for 
tenants. People defined as living in a “shanty town” could expect to pay up to a quarter of 
their former rent: from an average of 3000 francs to 900 francs per month.74 While the 
decree was a threat to the livelihoods of small and medium landowners, the degree 
promised an unheard-of improvement in their material conditions. Social rights for the 
urban poor were no longer the exclusive mandate of the Communist Party. Rather, 
material improvement would be controlled by the Prefecture, in a special shantytown 
commission run out of an office in the center of St Denis. It would be enforced by the 
police. After Debré’s decree, poor urban Réunion Islanders now had a new way of 
demanding rights directly to the state. 
i. The moral imperative of the shantytowns 
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“The shantytowns are the shame of our towns” proclaimed Debré. Debré’s decree made 
shantytown rents a moral problem which would be resolved by the French administration. 
In the National Assembly, Debré cast himself as the necessary agent of moral change for 
Réunion able to understand the island and create “a coherent doctrine for it.”75 From 
1963 to 1964 Michel Debré used his political influence in central government to lobby 
Ministers and ensure the shantytown law would eventually pass.76 The legislation did not 
go through quickly and stalled in the National Assembly in July 1964. The opposition 
feared that Prefects would have too much arbitrary power to define a shantytown. The 
law was eventually modified to make elected local authorities the judges, rather than the 
Prefect.77  
While waiting for the law to pass, Debré persuaded the Prefect of Réunion to 
issue a local decree in October 1964 defining what a shanty town was in La Réunion and 
how much a landlord could demand for renting one.78 Setting a minimum rent would 
incite the landowners to sell their land to the SIDR because they would no longer make a 
significant income from renting out their plots of land. 79 Thus, the decree did not intend 
to control the dangerous urban populations of Réunion. Rather, it principally aimed to 
change land values to enable the SIDR, run by the Prefecture, to buy plots in the center of 
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St Denis. It also aimed to diminish the perceived exploitation of Réunion Islanders in the 
shantytowns by the landlords who charged abusive rents.  
The Prefect defined that shanty towns could only exist in three towns in Réunion: 
St Denis, St Pierre and Le Port, even though housing conditions there were not 
fundamentally different from housing all over Réunion. Houses were shanty towns if they 
did not conform to “the minimal conditions imposed by the regulations on hygiene, 
salubrity and security.” Shantytowns were houses which did not conform to these 
regulations, usually constructed with old pieces of wood, sheets of corrugated iron, or 
flattened tin barrels. Shantytowns were now also houses with an earth floor, which did 
not have running water inside or in the courtyard. Houses that did not have an inside WC, 
regulation privy or collecting pot were also shantytowns. From now on, landlords could 
not charge more than 1 CFA per square meter for a bare plot of land, or 50 CFA for a 
house. Houses in St Denis which previously had been rented out at the average price of 
3,000 CFA per month would now to be reduced to 800 CFA per month.80 
The Prefect briefed the rightwing Réunion Island press to publicly support the 
shantytown proposal. 81 The right wing press now had to change its framing of poor 
populations in Réunion, part of Michel Debré’s larger anticommunist strategy to 
appropriate the social claims of the Communist Party. Rather than denouncing the poor as 
the “swarming,” unnamed masses as they had for decades, journalists in St Denis now 
described the living conditions of shantytown populations in Réunion. Whereas in the 
1950s elites had been proud to know nothing about the conditions in the Camps, 
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journalists now sought to display their knowledge, and incite the public to feel 
compassion for the people in the shantytowns of La Réunion.
 
 





From 1964 the Catholic weekly newspaper Croix Sud, which rarely mentioned any social 
inequality in Réunion, wrote about the importance of improving conditions in Réunion’s 
shantytowns as a goals of Christian social justice.82 Croix Sud devoted its Christmas 1964 
issue to pricking the conscience of its readers to the problem of the poverty in 
shantytowns.83 Its front cover shows a barefoot couple with African and Indian ancestry 
posing with their children in front of their house’s open door. The December sun shines in 
their eyes, making them squint. Underneath the photograph is a biblical citation from 
Matthew: 25 (35-40) “I was hungry and you fed me, thirsty and you gave me drink.” 
 This photograph and the accompanying article now framed poor Réunion 
Islanders in the shantytowns as objects of charity and sympathy. They were no longer to 
be perceived as threatening, able to claim their rights to French social legislation. Here, 
the poor are helpless, needing assistance, rather than political activists. In a May 1964 
article, Croix Sud had denounced landlords who charged high rents and took advantage of 
the lack of housing in Réunion. “They suck the blood of the poor who cannot find 
anything else and don’t know how to defend themselves.”84 
Similarly in 1964, the rightwing newspaper Le Progrès described shantytown 
populations as “compatriots” forced to live in bad conditions because they had no choice. 
The high rents they paid were now morally inadmissible. Landlords were at fault for the 
poor living conditions. It was time to declare war on the “slums”, and the rapacious 
landlords who exploited the poor.85 Shantytowns were as shameful as electoral fraud.86 
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The right-wing press now saw itself as the group which really understood the problems of 
the poor.87 
In contrast to the right-wing press, the Communist newspaper Témoignages 
implicitly opposed to the shantytown decree. Before Michel Debré arrived in Réunion, 
the Communist party had held the monopoly on discourses and claims of social justice. 
The Prefecture’s decree threatened to marginalize the Party which accused the 
administration of starting to care about a problem – shantytowns - which had long existed 
in Réunion.88 When the shantytown decree was published in October 1964 Témoignages 
claimed not to have space to print it. A week later, when it finally printed the decree, 
Témoignages quibbled its terms, portraying the French administration as if they wished to 
expel shantytown inhabitants.89  
The PCR framed themselves as the real champions of the poor by pedantically 
challenging the wording of the shantytown decree. “Why does the decree only designate 
shanty towns but not huts or sheds or courtyards? Pourquoi les bidonvilles et pas les 
cases ou des calbanons ou des cours?”90 Témoignages was even ready to defend the 
landlords and landowners, whom they normally called to capitalist exploiters. “We are 
the champions of the decent landlords!” the newspaper headline proclaimed.91  
Although the right-wing now fought the Communist Party to defend the poor, the 
real impact of the Prefect’s decree was that it enabled tenants to seek redress for their 
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own poverty. Tenants wrote to the Prefect of Réunion to make complaints about their 
landlords and to ask for their houses to be classified as shantytowns. In total, about 120 
people in St Denis corresponded with the Prefect between 1964 and 1966 about their rent. 
Although several letters were written in the same handwriting by professional letter 
writers, there is no direct correlation between location and letter writing. There was only 
one courtyard of neighbors who all wrote similar letters to the Prefect complaining about 
the same landlord. Otherwise the letter writers appear to be tenants individually 
motivated to claim their rights in the new French state decree.  
The Prefect had instituted a decree and used the police to enforce it. Réunion 
Islanders in shantytowns now had a legal right to be helped in their situations of 
inequality and poverty. The shantytown decree enabled Réunionnais to individually claim 
material improvement from the state as a fundamental moral and legal right.  
ii. A “worthless” law 
The Prefect’s decree was effective because it was backed up by the police. The riot squad 
(CRS),92 the Gendarmes and Police Nationale divided up St Denis into sections and 
patrolled the shantytowns to survey the rents being paid in every single house in the city. 
They checked houses street-to-street to discover how much rent every tenant paid. They 
classified the house to determine whether it was a shantytown.  
The shantytowns were being policed, but the landowners and landlords were the 
object of control, rather than the tenants. Tenants welcomed the police warmly into their 
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houses. Landowners and landlords did so with less enthusiasm. 93 The riot squad did not 
enjoy the reality of urban poverty in Réunion.94 After conducting surveys in Ste Clotilde 
the riot squad commander wrote to the Prefect complaining that his men had been bitten 
by dogs, ticks and fleas, they had contracted “disagreeable” skin diseases and had been 
infected by other parasites all of which had spread around the barracks.  
The police surveyed approximately 800 houses in central St Denis between 1964 
and 1966. There were 119 rent infractions: 62 for abusive rents, 52 for irregular receipts, 
and 2 for non-delivery of a receipt. A dozen other cases were ambiguous, but if the house 
was dilapidated but not completely run-down, the Prefect had no moral authority on 
unscrupulous landlords. “I have no intention of following your advice” a landlord curtly 
replied to the Prefecture when his house was not classified as a shantytown but the 
Prefecture attempted to persuade him to repair it anyway.95 
Despite Debré’s promises, Réunion Islanders did not have the equivalent pensions 
and state assistance as in Metropolitan France unless they were civil servants. Many 
landowners and landlords lived off their landholding incomes. Faced with the 
classification of their rental houses as shantytowns, landowners and landlords protested 
vociferously about the decree to the Prefecture, because renting houses was their living 
and their business.  
In 1965 Mr. J wrote to the Prefect to complain that the new rents made his 
situation “critical.” He lived from landholding since having suffered an illness, neither he 
                                                 
 
93 ADR 64 W 13 Préfet de La Réunion à M. le procureur général près la cour d'appel. Objet : 
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protect anonymity of people who are still living 
 
  223
nor his wife worked and he still had four of his seven children living at home. However, 
Mr. J included the details of his monthly rents, casting doubt on his claims of being in a 
“critical” situation.  
 Since 1959 Mr. and Mme J had lived off the rents from two plots of land in St 
Denis where they had built small houses. Mr. J rented one plot on Monthyon Street at 
120,000 CFA per year where he had built bedrooms. He sublet each bedroom at 1,500 or 
2,000 CFA per month. He rented his second plot on Boulevard de la Providence at 30,000 
CFA per year and sublet six bedrooms each at 3,000 CFA per month, making a substantial 
profit. Mr. J. complained that his houses had not been properly classified as they had 
water in the courtyards, and electricity, yet the Prefecture had reduced their rent to 1,000F 
each. This threatened his way of life: “I cannot possibly lower my rents, or I will no 
longer be able to meet my family’s needs” Mr. J complained, but even with the reduced 
rent his income was substantially higher than the majority of workers in St Denis, and his 
request was ignored.  
While this landowner clearly appeared to be able to continue to make a living 
despite the lower rents, a female landowner wrote to the Prefect in badly spelled 
Réunionnais Creole. Her living situation was more directly threatened by the Prefect’s 
rent decree. 
We live off the rent of our two rooms; with five children … I have a husband who 
doesn’t work, because he is blind. We needed [the rent] to live. How do you think 
that seven people can live with 600 Francs a month? … I would prefer to put two 
or three animals in those rooms; at least I know what money I could make from 
them… Do you think all the landlords got gifts from the hardware store [when 
they built their houses to rent]? … When you leave Réunion, I hope that you will 
be satisfied with your law which is worthless.96 
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Although the spelling and use of Creole is evidence of the author’s limited schooling, the 
letter narrator is clearly aware of the Prefect’s decree and its impact. She presumably 
exaggerates that she would rather keep animals inside the house than people, but she 
signs off her letter underlining that she was “disgusted” with the current Prefect and that 
everyone in Réunion had preferred Prefect Perreau-Pradier anyway. An employee in the 
Prefecture highlighted this letter in red crayon and noted next to it “this letter shows that 
there will be some small land owners who will be seriously affected by the shantytown 
laws.” How could the small landowners make ends meet if they did not rent out houses 
and rooms? One landlady’s son wrote that “mum doesn’t get the old age pension or 
anything. That’s why she rents two bedrooms at 5000 Francs.”  
The administration now appeared to favor the social rights of the Réunion Island 
working class. “What [the landowners] find most deplorable is that they are almost the 
only ones who will pay. If it could console them, we add that they are perhaps the first, 
and other [people] will follow” wrote Le Progrès.97  A landlady called Mme L wrote to 
the Prefect to complain. She only rented one house in St Denis. With a new law 
protecting the landless tenants who was going to protect the landowners? “If [Debré’s 
law] is a way of creating policy, it is marvelous because it plays into the Communists’ 
hands … making real conflicts between landowner and tenants. Where will the small 
landowners end up, who only have these rents to live off?98 
The complaints of the small landowners were not followed up by the Prefect. Yet 
landowners and landlords wrote to the Prefect anyway to vent their feelings about the 
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changes being made in the name of social equality and hoping that the Prefect might be 
able to act on their behalf. However, the Prefect supported the cause of the poor renters 
and subletters in the shantytowns to discourage the landowners from making profits, and 
incite them to sell their plots to the SIDR. Small landowners were well aware that the 
shantytown decree would affect their social position. The Prefect’s decree and Debré’s 
proposed law would change their fortunes, by changing the value of their land, a clear 
shift away from protecting, or tolerating, the traditional power of the landowners in 
Réunion. 
iii. “A violation of the constitution”: landowning as French citizenship 
Léonce Viadère, Edouard Rivière, and Camille Morel were not just renting a few rooms. 
They were making significant incomes from renting their large plots of land. These large 
landowners did not just want to vent their feelings in writing. They were directly and 
financially threatened by the Prefecture’s decree, and they had the economic wherewithal 
and the education to contest the decree in the courts. They considered that the state had 
no right to pass a law attempting to govern their commercial activities. They claimed 
their right to conduct commercial activities on their land as they saw fit, and remarkably, 
they succeeded in taking the French administration to the civil court to prove their point. 
Edouard Rivière and Camille Morel were taken to court in early 1965 and charged 
with setting extortionate rents and not delivering receipts to their tenants. Yet Rivière and 
Morel successfully fought back and contested the legality of the Prefect’s 1964 decree. 
They asserted the cultural, economic and moral right of Réunion Island landowners to 
dispose of their property as they wished, hoping to redefine the terms of the rent decree. 
In the civil court of St Denis they argued that the Prefecture had acted illegally, because it 
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had no right to govern rents. It was an issue of commercial freedom as governed by 
French civil law. The Prefecture had no rights to use its powers of police in such a way. 
The St Denis civil court released Camille Morel from all charges in June 1965.99  
The judgment in favor of Camille Morel threatened the entire standing of the 
shantytown rent decree and undermined the French administration’s program of reducing 
shantytown rents. The civil servants in the Prefecture were astounded. How could they 
have been judged in the wrong? “We have appealed. But the affair is very worrying” is 
scribbled on the copy of the judgment in the Reunion Departmental archives. Underneath, 
another hand has written “a civil court has no right to judge the legality of administrative 
decrees.”100 The Prefect justified the rent decree because exploitation of the poor for 
profit could create “political” disturbances which could then be used by political 
opponents such as the Communist Party.101 The Prefect immediately asked Michel Debré 
if a legal solution could be found to the problem.102  
Other landowners in St Denis responded to this judgment in favor of Morel by 
attempting to raise their rents. Because of the pro-Morel judgment, Mme R’s landlady 
demanded back payment. The landlady claimed that because Morel had won the case, the 
Prefecture’s decree was now invalid. Mme R’s rent had been recently reduced from 7,000 
CFA to 2,195 CFA. The shanty town commissioner saw the danger of Mme R attempting 
to re-hike the rent. “Very urgent, an example must be made of this immediately. Tell 
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[her] that it is out of the question to go back on the rent. Tell the owner the same, totally 
and firmly. Publish this information in the press.” 
The appeal against the Camille Morel judgment came back into the St Denis 
courts in October 1965. His lawyer claimed the landowners were moral people, 
exercising their commercial rights. In contrast, low rents would be an immoral influence 
on poor tenants in St Denis who were notoriously unclean and lacked hygiene. Low rents 
would “only produce the opposite of the desired outcome. The interested parties will have 
the [financial] means for constructing a few more shanty towns and drinking a bit more 
[rum].” Morel’s lawyer argued that the urban poor’s uncontrollable desire to build 
shantytowns and act anti-socially explained why there were so many shanty towns in St 
Denis. The lawyers also described the Creole landowners as French citizens freely 
undertaking commercial contracts which should not be regulated. The Prefecture had 
undermined the principles of commercial liberty for citizens enshrined in the 
constitutions of the 4th and 5th French Republics.103  
Framing the urban poor in St Denis as immoral, poor, dirty, alcoholic and 
somehow viral may have worked in the 1950s but not after Debré’s new policy for 
seeking the political loyalty of Réunion’s poor. Lawyers for the Prefecture successfully 
argued that controlling rents in the shantytowns was a way of avoiding public disorder, 
because Réunion Islanders’ poverty could be used for political ends (implicitly by the 
Communist Party, not by the French administration).104 In the middle of 1965 the 
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Prefecture had announced in public that the shantytown decree would be maintained 
indefinitely, in order to maintain social peace and for the public good.105 The final 
judgment in November 1965 acquitted the Prefecture, and charged the landowners guilty 
of taking the Prefect to court in order to continue their immoral exploitation of the 
poorest sections of the Réunion Island population with impunity. Rivière and Morel were 
forced to pay the costs of the trial.106  
A few years later, Michel Debré commented on the trial against Rivière and 
Morel. He said that the Prefect’s decree had imposed morality, and the landowners had 
slyly attacked this morality by contesting the decree’s wording “ils ont préféré alors faire 
triompher le texte d'une règle plutôt que la règle d'une morale.” Debré praised his moral 
political program in Réunion. The French administration could protect the poor by 
controlling the landowners’ control over land, “holding back the excesses of a badly-
employed freedom.”107 
The Prefect’s decree changed the relationship between the state and medium and 
small landowners. Instead of upholding the values of commercial freedom as a right of 
French citizenship, or allowing local landowners to continue their control over landless 
populations as the French administration and SIDR had done in the early 1950s, the 
Prefecture chose to support the poor, in order to obtain cheap land for the SIDR. By so 
doing, it threatened the livelihood of the small landowners and political loyalty of a small 
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middle class, in order to ensure that the more numerous poor Réunion Islanders in the 
shanty towns did not develop any more dangerous political opposition to the state.  
Debré and the Prefecture had not intended any more than this. However the 
decree also enabled poor Réunion Islanders in the shantytowns to individually apply 
directly to the Prefect for help, opening up a new way of making social claims and 
undertaking political action individually.  
iv. The state as social mediator of the poor Réunion Islanders 
By changing the rents, the Prefecture mediated changing relations between the 
landowners, landlords and tenants in Réunion. Individuals in the shantytowns 
successfully petitioned the Prefecture to reduce their rents. Low rents were now framed 
as being moral and the proof of poor Réunion Islanders’ social equality as French 
citizens. Through their letters, Réunion Island tenants articulated a new version of 
Réunion Island French citizenship. If the state now imposed and controlled welfare, 
individuals could also apply to the state for their rights, rather than taking to the streets as 
part of a political movement such as the PCR which was being repressed.  
Out of approximately 800 rent investigations in houses in St Denis, I found 48 
pleading letters, and about 50 letters between the Prefecture and tenants discussing rent. 
The major difference between writing supplicating letters to the Prefect before and after 
the Prefect’s decree was that these letters could now lead to significant social action. The 
introduction of the law into Réunion Island social life meant that the Prefecture became 




Mme R lived with her husband and six children in a three room house in St Denis. 
Two of the rooms had old planks on the floor and one had an earth floor. The roof was 
made of corrugated iron. The entire house was only seven meters by six. Yet in this quite 
standard situation of poverty, she wrote to ask the Prefect to intervene in her life. 
For the last eight years I have been in this house, I pay 7000F every month, and 
there have never been repairs, and since the rent has been reduced my landlord 
has told me to leave.  
I’m a mother of six children, and my eldest is fighting for France [sous le 
drapeau] in Metropole. … I can no longer cope with life in the poverty which 
surrounds me, and I am expecting another baby. Judge my situation for yourself. 
I’m about to lose my mind. Mr. Prefect, I hope that you will take pity on my 
situation and stop my landlord.  
 
Since the application of the rent decree, Mme R’s landlord had tried to throw her out, 
presumably to find more pliable tenants who would not argue with paying the pre-decree 
rent. In her plea to the Prefect, Mme R marshaled the morality of her position as a mother 
of young children, her helplessness in poverty and her fulfilling of her citizenship duties 
(one of her sons is in the French army). Although she had paid her rent for seven years, 
once Mme R had the possibility of a lower rent she could no longer “cope” with her 
poverty.  
Her letter underlines that the introduction of the Prefect’s decree gave the poor 
tenants in the shantytowns a new perspective on their financial and social possibilities. 
Thus Mme R seized the opportunity of writing an individual letter to the Prefect to claim 
her rights to pay a lower rent, rather than being forced into paying a higher rent which 
was no longer legal. 
For the last year I have lived in a five bedroom shed (calbanon) … made of brick 
with a corrugated iron roof, it is 3,85m long and 2,60m wide, with no kitchen, no 
doorstep, no water, no electricity and I pay 2500 Francs. The other tenants who 
live here used to pay the same amount as me, but since the shantytown 
inspections which reduced the price they pay only 500 Francs.  
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I wasn’t there on the day of the inspection, I still pay 2500 francs. I ask 
whether you can do anything. We are all poor and above all equal. I don’t see why 
they should pay less rent than me when we have the same things.  
 
Through a narrative of poverty and unfair treatment the letter writer, a 27 year old 
married woman asks to benefit from the same low rent and same social justice as her 
neighbors, because everybody who benefits from the shantytown decree is poor and 
therefore should be equally treated. Given that she is writing to the Prefect, the letter 
writer deliberately deploys the notion of equality because it is an ideology of the French 
Republic. Mme R made a political claim to be recognized as an equal citizen, through the 
idiom of a right to pay a lower rent, the same as other poor people in St Denis. 
A few Reunion Islanders manipulated their claims and some letters show that 
Réunion Islanders may have been trying to resolve personal scores, and neighborly 
disputes through the medium of the state. A 28 year old woman claimed that her landlady 
was harassing her– she had put a lock on the gate and not given her tenant a key. The 
woman could not open her own gate, and wrote to the Prefect in order to stop the 
woman’s “spitefulness”. This letter detailed strange acts of sabotage which appeared to 
have no motivation. The Prefecture’s commission eventually revealed a personal dispute 
which had got out of hand, and which the woman had hoped that she could win if the 
Prefect mediated on her side. Another letter writer deployed the fear of being evicted 
from his of his house to be replaced by Comorian tenants. The Commission later found 
out he was merely envious of a Comorian neighbor who had a larger room.  
Writing to the Prefect was only effective if writers had the time to wait for the 
administration to visit, and had the tenacity to make multiple demands. Mlle A walked to 
the Prefecture office to ask the CRS to come and inspect her bedroom which was 6m2. 
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She took a day off work to wait for them. They never turned up and so she wrote to the 
Prefect again complaining that her landlady was making her life terribly difficult, taking 
advantage of her because she was all alone. Since the shantytown decree her landlady had 
refused to accept her rent. Instead her landlady had started hassling her, packing up her 
dishes, and stopping the water, so she had to get water in the street. After Mlle A wrote a 
second letter, the Prefecture sent the Police around to investigate. The Police pressured 
and legally obliged Mlle A’s landlady police to reduce the rent from 1200 to 300 Francs, 
and in front of the Police she even said she would give the next month free until Mlle A 
found a cheaper place to stay. Similarly Mr. R wrote to the Prefecture several times. 
Eventually the Police tracked down his landlord who had been obliging the man to pay 
more rent, but who had used a false name to avoid being caught by. 
The Prefecture gradually became engaged as a mediator in disputes between 
landowners, landlords and tenants who made opposing claims about rent levels. Mr. A 
had been harassed by his landlady who lived on the property. After the rent commission 
controlled the area, his landlady was upset about the decrease in her rent. She 
immediately ripped out the fence of the house occupied by Mr. A and she cut off the 
family’s water supply. Mr. A had six children, some of whom were babies. She also 
threatened him with turning off his electricity. The shanty town commissioner asked the 
Police in St Denis “to advise the landlady that she must show herself to be more humane, 
reconstruct the fence and reconnect the water which this numerous family needs.”  
In stark contrast with 1961 fears about the “swarming” inhabitants of Camp 
Ozoux and their potential to make political claims, the Prefecture had become the 
protector of social rights in Réunion. Réunion Islanders in the shanty towns were no 
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longer seen as morally degenerate, or with a suspect allegiance to France. The effect of 
the 1964 shantytown decree was that the Prefecture now worried about the circumstances 
of an individual living in a shanty town and whether his fence needed to be mended.  
Some writers had much vaguer notions of the legal power of the Prefect, but still 
saw the importance of the Prefecture’s role in controlling rents. A woman claimed that 
her landlord was hassling her because she did not have a husband, the wind whipped at 
her house, and her child was sick. She asked for the Prefect to send a policeman to 
examine her situation and ended her letter “for the 1966 year, may God bless you in all 
your work and may he give you a long and happy life among your people.” The rhetoric 
in this letter, reminiscent of the end of a Catholic mass, suggests that for some Réunion 
Islanders, the Prefect still embodied a mysterious and magical power from a far away 
land, far removed from more any notions of “citizenship” at all. Other poor Réunion 
Islanders in St Denis understood their rights to change their poverty by paying lower 
rents, and specifically cited knowledge of their citizenship rights - “I am waiting for your 
services to send someone … if I am asking the shantytown commission it’s because I am 
conscious of the law.” 
The culmination of the Prefect’s rent decree with the repression of the PCR in 
Réunion enabled poor Réunion Islanders to individually write to the Prefect claiming 
their moral right to lower rents. This direct appeal to the state, rather than through 
political parties or other group claims was a new way of expressing Réunion Island 
citizenship, and was the result of Debré’s use of the French state to impose and control 
welfare in Réunion. The letters to the Prefect were not an isolated phenomenon. From 
this time, Réunion Islanders started to abandon the PCR, and its public claims, in order to 
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align themselves with the state and its distribution and control of welfare. Réunion Island 
French citizenship would become based on a moral claim to welfare and to state aid as a 
citizen’s right.  
IV. Cleaning the shantytowns and creating loyal citizens 
The Debré law had passed in the National Assembly in December 1964.108 Rather than 
merely regulating rent relationships, the Debré law provided local governments with the 
legal means to expropriate land being used for shantytowns. The Prefect’s decree of 1964 
just an interim measure for the French administration’s solution to the shantytown 
problem in Réunion. After all, even though they now paid lower rent, the tenants still had 
to be moved off the land. In 1965 the SIDR was able to expropriate Rivière and Viadère. 
They had already bought a new plot of land called Le Chaudron in Ste Clotilde, 3km 
from the center of St Denis to rehouse the tenants who were on the land.109  
At the beginning of 1966 Michel Debré gave a speech. He praised the new 
developments in shantytown removals, and the new construction of housing in St Denis. 
After all, the SIDR had tried to achieve this since 1949 without success. The construction 
of Le Chaudron was going well, with 450 houses destined for the inhabitants of Rivière-
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Viadère, of which 111 would be delivered that July.110 Including operations in Le Port 
and St Pierre, 3,700 Réunionnais families would be rehoused in 1966. 111  
Debré proudly declared that French financing of the shantytown operation for 
1966 had increased 267 % in relation to 1955. The financing for La Réunion represented 
25% of the total amount of money allocated for Metropolitan France, including the 
massive sums dedicated to removing the shantytowns in the outskirts of Paris. “Thus, my 
dear compatriots” finished Michel Debré, “the government wishes to progressively allow 
all the inhabitants of Reunion to have a decent house at their disposition.” It must be 
noted that Debré emphasized “disposition”, not ownership.  
As Debré had emphasized, a new model of social housing in Réunion appeared to 
have been implemented between 1963 and 1966. The French state had spent a large sum 
of money on Réunion’s shantytowns. Réunion’s finally appeared to be treated equally 
with the French administration, and the material conditions of urban Réunion Islanders 
were improving. The SIDR had even reimbursed the residents of Rivière-Viadère for the 
cost of their housing materials - corrugated iron sheets, and wood – in order that they 
could buy new furniture for their new houses in Chaudron.112 
Debré’s speech was also planned for publication. In the book draft, the editor 
noted in the margin next to Debré’s last words “photograph of a new house with smiling 
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families and pretty children, all well-dressed”. 113 The Prefect of Reunion seemed 
similarly content. He hoped that changing the houses of the urban poor would change 
their social behavior and their need to pay a regular rent would make them proper 
workers. As their incomes increased, the SIDR tenants would want to pay for better 
houses, the Prefect’s logic ran. They would move out of social housing, and uplift 
themselves from the poor urban proletariat, through their class aspirations.114 
 A running tally for the numbers of shantytowns destroyed and to be destroyed 
were regularly sent to Michel Debré in Paris. In 1966 the total number of houses in the 
shantytowns was calculated as 10,967 for the whole of Réunion. With all the planned 
constructions, 9,543 houses should be built in the next three years, and then the housing 
problem of Réunion would be resolved.115 
 This shantytown removal even seemed to be diminishing the importance of the 
Communist Party in the urban neighborhoods. Urban Réunion Islanders appeared to have 
accepted the role of the state in governing their social rights and their housing. When the 
SIDR planed the construction of social housing in Butor-Vauban in 1967 there were 
about 1,000 small landowners who had to be paid off. Most residents were owners, in 
contrast to Rivière-Viadère where they had been tenants. The SIDR bought up all the 
land plots and there were only 50 contestations.  
The Communist Party activist Mme Isnelle Amelin attempted to represent the 
residents of Butor-Vauban and publicize their “tragic situation” of being rehoused. She 
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only got 26 signatures of concern on the public enquiry. 116 Even when they made 
complaints to the public enquiry, Butor-Vauban residents merely asked for financial 
reimbursements from the SIDR for the cost of their land, and two people asked for a 
refund for the cost of their housing materials. They all wished to be rehoused by the 
SIDR house, and one person wished to be rehoused nearer the town center rather than Le 
Chaudron. 117 The secret police claimed that there was now no support for the 
Communist Party in Butor-Vauban and that most people there wanted to be quickly 
rehoused by the SIDR. The police only noted that there had been concern from poorer 
residents, such as domestic workers earning 5,000F per month, who worried that they 
would pay more rent in a SIDR house. Apart from this quibble, in 1966 the residents of 
the shantytowns appeared to find the idea of moving into SIDR accommodation 
appealing, and did not protest their removals, asking only for financial compensation.  
The curious 1965 picture of members of St Denis city council speaking in a 
bulldozed Vauban neighborhood with local residents listening (Figure 5.5) emphasizes 
the continuing class and race differences between residents in the shantytowns and those 
in government. Members of the municipal government of St Denis are grouped around 
the microphone, wearing suits and they are socially white, in contrast to the more 
informally dressed populations of Vauban on the right hand of the photograph, some of 
whom are in bare feet.  
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Figure 5.4 Destruction of Vauban shantytown 1965 
 
 
This photograph also underlines the different approach to shantytowns, and to state-run 
welfare in Reunion Island and Metropolitan France, where in the same year, the 
bulldozers destroyed the shantytowns of Champigny, using Debré’s law.118 Yet small 
landowners in Vauban received material compensation from the SIDR. The Vauban 
shantytown destruction was not fundamentally opposed.119  
 
V. Conclusion 
In the local context where politics, landowning and tenancy were closely linked, the 
introduction of new rent laws enabled poor Réunion Islanders to use rent claims to make 
new political claims. Réunion Islanders could individually appeal to the French 
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administration to improve their material circumstances, rather than directly following 
Debré’s citizenship format of patriotism and love for the mother country. The majority of 
Réunion Islanders accepted the improved material conditions which came with public 
political acquiescence to Michel Debré’s new idea of state-imposed social care.  
Through a new rent decree, the state became the mediator of the class divide in 
Réunion and chose the poor over the petit bourgeois. Because the French administration 
set the terms of welfare, individuals were also able to make social claims directly to the 
state. Social claims were no longer the exclusive purview of party politics and social 
movements, but could be demanded if individuals petitioned the state for welfare. 
 On one hand Debré was successful in creating a multi-racial idea of Frenchness in 
Réunion in the spirit of the Republican tradition. On the other hand, Debré did not 
successfully recreate an identical idea of French citizenship in Réunion. Letters written 
by individuals to the Prefect in 1964-66 do not constitute a collective social movement, 
but demonstrate that Réunion Islanders had found new ways to make claims on the state. 
The introduction of the shantytown decree enabled Réunion Islanders to mobilize 
previous ideas about the relationship between politics and landholding to request help 
from the authority figure of the Prefect. The Prefect’s legal means and deployment of the 
police offered shantytown tenants an unheard-of social and political power in Réunion. 
They could assert their new rights to cheap rent by calling in the Prefect’s commission to 
investigate the landowners who were exploiting them. The new decree was not merely 
about the morality of rents from land ownership. The entire relationship between Réunion 
Island tenants, landlords, landowners and the state was being transformed, and a new 
idiom of making citizenship claims linked to French state welfare had been created. 
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CHAPTER 6 MAKING FRANCE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN 1963-
2006  
I. Introduction 
Reporting on Debré’s 1963 election victory, the Prefect of Réunion noted that Debré had 
“confirmed himself as ... the very incarnation of France, and of her perpetuity in this 
faraway department.”1 Debré emphasized that Réunion Islanders were now as French as 
people in Metropolitan France. He also portrayed himself as the incarnation of France in 
Réunion. Debré portrayed himself as the personification of the French state and the 
distributor of its values and its welfare, the guarantor of French state legitimacy in 
Réunion.  
In May 1968 many Metropolitan French people rejected President De Gaulle’s 
project of creating a national French culture, coordinated by the central state.2 Yet during 
this time in Réunion, Debré frequently proclaimed that the island was part of a national 
French culture. In a 1966 speech to Réunion’s General Council, Debré asserted that 
“Réunionnais men and women feel, and profoundly express, their desire to be French. 
Here they make up a little France … and La Réunion will be the living reflection in the 
Indian Ocean of Our Nation and her civilization.”3  
                                                 
 
1 CAC 19941080/41 Préfet de La Réunion à M. le Ministre de l’Etat des DTOM. Objet: déroulement des 
élections législatives partielles du 5 mai 1963 8/5/1963 
2 Kristin Ross, May '68 and its afterlives (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002). 
3 ADR 57 W 12 Conseil Général de La Réunion. Réception de Michel Debré, Ancien Premier Ministre, 
Ancien Député de La Réunion, Ministre de l'économie et des finances. Allocution de M. Marcel Cerneau, 
Discours de M. Michel Debré 26/3/1966 
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Despite Debré’s assertions, not everyone agreed that Réunion was now a replica 
of France, or that this was a necessarily a good thing. In 1972 a left-wing Metropolitan 
journalist writing about Réunion claimed the island had “just come out of the colonial 
era” and then questioned “has it really left it entirely?”4 The opposition Communist Party 
also loudly denounced Debré’s colonial oppression of the Réunionnais, and accused the 
French administration of having an undemocratic influence in Réunion Island.  
Were Réunion Islanders even more French than France itself? Did the French 
Empire really live on in Réunion by 1973? If so, what was needed to maintain an 
apparently French colonial culture in Réunion in the face of two decades of Communist 
opposition to the French regime?  
After the 1962 French defeat in Algeria, recent scholarship has suggested that 
France made a breakpoint with colonization. Indeed, in 1962 politicians like Michel 
Debré appeared to frame French decolonization as something completely inevitable.  
Despite this, from 1963 Michel Debré sought to maintain French influence in Réunion 
using very similar idioms and to those of French colonialism. Shepard has also suggested 
that after the 1962 defeat in Algeria, and in the wake of enormous immigration from the 
colonies, race and ethnicity became meaningful markers in France to explain who could 
be considered French.5 This chapter shows how, unlike in Metropolitan France, Debré 
framed French citizenship in Réunion as multi-racial.  
Studying East Africans’ appropriation of British culture and consumer goods, 
Prestholdt suggests that East Africans used strategic representations of British imported 
goods both to flatter the British and to strategically manipulate the outsiders’ perceptions 
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of them. This was to further East African political, social and economic strategies, not to 
mimic British ideas of class, status or order.6 Prestholdt suggests that it was easy to 
distinguish between the two cultures, and that any East African appropriation of 
Britishness was purely calculated.  
In Réunion, both Michel Debré and Paul Vergès’ attempted to polarize political 
and cultural discourse on the island as a choice either for Réunion or for France. Yet by 
the 1970s in Réunion it was impossible to define the island as either French or Creole. 
This chapter shows how young urban Réunion Islanders in St Denis appropriated and 
made their own ideas about being French in the Indian Ocean, interpreting in their own 
fashion the pro- and anti- French ideologies which saturated political life on the island. 
Unlike the prevailing political discourse, Islanders did not need to choose either Réunion 
or France to understand what it meant to be French in the Indian Ocean.  
II. Shaping Réunion’s future on a politically divided island  
Being elected a deputy in Réunion Island enabled Michel Debré to enact his vision of the 
French Republican mission and gave him a springboard to re-launch his career, while 
remaining deputy for the island.7 Debré’s retained his National Assembly seat in Reunion 
from 1963 to 1988.8 Reunion was also a platform for Michel Debré to perform his own 
vision of what France could achieve overseas. The Communist Party had a radically 
different vision of Réunion’s future, based on a policy of autonomy from France, self-
                                                 
 
6 Jeremy Prestholdt, Domesticating the world : African consumerism and the genealogies of globalization, 
The California world history library (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008). 
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determination for the “Réunionnais people” and recognizing the contributions of Réunion 
Island culture. Debré and Vergès’ ideas about Réunion’s future operated in the same 
discursive field. They shaped each other and defined a framework for political expression 
action in Réunion which, in the 1960s at least, could only be oriented around one or other 
political sides: support of Debré or support of Vergès.  
Both Michel Debré and Paul Vergès were highly charismatic leaders fighting an 
ideological battle between Communism and Gaullism. They oriented their claims to 
legitimate leadership and visions of an ideal future for Réunion around an idea about 
“France” Were Réunion Islanders patriotic French citizens or should they have the right 
to self-determination? Had they been French for 300 years, as supporters of Debré 
claimed, or were they more like Vergès’ description of the “banyan people” like the tree 
whose branches become roots, creating multiple trunks.9 Both Vergès and Debré fought 
over the same teleological idea:  Réunion’s place in the nation. The only difference was 
whether Réunion was part of the French nation or Réunion was a nation in itself.  
Working within already existing paternalistic idioms in Réunion, Michel Debré 
promoted a popular idea of himself as “papa Debré”, a paternal figure, an incarnation of 
the French state, and the guarantor of Republican citizenship in Réunion.10 In turn the 
Communist Party built its own political ideology of opposition: the Réunion Island 
Communist Party became the party of resistance. However the PCR leader Paul Vergès 
was also known as “Papa Vergès” at the same time he portrayed himself as the maroon 
rebel and resistor of France’s colonial oppression. Paternalistic political leadership was 
strongly associated with President De Gaulle and was increasingly criticized in 
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Metropolitan France through the 1960s. In Réunion, where paternalism had long shaped 
landlord-tenant relations, the figures of Papa Vergès and Papa Debré were immediately 
understandable. They were also pervasive, shaping political discourse in Réunion for 
decades. 
i. Proving the viability of Overseas France in Réunion 
As Prime Minister to President De Gaulle between 1958 and 1962, Michel Debré had 
frequently been mocked in France’s satirical newspaper Le Canard Enchainé as a servile 
and self-effacing Prime Minister to an authoritative and regal President de Gaulle. Figure 
6.1 is a 1961 cartoon which portrays Debré as the Prince De Bré, kneeling down with a 
concentrated expression. He is offering slippers on a velvet cushion to an unseen king 
who the reader knows is President De Gaulle.11 When Michel Debré became elected as a 
deputy in far away Reunion Island in 1963, it was inevitable that Metropolitan 
commentators would see this as Debré’s own attempt to become king.  
 
Figure 6.1 The Prince De Bré Le Canard Enchainé 1961 
                                                 
 
11 Christian Delporte, "Le monstre bicéphale. L'exécutif dans le dessin du Canard Enchaîné (1959 - 1981)," 





Figure 6.2 “I’m the General!” Combat 20/7/1963 
 
The Metropolitan French press mocked Debré for having been parachuted into a 
parliamentary seat “in the sun”, where he could play at being General de Gaulle in front 
of the natives. Figure 6.2 portrays Reunion Islanders in the standard racist depiction of 
tiny black African natives with huge lips. The natives look at up at Michel Debré who is 
drowned in President de Gaulle’s uniform –Michel Debré was quite short, and de Gaulle 
was very tall. However in the cartoon, Michel Debré claims that he is now “the 
General.”12 It shows the newspapers’ lack of knowledge about Réunion and implies that 
Réunion Islanders are not really French. The most important aspect of this cartoon is not 
it satire of Michel Debré. Rather the cartoons emphasize that there was nothing strange or 
untoward about Michel Debré attempting to play at the being General de Gaulle in a 
sunny faraway land with tiny black natives looking on. This suggests that for 
Metropolitan French cartoonists, Algerian decolonization in 1962 was not an entirely 
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definitive breakpoint with ideas about the French Empire. Rather, it was an amusing but 
logical continuation of Debré’s previous role as a leader in French colonial policy.  
President De Gaulle had already affirmed his wish to stay in France’s Overseas 
Territories and to maintain political influence in France’s ex-colonies. There could be no 
question of abandoning France’s Overseas Departments.13 De Gaulle informed Senator 
Repiquet of Réunion, in Paris just before the 1963 elections there, that “Réunion is 
France … France is a big country and can solve [Réunion’s problems].” The new Prefect 
of Réunion, in transit in Paris, was informed by De Gaulle that “Réunion is a moral value 
for France, and an oceanic extension of the national territory” proving that De Gaulle had 
not formally and fully abandoned  ideas and policies of France’s extension overseas after 
1962.14  
Shepard claims that Debré framed an inevitable “tide of history” as the cause of 
Algerian decolonization in 1962 , casting those who sought to retain France’s legal link 
to Algeria as those who history had spurned. Yet outside the Algerian case, Michel Debré 
did not feel that the tide of history had turned away from Republican imperialism. Rather, 
by being elected in Réunion the year after the Algerian defeat, Debré intended to “defend 
faraway France … not only to assure the security of [people proud to be French], not only 
to prove that the idea of the nation was superior than that of race … also to oblige the 
leaders of our country to consider the worldwide interests of France.”15 Debré clearly 
conceived his role in Réunion as a continuation of his earlier ambitions for Overseas 
France which had been dashed in 1962.  
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Yet Debré’s vision of Overseas France after 1962 was a radical departure from previous 
models of French colonialism. From now on, France’s mission overseas would be racially 
inclusive. Réunion Island French citizenship was a multi-racial, transnational French 
citizenship which went beyond the borders of European France, as Michel Debré 
proclaimed to the Réunion Island General Council in 1966. 
 
This extraordinary wish, agreement, hope of the [Réunion] populations … at 
13,000 km from the Metropole women and men of diverse origins experience the 
constant feeling to strongly belong to the French nation … Réunionnais and 
Réunionnaises agree, that whatever the diversity of their origins or their beliefs, 
whatever their geographical distance, that they will remain French citizens.16  
 
Debré’s vision of Réunion Island citizenship now mirrored the “multinational French 
citizenship” that France’s ex-colonies had unsuccessfully petitioned the Metropole for 
between 1946 and 1960.17 For Debré, the continued presence of the French nation 
overseas in Réunion was more important than any outmoded ideas about inferior or 
dangerous races or a “civilizing mission.” This multi-racial citizenship was a radical 
departure from the new regulation of immigration policy in Metropolitan France, and 
differed markedly from the French administration’s views of dangerous “foreign” 
minorities in Réunion during the 1950s. In the National Assembly Debré frequently 
reiterated that the citizens of Overseas France were the equals of Metropolitan French 
citizens.  
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Debré’s new vision of a multiracial France in Réunion has been ignored in the 
scholarship in race on France. It calls into question theories that the French Republic was 
inherently racist, or has been incapable of incorporating difference. To be sure, Réunion 
and the other French Overseas Departments differed from French colonies of the 3rd 
Republic. Réunion had not had a legal regime based on exclusionary citizenship. Yet 
Debré’s vision of a new French order in Réunion was also based on a selective erasure of 
past inequalities in Réunion. A multiracial French citizenship in Réunion would only be 
achieved by a heady reaffirmation of Ernest Renan’s theories of nationhood, and by 
silencing the realities of social inequality in Réunion.  
Renan had emphasized that a nation had to be built of a select forgetting of past 
violence. Debré was fond of quoting Renan and frequently referred to the “sacrifices” 
which Réunion Islanders soldiers had made for the French nation. Each of his visits to 
Réunion included laying wreaths at Réunion Island war memorials. Nonetheless Debré 
systematically refused to even acknowledge that Réunion Islanders might support 
Réunion’s autonomy, or might have sympathy for the PCR’s claims. Debré also silenced 
Paul Vergès by ensuring that he was banned from appearing on French radio or 
television.  
The Communist Party directly challenged Debré’s vision of French citizenship in 
Réunion. Between 1964 and 1966 Paul Vergès successfully hid from the French 
administration in Réunion. During Vergès’ 28 month period of hiding in Réunion, the 
Communist Party revitalized and reappropriated the heritage of Réunion’s maroon 
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slaves.18 They portrayed themselves as members of a resistance against the 1960 Debré 
Ordinance which transferred “subversive” civil servants to Metropolitan France, against 
the pervasive electoral fraud in Réunion, and the Communist Party’s victimization by the 
French state. Paul Vergès was the democratic champion of the Réunionnais people’s 
rights and the resistor of colonial oppression. The Party promoted local popular culture, 
music and political figures against Metropolitan French Republican ideology.19 While 
Debré never referred to social inequalities in Réunion - such as the system of slavery – 
the Communist Party used slavery and resistance as metaphors for their current political 
position in Réunion. The PCR claimed to be the direct descendants of the liberating 1848 
abolitionists of slavery.20 They also participated in meetings in the Antilles to present 
their project for Réunion’s autonomy during the 1960s and 1970s. Vergès also frequently 
visited socialist countries during this period.21  
While rightwing city councils traditionally named their streets after Republican 
heroes, as soon as the PCR regained control of city councils in 1971, it named streets 
after Réunion Islanders linked to slavery. In 1971, the PCR city council of La Possession 
inaugurated new streets with the names of Edmund Albius,22 Sarda Garriga,23 Anchain, 
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Cimendef, who were linked to Réunion’s heritage of slavery and Raymond Vergès, the 
founder of the Communist Party in Réunion.24  
 
Figure 6.3 Fable: the Chinese cock (2nd district) and the Gallic cock (1st district)  
Journal de l’Ile 17/2/1967 
 
The discursive battle between Vergès and Debré was caricatured by the right-wing media 
in Réunion. The 1967 cartoon about the national elections in Réunion (Figure 6.3) 
contrasts the “Gallic cock”, a symbol of the French Republic with the “Chinese cock.” 
The Chinese cock’s head is a photograph of Paul Vergès and is portrayed falling down 
the side of a Réunion Island mountain, feathers flying. The “Chinese cock” emphasizes 
Vergès’ untrustworthy Vietnamese origins for racist effect. It portrays Vergès as a lackey 
of the USSR or China, and the Communists’ as a dangerous but a failure. In contrast, the 
Gallic cock stands in the foreground proudly asserting the rightful place of France in 
Réunion.  
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The cartoon was not penned by Michel Debré. A comprehensive study of Debré’s 
political role in Réunion emphasizes that Michel Debré was not himself racist.25 
However, Debré claimed to champion an inclusive multiracial citizenship in Réunion, but 
obviously tolerated racist Réunionnais portrayals of Vergès’ untrustworthy racial 
heritage. An acceptance of multiracial citizenship in Réunion acceptance did not extend 
to political enemies like Paul Vergès who did not share Debré’s notion of France’s 
Republican mission in Réunion. 
Even in the 1980s, Michel Debré continued to assert his paternalist vision of 
multiracial French politics in Réunion (Figure 6.5).26   
 
Figure 6.4 Michel Debré with Réunion Island women and children c1986 
 
Dressed in a formal suit, Michel Debré is the only man in the photograph. He is an 
incongruous figure among the Réunion Islanders. This photograph was not taken 
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specifically for an election. It is even more significant, as it is the only photograph of 
Michel Debré in Réunion Island in his entire five volume autobiography. This image was 
important for Debré and it clearly shows his acceptance of racial diversity in Réunion. 
Yet this photograph of Debré surrounded by a picturesque multiracial French diversity 
hides the political repression which needed to make it function. It also leaves the reader 
of his biography with an image of Réunion Islanders as the childlike and feminine 
recipients of his patriarchal munificence. The photograph suggests, as Françoise Vergès 
has argued, that the political relationship between Réunion and Metropolitan France has 
consistently followed this patriarchal framework, managed by the Metropole.27 
 Réunion Islanders were not merely the passive victims of Debré’s patriarchal 
regime, however. Despite the pervasive discourse of the two main political leaders in 
Réunion, Réunion Islanders also created their own frameworks for interpreting the 
meanings of being French in the Indian Ocean. From singing political songs of support to 
understanding the environment around them, Réunion Islanders did not merely recreate to 








                                                 
 
27 Vergès, Monsters and revolutionaries : colonial family romance and métissage. 
 
  253
III. The meanings of being French in the Indian Ocean 
Tonton Debré (Uncle Debré) c1971  
 
1.   
Na longtemps nu gett'   For ages we’ve been searching 
Dans not'ciel out' l'avion  In our skies for your plane 
Mais not' ziés y rest'   But our eyes stay white 
Blanc comme un bout' coton  [We’re waiting in vain] 
 
REFRAIN    CHORUS 
O tonton Michel   Oh uncle Michel 
Coça l'arriv' aou   What’s happened to you? 
Laiss' pas nous tout seul  Don’t leave us alone  
Nous na besoin aou   We need you 
...     … 
4. 
A caus' rest' en Franc'  Why do you stay in France? 
Ca la pas in' manièr   It’s just not right 
Ou not' l'espéranc'   You are our only chance 
Jeanne d'Arc' de l'il' entièr'  The island’s Joan of Arc  
5. 
… 
Si nous l'est hérés   If we’re happy 
Tonton ou mêm' l'auteur.28  Uncle, it’s all thanks to you 
 
This séga song was written by two Réunionnais popular musicians. It appears to idolize 
Michel Debré as the very incarnation of France. Debré is framed as the originator of all 
the infrastructure and social renewal in Réunion. The first verse describes Islanders who 
look desperately into the sky. The politician is longed-for, but he doesn’t arrive. The 
chorus reproaches Debré for his absence. Debré is described as “Joan of Arc for the entire 
island”; Joan of Arc is a savior figure from Metropolitan French political mythology 
                                                 
 
28 The words and music are in the Debré papers with a message “reconnaissance et gratitude” written and 
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whose cross was used as General de Gaulle’s symbol of Free France.29 Michel Debré as 
Joan of Arc is the redeemer of Réunion who appears to need professions of public 
gratitude.  
The song seems to merely adulate Michel Debré. Yet the song also reveals the 
growing financial and political power of the city councils in Réunion (explored in the 
following chapter). The song describes Réunion Islanders who stare at the sky, waiting 
for a plane to land. Réunion Islanders would frequently congregate at the island’s airport 
to greet political figures when they landed. However they were often there because they 
were city council employees, transported by their employers and given free food to incite 
them to attend when Debré or other politicians landed at the airport.  
Réunion Islanders sang songs to welcome visiting French politicians which 
mirrored Debré’s rhetoric about an adoring, patriotic, French citizenship in the Indian 
Ocean. Yet these songs did not fit neatly into the political binaries drawn up by Debré 
and Vergès, where Réunion Islanders had to choose between either being French or being 
resistors to France’s colonial oppression on the island. Even if Reunion Islanders 
attempted to reproduce Debré’s rhetoric for his own consumption when he arrived in 
Réunion on political visits, Réunion Islanders also created their own notions of what it 
could mean to be French in the Indian Ocean.  
Sega Debré 1973 
 
Debré l’arrivé, li artourne voir à nous Debré has come, he’s come back to us 
Nout papa lé là, nout papa lé là Our papa is here, our papa is here 
… … 
Tout bann communistes y pé pas fait  Those Communists can’t make us afraid 
 père à nous  
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Quand Debré lé là, quand Debré lé là When Debré is here, when Debré is here 
… … 
L’ecole, çomin, qui ça la donne à nous Who gave us the roads and the schools 
Si la pas Debré, si la pas Debré If not Debré, if not Debré 
Vieux moun, marmaille, The old and the young, 
Qui ça que la aide à nous Who helped us 
Si la pas Debré, si la pas Debré If not Debré, if not Debré 
… … 
Roule à ou Joseph, roule à ou Titine Roll it Joseph, roll it Titine ! 
Voui lève quatre hères, voui coule café You get up at four, you brew the coffee 
Voui prend le car, roule à ou Tantine You take the bus, roll it girl! 
Dépêce vienne crille :  Hurry, come shout!  
Vive Michel Debré !30 Long live Michel Debré!  
 
 
This song was written for Debré’s visit to the town of St Joseph in southeast Réunion in 
1973. Guy Hoarau, Mayor of St Joseph for 32 years, was a supporter of Debré. The song 
is written in Réunionnais Creole and uses the local musical rhythm of séga. Although the 
song may resemble colonial celebrations of the French Empire, the song lyrics do not 
refer to France at all. Rather, they celebrate the powerful persona of Michel Debré.  
Michel Debré is portrayed as a “papa”, the providing father of Réunion Islanders. 
He is the defeater of Réunion’s Communist party. Although the songwriter is anonymous, 
the depiction of Réunion and celebration of Debré make it highly probable that members 
of Réunion’s rightwing elites –the Mayor, or the National Assembly deputy for southern 
Réunion - commissioned it. They wanted to impress their loyalty on Debré, to show that 
he was welcome and that they preferred his politics to those of the opposition Communist 
party.  
The song describes Debré as the creator of schools and roads, and the source of 
social welfare for young and old on the island. In this rightwing elite perception of the 
French welfare, Debré is the agent of an imagined Réunionnais modernization. He is also 
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portrayed as the source of social rights and welfare for all citizens, eliding the left’s battle 
for these social rights during the 1950s, the role of the previous administrations, and the 
access that Réunion Islanders should have had to these rights as supposedly equal French 
citizens. French citizenship rights now emanate from one individual, Michel Debré.  
Yet once again, the last verse points to the political pressures in Réunion. The 
song describes what the singers should have done that morning: arise at four, brew their 
coffee and get on the bus to come and shout “long live Michel Debré.” The real buses 
that actually transported Réunion Islanders to sing Michel Debré's praises, and to listen to 
his speeches were provided by city councils. The song praises Michel Debré but once 
more reveals the rising power of city governments, and the pressure they exerted on 
communal employees to participate in political events, in return for maintaining their 
jobs.  
Bienvenue Monsieur le Ministre 1973 
 
Lost in the heart of the ocean      
At 13,000 kilometers from Paris 
We, too, are the children 
Of France, our motherland 
Our hearts are full of love 
And will always remember 
The immense kindness 
That France has showered on us. 
 
Children in the town of St Joseph sang this song to welcome the Minister for Overseas 
France who also visited La Réunion in 1973.31 They sang that they were the children of 
France who gratefully received the kindness of the ‘mother country’ in their faraway 
island lost in the Indian Ocean. The celebratory lyrics of this song appear redolent of high 
French colonial propaganda, even though they were sung over a decade after the official 
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end of French imperialism.32 Yet once again, the song appears to be pro-French but it 
also emphasizes that Reunion is not a carbon copy of France, but is located in “the heart” 
of the Indian Ocean, 13,000 km from the French capital. 
Rightwing Réunion Islanders sought to emulate and reproduce Debré’s patriotic 
rhetoric. Réunion Islanders physically participated in these public rituals legitimizing and 
celebrating Debré’s role in Réunion.  Yet what they thought of France was also mixed in 
their own experiences of local pressure from city governments. The song lyrics 
demonstrate that Réunion Islanders were also finding their own ways of expressing the 
meanings of being French in the Indian Ocean. 
ii. Locating France in the Indian Ocean 
Réunion Islanders were taught to understand themselves as French citizens particularly 
through schools, the principal medium of indoctrination into national French culture. The 
boom in school construction occurred in Réunion at the end of the 1950s. Réunion 
Islanders who grew up in St Denis shantytowns in the 1960s were the first generation to 
have a comprehensive school experience, and were the first to fully learn about the 
prevailing and pervasive political discourses about France through French Republican 
education.  In contrast to the rural Petit Blanc of the 1950s, who wondered whether 
his teacher had invented a place called France (Chapter 3) by the 1960s France was more 
present in daily life.  Far more young people were educated, and stayed at school, having 
longer contact with the French republican education system.  
                                                 
 
32 Pascal Blanchard, Sandrine Lemaire, and Didier Daeninckx, Culture impériale. Les colonies au coeur de 
la République, 1931-1961 Collection Mémoires (Paris: Ed. Autrement, 2004). 
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Indoctrination by the French education system in Réunion encouraged Mr. D, 
born in 1963, to believe that France was the celebrated “mother country” which Michel 
Debré championed. “Like all Creoles I thought France was super, immense, you know, 
the dream” Mr. D said. When he arrived in the Metropole to do his military service in 
1980, Mr. D realized that his image of French racial equality did not hold up to the reality 
of Metropolitan France, like many, many Réunion Islanders before and since. Equal, 
multi-racial, French citizens did not seem to apply in Metropolitan France. Mr. D’s 
fellow soldiers on military service called him a bougnole, a highly derogatory French 
insult directed at people of North African origin. Mr. D. told me that his experience made 
him realize that, despite what he had been told growing up in Reunion, in the Metropole 
Réunion Islanders were “just French on paper.”33  
Left-wing families participated in the affirmation of Réunion Island Communist 
political culture, alongside the indoctrination of the French education system. Mr. Lionel 
Boyer remembered that “my grandmother only swore on the name of ‘Papa Verges’!”34 
Although support for the Communist Party was smaller, Party members and supporters 
often attended political meetings outside, or in the Rio cinema in St Denis during the 
1970s. They participated in a parallel form of political culture to the meetings where 
Réunion Islanders sung about Michel Debré. In Communist Party meetings the emphasis 
was on Réunionnais identity.    
                                                 
 
33 From my conversations with many people in Réunion, this realization of an unequal citizenship seems to 
be a universal phenomenon when Réunion Islanders travel to the Metropole. Réunion Islanders discover 
that, in contrast to what they have learnt in Réunion, they are not perceived as racially French; and their 
school qualifications are sometimes considered to be second class, even though they are identical to the 
Metropolitan education system  
34 Interview Lionel Boyer 2/6/2009 
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People from politically active left-wing families invariably despised Debré and 
his policies. Gisèle Tarnus was born in 1958. She is a middle-class Réunion Islander 
whose parents supported Réunion’s Communist Party, and is also descended from the 
exiled Prince of Annam.  
Michel Debré was ... an anti-hero, what you shouldn’t be like. When he made his 
speeches I always heard my father saying ‘it’s easy for him ... he has all the 
power’ ... we really weren’t convinced [that his programs were reasonable]; we 
felt he was self-seeking, only interested in power, [Réunion Island] was only a 
springboard for him.35 
 
Just like Réunion Islanders who participated in right-wing political meetings, those who 
supported the Communist Party could also find a space to change their opinions from the 
prevailing discourse. Mr. C, born in 1955, told me that as a child, he had attended 
Communist meetings. He had chanted “we want to be independent” along with other 
participants, but he claims he did not understand any of it. When he was 21 he changed 
political sides. “I understood that thank goodness that France was behind us … Michel 
Debré brought development to Réunion.” Many Réunion Islanders attempted to navigate 
their own course between the different and competing political discourse on the island, to 
make their own understanding of what it meant to be French in the Indian Ocean.  
Mr. M, born in 1951 felt that the French education system told him tales about a 
place which seemed almost unreal. “All those stories (tout bann zistoires) … school says 
to you that you’re French … you know that you’re French, you don’t say that you’re 
Creole, you say that you’re French.” In contrast to Debré’s claim that Réunion Islanders 
spontaneously felt French, being French was clearly a process of cultural indoctrination – 
as in all national identity – but which was strongly perceived as indoctrination by poor 
                                                 
 
35 Interview Gisèle Tarnus 17/7/2009 
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Réunion Islanders. Yet France was also a real place for Mr. M. He lived in Maperine, a 
shantytown next to the aiport runway. When politicians arrived from Paris, France 
became a material presence in his life as the airplanes landed. “You had to think about 
France! The airport was just next door! When the planes landed, the house used to shake! 
Té oblige penser, té juste à côté! Quand l'avion té pose la case té tremble !” 
Jean-Pierre Gourama was born in 1963 in a shantytown next to SIDR Petite Ile. 
He had Indian ancestors from his father’s side and Malagasy grandparents on his 
mother’s side. Mr. Gourama grew up in Petite Ile but he had to cross the St Denis river to 
attended the primary school in Bas de la Rivière. When I asked him to tell me what he 
thought of France, he was stuck for words, and sat thinking for a minute.  He then mused 
“you know, nobody ever asked me that”. This proves how the idea of Réunion Island as 
French became a hegemonic idea for Islanders, which people are not used to questioning. 
France was not merely an abstract concept for him. Mr. Gourama materially located 
“France” and “Réunion” in his daily life and the world around him.  
In school it’s France … there’s the schoolmistress, the [French] teaching, you’re 
in another dimension. When we left school we took the path back home, we 
crossed the river … at home it’s no longer France! When my dad arrived drunk at 
home it wasn’t France! You understand? I had to go and fetch water, the tin 
bucket (fer-blanc) on my head; there was no more talk of France. … I had a 
brother who left for France with the BUMIDOM to train … maybe the TV told us 
something about France, a few films, but afterwards it was over! 
 
Mr. Gourama’s comments illustrate that the polarized political rhetoric of Debré and 
Vergès hid many ambiguities. “Integration” or “resistance” to France was complicated by 
Réunion Islanders’ daily participation in French state institutions, and especially schools. 
Yet as Mr. Gourama underlined, French schooling did not “make” him French. In his 
daily life around Petite Ile, schooling was a separate, French dimension, as was the 
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growing presence of French mass media. Mr. Gourama framed part of his childhood 
material world as French and part as not French. This suggests that he interiorized civic 
or masculine values such as not getting drunk as ideologically French. Equally he 
classified manual activities like fetching water as not being French. This underlines that 
“French” jobs in Réunion were usually perceived as being with the growing 
administration and civil service. Réunion Islanders – such as Jean-Pierre Gourama’s 
brother - were encouraged to go to work in Metropolitan France through the Overseas 
France Migration Bureau (BUMIDOM) created by Debré and were obliged to do national 
service.36 France was a real place and a destination for Réunion Islanders.  
Mr. C remembered Réunion Islanders crying as the train left the army barracks in 
Petite Ile for Le Port, as families said goodbye to young men going to do their French 
military service in Algeria or elsewhere. Mr. M knew that France existed because he 
lived near the airport and saw President De Gaulle arrive in 1959, as well as Michel 
Debré and other French politicians. Whilst French citizenship and France became natural, 
unquestioned categories for some Réunion Islanders, they were also contingent on 
experiences – whether at school, or traveling to France.  
Debré often claimed that Réunion Islanders of all racial origins were equal to 
Metropolitan French citizens. The majority of subaltern Réunion Islanders who grew up 
in the 1950s and 1960s did not actively consider the meanings of their French citizenship, 
                                                 
 
36 This is especially and viscerally true in relation to the BUMIDOM office which, worried about 
demographic increase, sent poor Réunion Island children to ‘populate’ rural parts of France. These ‘enfants 
de la Creuse’ suffered all manner of racial discrimination and could not contact their families in Reunion. 
Even if Debré was not quite at the origin of this forced migration (see Prefect correspondence c1958-60), 
Debré is closely associated with the creation of BUMIDOM and sending Réunion Islanders off to work in 
France, never to return. This part of Debré’s policy is too large to elaborate here, though undoubtedly 
crucial for how Réunion Islanders remember Debré’s policies today. Gauvin, "Michel Debré et l’Ile de La 
Réunion. Archéologie d’une Identité Nationale (1946-1988)"; Ivan Jablonka, Enfants en exil : transfert de 
pupilles réunionnais en métropole, 1963-1982, Univers historique (Paris: Seuil, 2007). 
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unless they experienced it by travelling to the Metropole. This continues to be the case 
for Réunion Islanders who leave to work or study in Metropolitan France. In spite of 
Debré’s claims about an equal, multiracial French citizenship in Réunion, Islanders often 
found that the relative social and racial equality of Réunion Island was not the same as in 
Metropolitan France, when they arrived in the Metropole.  
IV.  Conclusion 
Michel Debré and Paul Vergès were reliant on maintaining their political views as 
completely opposed in order to create two defined electoral constituencies in Réunion.  
These powerful, popular and contrasting poles of political discourse monopolized 
political discourse and action for decades in Réunion. Even though Michel Debré died in 
1992, they still continue to shape political representations in Réunion. Since 1998 Paul 
Vergès has been President of Réunion’s Regional Council. In March 2006, on the 60th 
anniversary of Réunion becoming an Overseas Department in 1946, Paul Vergès made an 
effective publicity stunt. Michel Debré was no longer alive but Paul Vergès invited 
Debré’s son, Jean-Louis Debré, to Réunion for the celebrations. As a book cover using a 
photograph of the event shows (Figure 6.6) Paul Vergès made a public ritual of hugging 
Jean-Louis Debré.37 By doing so, Vergès positioned himself as the magnanimous victor 
of a dual struggle, underlining the continued importance of these historical political 
divisions in Réunion Island political life which were shaped by Debré and Vergès from 
the early 1960s. 
                                                 
 





Two main political groups 
groups claimed to hold the definitive 
Réunion as an extension of the 
people. Ordinary Réunion Islanders were often pressured to take part in the political 
culture of these groups as city counc
Party (after 1971). Yet in their own daily lives, Réunion Islanders did not consider France 
and Réunion to be two separate, irreconcilable entities. Rather, they found ways of 
understanding France as a material presence in their lives in Réunion. 
Debré’s promises of Réunion Islanders’ multiracial citizenship, Islanders frequently 
experienced different racial categorizations when they travelled to Metropolitan France.
                                                
 
38 The rise of other political groups in Réunion (such the Socialist party) from the 1970s complicates this 
narrative, but does not change the important p
both worked to maintain. 
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 The political opposition between the right and the left wing in Réunion attempted 
to define Réunion as entirely French or entirely local. Yet both political groups silenced 
the means of their party’s political support and financial power. Both the Communist 
Party (after 1971) and the rightwing were financially reliant on the French 
administration’s funding of local government, and of social insurance schemes in 
Réunion. Both groups were also reliant on local forms of Réunionnais politics, based 
around landlord-tenant relations and networks of Réunionnais sociability. These networks 
distributed of material benefits paid for by the French administration to local voters to 
maintain political support, as the following chapter demonstrates.  
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CHAPTER 7 TRANSFORMING CLASS RELATIONS AND 




The Prefect’s 1964 shantytown decree had allowed Debré, the Prefecture and the SIDR to 
become the intermediaries of the class divide in Réunion, and had permitted Réunion 
Islanders to individually claim their rights to welfare from the French administration. 
By 1966 the French state’s role as the intermediary had started to change. Elected Creole 
elites in city councils started to take control of key posts in the French administration.  
As part of his strategy to forge worker allegiance to the French administration, in 
1963 Michel Debré created a social insurance fund for Réunion. Local employer 
contributions funded the distribution of financial resources to Reunion’s city councils for 
social projects. This gave Réunion’s city councils vastly increased economic power. The 
city councils could now distribute material goods and employ increasing numbers of the 
electorate.  The increased financial power of the city councils allowed Mayors and other 
city councilors to challenge the traditional political and economic dominance of the 
landholders.  
In 1973 Auguste Legros, Mayor of St Denis also became President of the SIDR 
housing agency. He retained these two posts until 1989. Legros now combined his 
significant economic and political power as Mayor of St Denis with the traditional role of 
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a landholder. Legros was a new type of Réunionnais landholder, however. He did not 
personally own the land but managed it for the SIDR, and for his own political interests. 
Legros’ control of the SIDR and the St Denis city government allowed him to create new 
political networks in the social housing neighborhoods by distributing jobs, housing and 
building materials to political allies. Elected officials in the city councils were able to use 
the resources of the French administration, giving them much more financial and political 
power than ever before.   
The increased financial power of the city councils, through new applications of 
French social legislation enabled previously poor Réunion Islanders - especially women 
who had previously worked as domestic servants - to seize economic and political 
opportunities working for city council school canteens and as school sweepers. The new 
application of French social legislation in Réunion, with its significant financial 
resources, fundamentally transformed traditional class divisions between the extremely 
poor majority and the landowning minority by creating a new middle class. However, in 
the same way as landowners had previously been the source of material wealth, many 
people now considered that material welfare and employment came directly from the 
Mayors.  
I. The increasing financial and social power of city governments 
i. Health and social care before 1964 
After the 1946 law of assimilation in to France, Réunion’s 24 city governments had 
financially benefited from being part of the French administration. Réunionnais Mayors 
were able to give more incentives to Réunion Islanders to vote for them, as they had 
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increased financial resources obtained from new local taxes and financial transfers from 
the French state.1 Declining geranium agriculture, sugar cane layoffs and agricultural 
mechanization had forced Mayors to give out employment in public works. Jobs were 
usually given to political allies in the neighborhood. From 1948, healthcare in Réunion 
was also governed by the Mayors who distributed tickets for free health care to their 
constituents.2 The healthcare tickets were paid for by the French state. They could be 
used as a political favor to constituents and to specific local doctors and pharmacists.3  
This social system was extremely costly for the French state. In 1964 central 
government in Paris paid 66% of all social assistance costs in Réunion compared with 
5.2% of social costs in the Metropole. Central government paid for 50% of all healthcare 
in Réunion, compared with 2.65% of healthcare in Metropolitan France.4 Another 1964 
report claimed that out of Reunion’s 380,000 habitants, 222,000 people were eligible for 
social care paid for by central French and local Réunionnais governments. 5 The report 
claimed that this contributed to a “welfare mindset” or mentalité d’assistés in a large part 
of the Overseas French population who, it claimed, merely waited for handouts from the 
state. The first Réunion Island social workers’ manual in 1964 also warned its readers of 
the Réunionnais welfare mindset. It claimed that Réunion Islanders “give the impression 
of abandoning, at least partially, their [personal] responsibility … to the Welfare state 
                                                 
 
1 City council incomes included a share in Réunion’s lucrative octroi de mer import tax which was levied 
on a range of consumer goods to Réunion, including gasoline 
2 The Assistance Médicale Generalisée was instituted in Réunion in October 1948 
3 Many of my informants claimed that the Mayor’s control of medical aid meant that access to social care 
depended on political affiliation, but others declared that this was not the case.  
4 ADR 53 W 1 Les départements français d'outre-mer.  Le Developpement des DFOM, Edité Information et 
entreprise SA, 38 Avenue des Ternes, Paris XVII pour le compte du Ministere DTOM 1/3/1964 
5 CAC 19840179/1 Societe d'aide technique et de cooperation, 110 rue de l'Universite, Paris VIIe 1/9/1964 
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Etat-Providence ... the state holds a treasure of which they don’t know the origin but only 
where it has to go – because it is [their] right.”6   
These Metropolitan French commentators the complicated landlord tenant 
relations and which existed in Réunion and merely assumed that Réunion Islanders had 
chosen to be passive spectators of state munificence. The increased social aid after 1963 
and the new employment opportunities it offered to poor Réunionnais women shows that 
the welfare mindset did not accurately reflect their experiences and ambitions. As more 
women became employed in city government jobs, the political importance of women in 
Réunion changed. Dinner ladies and city council employees were forced to participate in 
political demonstrations to retain their jobs. Yet women were not merely the dependent 
puppets of charismatic city council politicians, or the passive recipients of state-funded 
welfare jobs. They used this new system to improve their material conditions, and created 
new political and economic opportunities for themselves. 
ii. The creation of the FASO 
In 1963 Michel Debré reorganized social and health care in Réunion on a miniature 
version of a Metropolitan French model. Employer contributions would fund an island-
wide social insurance organization called the FASO (Fonds d’Action Sanitarire et 
Solidaire Obligatoire).7 Health and social care would no longer be locally controlled by 
the city governments. The FASO would co-ordinate health and social care in Réunion, 
funded by Metropolitan French subsidies and by private sector salary contributions in 
                                                 
 
6 ADR PB 2350 Secrétariat social de La Réunion. Problèmes sociaux de La Réunion 1964 
7 Arrêté du 14 aout 1963 modifie par arrêté du 14 octobre 1968 
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Réunion. Civil servants, teachers and other state employees contributed to Metropolitan 
social funds instead of the FASO.  
Even though the 13.5% salary contributions were the same, the FASO differed 
from Metropolitan social insurance funds. Individual workers had family allowances in 
the Metropole. In Réunion Island individual family allowance diminished after the fourth 
child. The remaining money was held back and put into the FASO fund. This was a 
deliberate policy to privilege state-imposed “collective” benefits over individual benefits 
for Réunion Islanders. It was also doomed attempt to discourage Réunion Islanders from 
having too many children by limiting their family allowances; Réunion Islanders valued 
large families as a sign of wealth and many followed Catholic contraception practices.  
Despite these inequalities the FASO fund created enormous social change in 
Réunion. The FASO paid for school canteens as part of Michel Debré’s broader plan to 
improve child health on the island through better nutrition.8 They also FASO paid for 
dinner ladies to work in the canteens.9 Women did not need to be educated to work as a 
dinner lady preparing and serving meals, but they could earn significantly more money 
than working in agriculture, as a domestic servant or as a washerwoman. Dinner ladies 
also had access to pension rights and had a superior social status than domestic 
employment. Nevertheless, working on an annually renewable contract as a dinner lady 
for the city government was also a precarious job. To be re-employed the following year, 
women were pressured to demonstrate their political loyalty to the Mayor.   
                                                 
 
8 Gauvin, Michel Debré et l'île de la Réunion : une certaine idée de la plus grande France. 
9 Central government later expanded the FASO to pay for social workers, contraception education, housing 
aid and other groups which promoted social and health goals CAC 19790543/72 Affaires d'outre-mer: 
allocation-logement Ministre Equipement 1971 
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II. The transformation of female labor in Réunion 
The advent of employer contributions restructured male employment in Réunion from 
agricultural work to the construction sector (see Chapter 3). This did not affect women’s 
labor. Most women in urban areas were undeclared domestic servants, or worked for 
themselves as washerwomen.10 Many of these women had African or Indian ancestry, 
and the figure of the matronly domestic servant or nenène was a standard part of elite 
Creole domestic culture.11 In the 1950s domestic servants were not always paid, and 
some employers still merely gave servants a room to live in the sheds or dependences in 
the back yard.12 Roger Vailland visiting La Réunion in 1959 noted that “for the same 
price as a cleaning lady in Paris, [Réunion Islanders] can employ a cook, a nanny and 
houseboys.” 13 The Prefect noted in 1954 that almost everyone who could afford it 
employed domestic servants as it was a mark of class aspirations.14 
A scene of the Sucre Amer film which covered Debré’s 1963 election emphasizes 
the social control that some employers had over their domestic servants. In the film, an 
elite Creoles woman tells the political meeting to “let their domestic servants out” for the 
elections. A woman with her cardigan demurely draped over her shoulders, clearly a 
member of the Creole elite says: “I thus ask you to explain to your [pause] domestics that 
they must vote. Even if you have to do their work instead, do the work, Ladies, of your 
                                                 
 
10 CAC 19940180/9 Documentation sur le Département de La Réunion et la ville de Saint-Denis à 
l'occasion du voyage du Général de Gaulle juillet 1959 
11 Frédéric Mocadel, Dames créoles (Sainte Marie [Réunion]: Azalées Éditions, 2005). Interview Suzie 
Bachelier 11/2007  
12 CARAN F/1cIII/1363 Préfet de La Réunion à M. le ministre de l'intérieur. Objet : rapport mensuel de 
mai 1954 05/06/1954 
13 ADR 380 W 240 France-Soir Roger Vailland. ‘A la recherche du paradis perdu’ 22/5/1959 
14 CARAN F/1cIII/1363 Préfet de La Réunion à M. le ministre de l'intérieur. Objet : rapport mensuel de 
mai 1954 05/06/1954 
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[pause] servants. They must go and vote.” The woman’s hesitant use of the French words 
serviteurs and domestiques in front of the cameras, rather than the more derogatory 
Creole nenène, or the French bonne (which were much more commonly used in speech) 
shows that she was trying to make a good impression for the cameras. The woman’s 
exhortation to let the servants out even if it meant doing their work underlines the power 
that employers had on their domestic servants’ liberty. 
The social importance of domestic servants was changed by the alternative 
employment opportunities offered by new government and city council service jobs in 
Réunion. Domestic service no longer became the inevitable job of poor women. Women 
actively sought out these new opportunities. The right-wing Catholic weekly newspaper 
Croix Sud feared that these social changes threatened to discourage women from being 
domestic servants in a 1964 article. 
The article is framed as an older man meeting a young woman named ‘Celine’ 
who is walking through the streets of St Denis wearing her best clothes and with a folder 
under her arm, as if she was going to work in an office. Celine is a domestic servant, and 
the narrator is confused why she is carrying a folder. Celine admits that it looks “better” 
to be an office worker, because “in her work people consider her as lower than others; 
boys don’t look at her when she is wearing her apron.” The narrator is aghast at Celine’s 
social aspirations, and her shame about being a domestic servant. 
I want to cry out … in front of all the employers that your job is the most 
beautiful that exists! I know you are badly paid! I know that sometimes people 
take advantage of you! … I know you are often alone and because you come from 
the quartiers it is difficult to go out with girls that you don’t know! … You are 
my sister Celine, and not my inferior! … If I can ask you to do anything, it is to 
love your job!15 
                                                 
 




This 1964 article underlines that middle and upper classes in Réunion were anxious about 
the changing opportunities for poor Réunion Island women. Women from the St Denis 
quartiers – a euphemism for the poor shantytown neighborhoods - now had opportunities 
to work in offices. Domestic work was no longer a job to be proud of.  
In the language of Christian charity, the article attempts to persuade the reader – 
presumably a domestic servant, but also employers - that domestic work is really 
enriching and valuable. Celine is the author’s “equal” rather than his “inferior”. She is a 
poor equal, however, who is explicitly told not to have any other aspirations, but to love 
her job. If the journalist was moved to “cry” that domestic servants were equal, it reveals 
that poor Réunion Island women were considered to be fit only for domestic work, and to 
stay with those aspirations. The article underlines that readers had become anxious about 
the new opportunities for these women in other occupations, and that there were fewer 
women wanting to do this job. 
 It is not explicitly stated in the article, but domestic service was usually only 
considered suitable work for African and Indian–origin women in Réunion. By 
dissuading domestic servants to have other aspirations, the Croix Sud article implicitly 
aimed to retain African and Indian origin women as their domestic labor force. A 1971 
secret police report reveals these pervasive attitudes about race and domestic servants in 
Réunion. Increased French education opportunities also posed a threat to the old racially 
defined plantation order in Réunion. 
Mr. X, teacher in the [St Denis] Leconte de Lisle high school, gave his … class to 
understand that Mme Y had told him, in relation to students graduating from the 
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class, “that you mustn’t uplift the little blacks [petits nègres] too much, or there 
won’t be any more domestic servants in Réunion. 16 
 
 
The above police report was concerned that Mr. X’s comment had made the class angry 
with Mme Y. The report specifies that Mr. X was “known for his Communist ideas.” The 
police report only emphasized Mr. X’s Communist views. It did not comment on the 
racist opinions of Mme Y, underlining that her racialized view of domestic labor was 
totally natural in Réunion in 1971, and not even worth commenting on. 
i. Domestic servants to dinner ladies 
The FASO funds significantly changed employment opportunities for women. FASO 
allocated money to city governments to pay for free meals in primary schools. These 
funds also paid for the employment of municipal dinner ladies. Being employed as a 
dinner lady was an easier job than being a domestic servant, in terms of the hours 
worked, and the length of the working day. City councils were also able to employ far 
more of their female electorate, and for longer periods than the two week public works 
programs which had been given to men. However, being a dinner lady meant publicly 
supporting city governments during election time, going to political meetings and waiting 
at the airport for politicians to arrive from Metropolitan France.  
By 1964, only eighteen months after the creation of the FASO, 135 primary 
school canteens had been set up in Réunion.17 The St Paul commune was the second 
biggest in Réunion, and 43 out of its 44 primary schools had canteens in 1966. The 
budget records of the St Paul city government demonstrate the growing importance of 
                                                 
 
16 CAC 19940180/240 Préfecture de La Réunion, note de renseignements 27/07/1971 
17 Gauvin, Michel Debré et l'île de la Réunion : une certaine idée de la plus grande France. 
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city employment - including dinner ladies - from the 1960s (St Paul has more detailed 
records than St Denis for this period). 
In 1963 the city government of St Paul spent 27% of its budget on personnel, and 
15% on other social care such as medical aid.18 The following year the city council spent 
over double the amount on personnel, 56% of its total budget. This took money from 
other operations such as providing running water or paving roads in the rural areas.  In 
1964 the Prefect told city governments to distribute meals for children during the school 
holidays. The St Paul city government decided not to pay for school canteens during the 
holidays, even though the employees and food were paid by the FASO. It used the money 
to pay for personnel, aligning all its employees with the 35% salary bonus that other civil 
servants received when working in Réunion.19 St Paul city government also used the 
FASO money for other costs. In 1964 the council transferred money from the school food 
budget to the “parties and ceremonies” budget which included meals and drinks for the 
city council members.20 In 1970, St Paul had not used up all of its funding for the 
canteens. It used 8% of the FASO funds to buy some land for city buildings.21 
Michel Debré asked the Prefect to investigate whether city governments were 
embezzling FASO money 22 Témoignages also denounced the embezzlement of canteen 
funds in 1968, perhaps because the Communist Party did not control any city councils 
between 1962 and 1971). Témoignages accused city governments of only providing 
                                                 
 
18 AMSP (25/1/1963 - 24/4/1965) Affaire 1 examen et vote du budget primitif pour 1963 30/01/1963  
19 AMSP (PVs 25/1/1963 a 24/4/1965) Affaire no 22 - Repas chaud aux enfants des écoles pendant les 
vacances 21/12/1964 ; AMSP (22/10/1965-28/10/1968) Affaire No 1, Examen et vote du budget primitif 
1966 29/12/1965 Gauvin, Michel Debré et l'île de la Réunion : une certaine idée de la plus grande France. 
20 AMSP (25/1/1963 - 24/4/1965) Affaire No 16, Compte 6601 Fêtes et Cérémonies 28/10/1963 
21 AMSP (30/12/1969 - 27/5/1971) Affaire no 21 - acquisition du terrain de M. Jacques Chabrier 
08/10/1970 
22 Letter from Debré to Vaudeville Gauvin, Michel Debré et l'île de la Réunion : une certaine idée de la 
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meals twice a week, instead of every day, despite the fact that the communal employees 
were employed all year round. The Communist Party newspaper even claimed that city 
governments used FASO money to employ strongmen nervis.23 Although city 
governments certainly employed strongmen, female city employees paid for by the FASO 
were also important political campaigners who were also used by city government during 
election time.  
 Mme D became a city dinner lady after having worked as a domestic servant. Her 
son told me her story and emphasized the different kinds of constraints which Mme D 
may have felt changing from domestic employment to dinner lady. Mme D left her 
family’s sharecropping occupation to search for an urban job in St Denis in the early 
1950s. She became a domestic servant for a doctor in St Denis. She had 14 children and 
lived in a St Denis shantytown. She worked all day in the doctor’s house, and sometimes 
worked late in the evening if the doctor was entertaining. Mme D’s son vividly an 
occasion when the doctor came to eat with his wife and children in their shantytown 
house in St Denis. He remembers watching open-mouthed as his mother, with a towel 
over her arm, poured water from a jug for the doctor to wash his hands in their courtyard. 
He had never seen his mother do the same for someone in her own family, and this 
underlined for him the social position of domestic servants as the lowest in Réunionnais 
society.  
When Mme D’s partner died in 1973 she gained a job as a dinner lady in Mayor 
Legros’ city council through a friend’s influence. While the salary was much better, Mr. 
D felt that his mother had merely transferred her submission to the doctor to submissive 
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obedience to the Mayor. His mother feared losing her job if she did not attend political 
meetings or to go to the airport to welcome politicians such as Michel Debré when they 
arrived from France.  
Whenever one of the [French] politicians came to St Denis, she had to go and 
welcome the ‘guardian angel’ (l’homme providentiel) because she worked for the 
city government. I call that submissive because if she didn’t turn up, she would 
have lost her job. ... You give someone a job, and all their life they have to be 
grateful? I’m revolted by that political mechanism… 
 
Mr. D’s felt that nothing had changed when his mother became a dinner lady after having 
been a domestic servant. She merely continued to be submissive. Mr. D claimed that 
nowadays he still had to persuade his mother to stand up for her rights. When she 
received administrative letters in error, she would not protest, whereas Mr. D would tell 
her “don’t let it go, [that time] is over, you have your rights, you have to take them”. 
Mr. D’s analysis of his mother’s submission was partly colored by his different political 
views, and his different education and life experience. Perhaps if Mme D had told me the 
story herself, it might have been different. After all, she also had access to social 
insurance benefits, worked fewer hours, and had a better salary than a domestic servant. 
Other women I spoke to in Petite Ile recognized that being a dinner lady gave them new 
opportunities for political and social power, as well as increasing their earning power.  
III. Local elites take control of social housing 
In 1966 Aimé Césaire railed against the power and the monopoly of state-funded housing 
companies during a debate at the National Assembly. As a deputy for Martinique and 
Mayor of its largest town, Fort-de-France, Césaire turned social housing into a political 
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priority and became well-known for this policy.24 Césaire accused the unelected 
technocrats who ran the housing companies of using their power without any democratic 
checks.25 Césaire proposed that locally elected leaders should have control over state-
funded housing companies.26  
Like Césaire, Réunionnais elites had wanted to control the SIDR since its creation 
in 1949. In 1967, the same year as Césaire’s speech, the powerful local politician Pierre 
Lagourgue became the first Réunionnais President of the SIDR. In 1968 the rightwing 
Auguste Legros became Mayor of St Denis, and in 1973 Legros replaced Lagourgue as 
President of the SIDR. In 1971 Paul Vergès became Mayor of the Port and in the same 
year he also became Vice-President of the SEDRE, another of Réunion’s mixed-economy 
infrastructure and housing companies, underlining the local elites’ growing control of 
state subsidized organizations. 27 
From 1973 Auguste Legros was able to control rent and housing through the 
SIDR, and city council jobs and finances through his post as Mayor of St Denis. Legros 
also campaigned on behalf of Michel Debré who was the deputy of the electoral district 
that included St Denis. Funds such as the FASO enabled Auguste Legros to hire local 
workers such as dinner ladies. Legros also distributed gifts such as building materials and 
social housing to SIDR and shantytown neighborhoods. His networks of material 
distribution used the threat of higher rents or job losses to incite people to politically 
support him. With his control over the SIDR’s significant property holdings in St Denis, 
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26 The SIMAG was created in 1955 for Martinique and Guadeloupe, becoming the Martinique-only housing 
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created by the 1964-1973 construction boom, French social legislation had effectively 
enabled Auguste Legros to become a powerful new urban landlord in Réunion. 
IV. The SIDR: a new landlord  
In the late 1950s, the French administration had feared that Petite Ile was a bastion of 
Communism. By the end of the 1960s the neighborhood began to support the right-wing 
because inhabitants of Petite Ile had been employed in city council jobs, had been 
allocated SIDR houses with rents paid by the city council, and controlled local 
distribution of food to electoral supporters. I interviewed a number of retired women in 
Petite Ile about their experiences as dinner ladies and school cleaners for the city council. 
Mme Robert, whose sister was employed as a city dinner lady, summarized the social 
obligations of the city council workforce. “They were always running around after the 
politicians! (tout le temps té bat karé pou bann zhomme politique!)” Mme Robert 
laughed. 
Even if working for the city council involved “running round” for the politicians, 
women in Petite Ile were prepared to offer this electoral support. They all stopped being 
washerwomen and domestic servants as soon as there was a better opportunity working 
as cleaners and dinner ladies, although some also worked in the private sector - Mme B 
became a cleaner for the a Parisian bank when it opened in St Denis in 1963. As the St 
Paul city records demonstrate, city governments were prepared to spend significant sums 
of money on their personnel. City councils also employed more people than the private 
sector, as they were not expected to turn a profit. 
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 Mme T currently lives in a SIDR house in Petite Ile and previously lived in Camp 
des Noirs. As a dinner lady, Mme T became involved in politics from the early 1960s in 
St Denis. In return for continued employment, she was expected to reciprocate with 
political support for the Mayor.28 Her memories of her political practices were strongly 
linked to the personality of the Mayor of St Denis, and the material benefits he could 
deliver. “Ah, Michel Debré! I was his activist! I supported him (moin té marche ek li)! I 
was an activist for Auguste Legros, Mr. Debré, and Mr. Chirac! ...” she told me proudly, 
mentioning President Chirac only after Mayor Legros and Michel Debré who were 
obviously more significant for her. In her living room, Mme T had photos of herself next 
to all of these political figures, because they had accompanied Auguste Legros on 
political visits to SIDR Petite Ile during election time. A number of people I spoke to 
remembered Michel Debré coming to political meetings in Mme T’s house. 
Mrs. T remembered her days as an activist for Mayor Legros with evident relish. 
She enjoyed the political outings and the freedom to spend time with her female friends 
“marching” for the Mayor (the Creole expression for public political support is marcher 
pour - to “march’ for). “Day or night! We marched in Brûlé, everywhere! La Montagne 
[to stick posters up on the walls]! ... We’d go over and help Barau [the Mayor of Sainte 
Marie]!” She took pleasure in attending Mayor Legros’ political meetings at the Place 
Verdun in Petite Ile, because there would be free samosas and Coca Cola.  
Mrs. T was not merely content with food, however. She managed to get a city 
council job for her daughter and an SIDR apartment in St Denis for her sister because she 
was an important neighborhood political organizer. She encouraged residents of Petite Ile 
                                                 
 
28 In France, primary schools are organized at the communal level. Thus in St Denis Mrs. T along with 
other cleaners, janitors, bus drivers and dinner ladies were employed by the St Denis city government  
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to attend house meetings, political rallies in the neighborhood, and larger events like 
attending Michel Debré’s speeches. She organized the city council buses which lined up 
at the Place Verdun in Petite Ile to transport communal employees to the airport to 
welcome Michel Debré. Another person in Petite Ile told me that “when the [politicians] 
arrived, there would be five or six buses full up with people [in Petite Ile] because [she] 
distributed [city] provisions.” People who supported the Mayor received food provisions 
as long as they attended political meetings. At the end of the month Mme T doled out tins 
of beans, a bag of rice, or some cooking oil to active political supporters of Legros. These 
were a welcome help to poor Réunion Islanders.  
A younger member of Mme T’s family claimed that poverty and material 
improvement were the only motivations for people in Petite Ile with jobs in the city 
council. Rather than people passively waiting for state welfare, they made calculated 
choices about the political figures who would protect them. 
I’d say that [in] Petite Ile … almost everyone was right-wing. Why? At that time 
people were given provisions, tickets [for] sugar, rice, etc. If you supported the 
other side you didn’t get sugar, on that basis people weren’t choosey (ils ne 
faisaient pas le difficile). ... I can only talk about that today, but I don’t have the 
same political opinions. My parents were right-wing by obligation. 
 
Mme T did not seem to have been a supporter of a right wing mayor only by obligation. 
She clearly enjoyed the political and economic opportunities which working for the city 
council offered her. 
Jean-Luc Alba’s family was also political organizers in another neighborhood in 
St Denis, where they lived on their own plot of land in the 1960s. His mother got a job as 
a city dinner lady in a primary school in St Denis and in return she agreed to have 
political meetings in her house for Auguste Legros. As a boy, Jean-Luc enjoyed these 
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political meetings as there was always food, drink and music, paid for by the city 
government. The Mayor regularly rewarded the Alba family with cement and corrugated 
iron to help build and extend the houses on the family plot of land. Indeed, his family 
only had to order these building materials from Ravate (a major St Denis hardware store) 
and they would be delivered to them, paid for by the City government. His siblings ended 
up working for the city council and Jean-Luc eventually went to work for the SIDR, 
underlining the links between political jobs, housing materials and jobs for children. 
Every woman I spoke to who had been a dinner lady in the 1960s had managed to get 
jobs for some of her children in the city council. 
Just as Mr. D’s described his mother’s “submission”, other people in Petite Ile 
hated the link between material benefits and expected political support. Jean-Pierre 
Gourama’s father worked as a construction worker for the St Denis city council, yet he 
secretly supported the Communist Party. Mr. Gourama’s father did not ‘march’ for the 
Communists because he was afraid of losing his job. He did not attend political events 
run by the Mayor of St Denis either. Thus, his family did not receive provisions from the 
city council, even though the Gourama family was large: 18 people in a small house 
made of wood and corrugated iron in the bidonville of rue des Bois Noirs, opposite the 
SIDR Petite Ile.  
However as young boys, when city council buses were lined up to transport city 
council employees to the airport, Jean-Pierre Gourama and his brother used to hop on 
them for entertainment and because they were attracted to the free food given to everyone 
who turned up. They did not stay to listen to the politicians, but ran out of the airport to 
visit the nearby stables at the Club Hippique Bourbon. “And then we’d go back and get 
 
  282
our sandwich and our drink. Sometimes we’d even get a T-shirt with Michel Debré’s face 
printed on it. But I didn’t dare bring those back home!” Jean-Pierre Gourama 
remembered.  
Not everyone profited from this system in Petite Ile. Mr. and Mme Robert 
claimed that they had never received anything from the city government because neither 
of them worked for the Mayor, or marched for him. They observed that there were never 
any iron sheets or cement when they came to get it. “We were always told, ‘too late, 
Monsieur’. We never got anything! Nou la jamais gagne rien!”  There were also many 
people in Petite Ile who did not work for the city council. But Legros’ system obviously 
worked, as Mr. C. another inhabitant of Petite Ile said to me “they continued voting him 
in for 20 years, didn’t they!” 
As President of the SIDR, Mayor Legros kept rents low in Petite Ile because of 
the political importance of the neighborhood. During the 1970s, SIDR Petite Ile and 
SIDR La Source had the lowest rents in St Denis.29 A Ministry of Construction report put 
it directly: “for the last five years rents have not been raised for political reasons”.30 
Keeping rents low and distributing building materials was a political priority. Poor 
Réunion Islanders appreciated these gifts of building materials. In 1977 the Ministry of 
Construction stated that 65,000 out of 105,000 Reunion Island families were “badly 
housed”. In 1977 some SIDR houses even lay empty, because they could not find tenants 
who could afford pay the rent.31 Réunion Islanders thus continued to build their own 
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houses, often on land belonging to the city council, thus replicating rural models of 
landlord-tenant relations.  
Like Mayors in other communes, Auguste Legros distributed political gifts such 
as corrugated iron sheets, wood, gravel and cement. In addition, Auguste Legros could 
distribute SIDR houses. He had frequently promised tenants of SIDR Petite Ile that their 
neighborhood would be renovated and they would be able to buy their houses, although 
neither of these electoral promises was fulfilled (see Chapter 8).  
Mayors allowed shanty towns to spread on land owned by the city council. By 
allowing people in St Denis to enlarge their homes with free cement and corrugated iron, 
the city council effectively sponsored shantytown construction. This was not necessarily 
an incoherent policy. An electorate who lived precariously on shantytown land could be a 
captive political group, who would continue to vote for the promises of improved 
infrastructure. As the example of Maperine demonstrates, the landlord-tenant relations of 
the 1950s were still important political tools in the 1980s.  
Maperine was a small shantytown in the neighboring commune to Saint Denis, 
Sainte Marie. Men in Maperine worked in the La Mare sugar factory, and most women 
worked as child minders, cleaners and washerwomen for bourgeois families in the 
outskirts of St Denis. Mme S was born in Maperine in 1936. As soon as she was old 
enough to vote, she had been approached by Sainte Marie politicians who offered her a 
tin of beans or a bag of rice for her vote. When her daughter F reached eighteen in 1979, 
F was also approached for her vote.  
When F married, the Ste Marie city council helped her build a little house in 
Maperine and gave F and her husband corrugated iron, cement, and wood. The Mayor of 
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Ste Marie gave them verbal permission to build their house, instead of going through the 
written system of building permits. The city council also sent round employees to help 
them build the house. F did not seem bitter about this process, and described it to me in 
good humor.  
Before, the politicians often used to come round to [Maperine], and they gave out 
money! I remember … I went out to buy a pair of flip flops! [Laughs] … They 
paid you for your vote, especially in the second round when they needed votes, 
they would come round to people’s houses, check their lists [to see if you had 
been voting] and then! Voila! The envelope! That’s how it was! ‘Vote for me and 
we’ll sort out a little kitchen for you!’ They really gave stuff, it wasn’t empty 
promises. 
 
F did not feel that she was submissive to the politicians, because she did not work for the 
Ste Marie city council. She did not have the pressure of losing her job and she claimed 
she was at liberty to vote for who she pleased. “[In the end] I didn’t vote for the party! 
People gave me money, I took the money! [Laughs] You take it, right?” F voted for her 
convictions, but she did not speak out about her political opinions. She felt that her 
children would be refused financial aid if the city council knew how she really voted.  
F talked about the different political context for her family nowadays. In the 
1990s Maperine had been demolished to make way for the airport’s enlarged runway. 
The family had been rehoused and now owned their house. “They don’t give out 
[political gifts like] corrugated iron anymore – it’s forbidden” F observed. I pointed out 
that buying votes was forbidden in the past as well, but she didn’t agree. “It wasn’t 
forbidden!” she said “it was logical! ... politics depends on money … if you haven’t got a 




In 1970 the Prefect informed Michel Debré that Réunion’s political system was based on 
“feudal loyalty” to the sugar barons and the big landowners, as well as the elected leaders 
who controlled Réunion’s 24 city governments.32 Through the 1970s, this “feudal 
loyalty” was transformed by local elites’ appropriation of para-state organizations such as 
the SIDR. Mayor Legros had taken control of the SIDR and used it and the FASO social 
insurance money to maintain a large number of political followers by using French state 
aid for local political ends. 
The French administration regularly criticized called the poorest sections of the 
Réunion Island population as having “lack of initiative … insouciance … fatalism and 
this welfare mentality”. The French administration considered it was this which created 
electoral corruption in Réunion.33 Yet poor Réunion Islanders were far from passive. 
They clearly understood the prevailing political system and decided whether to 
participate in it by measuring the benefits to themselves.  
For F, in her house in Maperine, as for many thousands of Réunion Islanders, the 
Mayors were the logical source of material benefits and employment. They did not see 
that the power of locally elected leaders in Réunion was underpinned by the central 
French government, as well as by the salary contributions to the FASO.  In the same way 
as landowners had previously been the source of material wealth, many people 
considered that material welfare and employment came directly from the Mayors.  
The French administration and Michel Debré were well aware of these networks 
of political obligation and the recreation of landlord-tenant relations by using the 
resources of the French administration. Debré received frequent reports from Réunion’s 
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Prefecture detailing the political basis of his support in Réunion. Yet these reports also 
judged Réunion Islanders as simply passive puppets of the elected leaders.  
However these practices were an integral part of Réunion Island sociability, 
inherited from the plantation system and the rural modes of landlord-tenant relations. 
Réunion Islanders made claims on the largesse that the local elites had at their disposal. 
Despite the weight of official discourses of Réunion Islanders being like Metropolitan 
French political practices at were still based on landlord tenant relations, even if they now 
included organizations like the SIDR.34 The major transformation was that the new 
application of French social legislation in Réunion fundamentally transformed traditional 
class divisions between the extremely poor majority and the landowning minority by 
creating a new lower middle class, who were employed in manual jobs by the city 
governments.  
Sharing out the French administration’s networks of welfare and distribution in 
Réunion has been in the interests of all political groups.  The increasing French 
bureaucratization of local government, and its increased funding of social provision in 
Réunion - especially after socialist President Mitterrand was elected in 1981 - ensured 
that all of Réunion’s different political actors were able to gain control of elements of the 
system of material distribution. From 1981 Reunion Island had both a General Council 
and a Regional Council, each with different responsibilities. There is usually a right-wing 
majority in the General Council and left-wing majority in the Regional Council: both 
political groups have a monopoly on one type of local government. During the 1990s the 
Communist Party also unsuccessfully attempted three times to divide Réunion into two 
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departments (like Corsica) in order to maximize its political control over the distribution 






CHAPTER 8 “THEY CLAIM STRONGER RIGHTS THAN 
PROPERTY OWNERS’ RIGHTS”: INVERTING LANDLORD – 
TENANT RELATIONS IN SIDR PETITE ILE 1998-2009 
 
I. Introduction 
From the 1950s shanty town renovation became a political imperative for the French 
administration in Réunion. SIDR Petite Ile was constructed in 1960 and was the SIDR’s 
first social housing project built over Camp des Noirs in St Denis. The aim of replacing 
the shanty towns was to diminish their importance as a political recruiting ground for the 
Communist Party. However, the neighborhood of Petite Ile became a bastion of political 
support for Auguste Legros, the right wing Mayor of St Denis from 1969 to 1989, and 
President of the SIDR from 1973 to 1989.  
Mayor Legros used French subsidies to distribute city council jobs to some 
political supporters in Petite Ile. Through his influence in the SIDR he maintained low 
rents in the neighborhood. He also allowed residents to construct extensions to their 
bungalows in wood or corrugated iron, giving building materials as a pre-election 
sweetener. These home-made extensions did not help SIDR Petite Ile age very well and 
by the 1980s it had become run-down and its infrastructure outdated.1 The SIDR 
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renovated some of its other 1960s social housing projects in St Denis but SIDR Petite Ile 
was never renovated, probably because it was a prime plot of SIDR land near the center 
of St Denis and the city council and SIDR hoped to build a new development over the 
land. 
 In August 1998 the Managing Director of the SIDR suggested to the St Denis city 
government that the Petite Ile housing project should be entirely demolished and rebuilt. 
It had become “insalubrious”. Many SIDR residents strongly opposed the idea of losing 
their bungalows and being rehoused in apartments. The SIDR later relented. In 2004 it 
launched a renovation and rebuilding program for Petite Ile, rather than wholesale 
destruction of the neighborhood. The neighborhood renovation was projected to take five 
years. Astonishingly for such a small number of houses, the renovation of SIDR Petite Ile 
is scheduled to continue until at least 2012, if not longer. By 2009 only eighteen 
bungalows had been demolished and only twelve had been renovated out of a total of 
175. Why has it taken the SIDR so long to renovate this neighborhood?  
The delays over the renovation of Petite Ile have been linked to moral judgments 
about cleanliness and about the moral right to be a property owner. Who was to blame for 
the renovation? What was the appropriate way of living in social housing? Should tenants 
be able to buy their houses if they had lived in them for generations? These questions 
were linked to ideas about how to behave as a recipient of housing welfare and the 
expectations around being a property owner in Réunion. 
The current renovation project in Petite Ile demonstrates that landholding 
monopolies and landlord-tenant relations in Réunion still structure social and political life 
in important ways. Residents of Petite Ile expected to be given their bungalows for free, 
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because they had been loyal tenants to the SIDR, regularly paying rent for 50 years. They 
wanted to become property owners and considered that their landlord, the SIDR, give 
them land – mirroring rural landlord-tenant relations of the sugar cane plantations. In the 
current renovation project in Petite Ile, the residents have been partly able to achieve their 
aims of becoming property owners. The power to govern land in Réunion, for so long 
held by landholders and the French administration, has now transferred, in a small way, 
to residents of social housing neighborhoods. The threat of unhappy poor urban residents 
also gives the Petite Ile residents political and social power against the SIDR and the 
French administration.  
II. Dwelling in Petite Ile from the 1960s to today 
Petite Ile was built with the specific aims of rehousing the residents of Camp des Noirs 
who were considered to be poor and dangerously Communist. The French administration 
and the SIDR assumed that rehousing the inhabitants of the Camps into small bungalows 
would change their political leanings, and their insalubrious ways of living. In the first 
few years of the SIDR, the housing agency held gardening competitions in Petite Ile and 
other bungalow developments, to encourage the residents to look after their 
environments, and conform to normative French ideas about the appropriate ways of 
living in social housing. The SIDR also installed a circular clothes washing station in 
contrast to the usual rectangular variety, in order to encourage appropriate 
communication between the women as they washed their clothes.  
 However these investments did not last a long time. Early in the 1970s the SIDR 
complained that Petite Ile and other residential spaces had become run down, and that 
 
  
they were unable to raise the rents of the neighborhood 
had originally intended for the bungalow neighborhoods built in the 1960s to eventually 
be demolished when their shantytown 
urban living.  Petite Ile tenants complained to me 
the neighborhood to become more run
time, the SIDR and the Mayor of St Denis had continually made
tenants would be eventually allowed to buy their b
i. Petite Ile today 
Figure 8.1 Downtown St Denis with
                                                
 
2 CAC 19840179/72 SIDR Conseil d'administration séance du 30 mars 1976. 
concernant les majorations de loyer 30/3/1976
Petite Ile 
for political reasons
inhabitants had finally become assimilated into 
that the SIDR had deliberately 
-down during the 1980s and 1990s
 vague promises that the 
ungalows. 
 the Indian Ocean to the north
 
 
Objet : propositions 
 
291
.2 The SIDR 
allowed 





Petite Ile is between two curved lines on Figure 
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to the saints, but they do not usually drive through the SIDR neighborhood. This gives 
SIDR Petite Ile a village-like character which is unlike the other neighborhoods near the 
St Denis city center. 
The St Denis city council administers Petite Ile with Bas de La Rivière, the 
neighborhood which runs along the banks of the St Denis River. Although Petite Ile has a 
city government annex, a church primary school and some small grocery shops with bars, 
the nearest large shops, the municipal sports center and the social services infrastructure 
are on the other side of the river in Bas de la Rivière. Petite Ile’s spatial separation is 
mirrored by the residents’ sense of social separation from Bas de La Rivière and the rest 
of St Denis.  Residents expressed Petite Ile’s specificity to me in different ways: 
memories of adolescent rivalries over neighborhood identity with Bas de la Rivière, 
sports rivalry with other areas of St Denis and the stability of family presence in Petite 
Ile.  
A number of families in Petite Ile have lived there for at least three or four 
generations. Family links in the neighborhood are important, and many neighbors are 
related through family connections. Referring to the longstanding stability of families in 
Petite Ile, and the calm of the neighborhood was sometimes a subtle way of criticizing 
Petite Ile’s class and race differences with Bas de la Rivière where there is a more visible 
presence of the Mahorais community, the most recent French migrants to Réunion, 
stigmatized because of ideas about their foreignness and poverty.4  
                                                 
 
4 The Mahorais are the French citizens of Mayotte Island in the Comoros archipelago northwest of 
Madagascar. The rest of the Comoros Islands became independent from France in 1976, but Mayotte chose 
to remain a French territory and in 2009 voted to become France’s newest Overseas Department  
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Residents consider Petite Ile to be more pleasant to live in than other social 
housing projects. It has cases-à-terre, bungalows with an outside courtyard. Tenants 
pitied other Réunion Islanders who lived in the social housing high-rise apartments, 
known by Réunionnais as cages-à-lapins or rabbit cages. Despite their professed 
attachment to the neighborhood and its group identity, residents of Petite Ile live privately 
in their houses, mirroring the rural homestead preference for seclusion. Even though 
residents of Petite Ile are urban, and say hello to their neighbors, many people I 
interviewed are wary of maintaining too close neighborly relations. Like many Réunion 
Islanders, residents of Petite Ile fear the effects of ladilafé, malicious neighborhood 
gossip. In short, Petite Ile tenants strongly valued their quality of life in Petite Ile, and 
their bungalows.  
ii. Protests against the SIDR renovation 1998-2004 
In 1998 the Managing Director of the SIDR Jean-Paul Poinsot wrote to the Mayor of St 
Denis. Poinsot claimed that something needed to be done about Petite Ile, because 
renovating the project would be too expensive and selling the SIDR’s houses to the 
current tenants would be “delicate”.5 The SIDR intended to bulldoze the bungalows and 
replace them with new apartment blocks to house more families in the neighborhood. The 
only obstacle to this plan was the question of what to do with the current tenants of Petite 
Ile. The Mayor of St Denis, Michel Tamaya was unwilling to publicly support the SIDR 
President’s program, because he was aware of the discontent of a large number of his 
electorate in Petite Ile. Yet he did not publically oppose it either.  
                                                 
 
5 Journal de l’Ile de La Réunion. J-B C. La SIDR envisage de raser 173 logements à la Petite Ile. 
13/8/1998 ; Le Quotidien Les Petite Ilois se mobilisent pour leur quartier 13/8/1998 
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Tenants of the SIDR housing project called an emergency neighborhood meeting 
where a group of tenants resolved to “stop the demolition project, whatever it takes.” A 
spokesperson denounced the SIDR. “The problem is that there have been no repairs by 
the SIDR for some years. [The SIDR] has allowed the neighborhood to fall into disrepair. 
And now they are trying to make out that Petite Ile is a shanty town. That is just mocking 
people.” Although Petite Ile residents attended neighborhood meetings in August and 
September 1998, only a much smaller group of residents grouped together to protest 
against the SIDR’s plan. They set up a group defending the heritage of the neighborhood 
of Petite Ile: l’association de defense du patrimoine des habitants de SIDR Petite Ile.6  
These residents accused the St Denis city council of opposing their right to 
purchase their social housing, in view of future urban developments in Petite Ile. “How 
can you say to people who have paid rent for 40 years that tomorrow they have to go and 
live in an apartment block? They aren’t fools. The SIDR want to reclaim the land to build 
concrete blocks. We don’t want that here.”7 Some members of the group even set up a 
roadblock in December 1998, although not all residents of Petite Ile participated. “We 
want to stay here” affirmed Germaine Brema, a resident of the neighborhood since 1959, 
“we are just fine here, and our neighborhood is far from being a slum (taudis).”8  
The protest of the residents of Petite Ile, and the St Denis Mayor’s unwillingness 
to take a stand on the Petite Ile meant that a stalemate occurred for the next five years. In 
2001 the Mayor of St Denis changed, and in 2004 the SIDR and the St Denis municipal 
council changed their plan to demolish the Petite Ile housing project. They made a study 
                                                 
 
6 Le Quotidien Le Maire ne veut pas se positionner 4/9/1998  
7 Le Quotidien Les Petit Ilois se mobilisent pour leur quartier 13/8/1998 
8 Le Quotidien La mairie n'a pas de projet sur ce quartier 31/12/1998. 
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of Petite Ile and interviewed all the residents. The study suggested that whilst some of the 
houses in Petite Ile were insalubrious, some of them could be repaired, rather than being 
demolished.9  
The SIDR had changed its policy towards Petite Ile because unhappy 
neighborhoods gave very bad publicity both to the St Denis city council, the General 
Council (who had board members in the housing agency) and the SIDR. The SIDR was 
conscious of its image in St Denis, given that it houses 30% of the St Denis population. A 
SIDR manager later explained how the housing agency understands urban renewal and 
tenants’ demands. “We … must maintain peace in the neighborhoods, there mustn’t be 
rioting (il ne faut pas des émeutes).” 
iii. Looking like a shantytown 
Petite Ile had partly been declared as “insalubrious” because of its outdated infrastructure 
– poor drainage, sewage, electricity and unpaved roads in the project. The other problem 
was that the SIDR considered that it resembled a shantytown. Most tenants had built 
extensions to their houses in corrugated iron, plastic and wood, the traditional materials 
of the Réunion Island shantytown. “The problem with Petite Ile was that the 
neighborhood looked like a shantytown” Bernard Hoarau, the PR manager for the SIDR 
told me. The SIDR objected to these handmade extensions, especially the way that 
tenants had covered over their gardens with corrugated iron shading. The universal 
preference of Réunion Islanders in Petite Ile houses was to have a shady place to sit and 
                                                 
 
9 SIDR and ReA.R, "Etude pré-opérationnelle, R.H.I “ Petite île.”." 
 
  
eat outside, but because the original Petite Ile houses were not built with any shades or 




Figure 8.3 Petite Ile 1960 






Figures 8.3 and 8.4 are aerial photographs of Petite Ile
in the 2003 report which recommended the renovation of the SIDR. While Figure 8.3
shows the neighborhood in 
8.4. shows the neighborhood forty years later.
Tenants in Petite Ile all constructed corrugated iron exten
yards. In some places the extensions were 
housing survey commented that these extensions were inappropriate
enough air or light, and rainwater was badly drained from them.
concerns about the circulation of air and light seem redolent of 1950s visions
slum dwellers in Réunion, and ignore Réunion Island practices of shaded sociability. The 
public spaces in Petite Ile also made it appear to be a shantytown, especially because 
some roads in the project had never been 
Figure 
                                                
 
10"Etude pré-opérationnelle, R.H.I “ Petite île.”."
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Furthermore the project bathrooms needed updating. 
admitted that the neighborhood’s 
infrastructure. Yet he also 
“appropriation” and investment in the bungalows on the part of tenants who “did not 
behave like owners.” 
III. The “right” way to live in a social housing bungalow
A SIDR manager described SIDR Petite Ile to me as a “Gaullish village”
referring to the Asterix comic strip series, where an isolated village of Gauls successfully 
holds out against the Roman invaders in 52 BC. Her description mirrored her general 
sense that the neighborhood was resisting the SIDR’s inevitable and necessary r
process.  
 
-made improvements to SIDR Petite Ile bathroom 
 
SIDR Manager Bernard Hoarau 
“insalubrity” was really caused by the decrepit 








 The SIDR renovation plan for the neighborhood was to demolish some of the 
bungalows, and renovate others. This created tension between tenants and the SIDR. All 
Petite Ile residents wanted to buy their bungalows, but there were not enough bungalows 
for everyone. The SIDR planned to demolish bungalows in groups, retaining some rows 
of and selling off others. This meant that tenants who had “looked after” their bungalows 
might be moved out, if they were in a row set to be demolished. Equally, other tenants 
who had not invested money in their housing might be able to keep their bungalows if 
they were situated in a block to be sold off. To alleviate this problem, the SIDR planned 
to move tenants who had not looked after their houses into transition apartments. It would 
allow “good” tenants to move into renovated bungalows – bungalows which their 
neighbors may have lived in for thirty years. This created a certain amount of conflict and 
jealousy in the neighborhood, and anger at the SIDR which was exacerbated because no-
one knew who was going to move where. 
Since 2003, the SIDR demolition plans and reasons for delays had not been 
effectively communicated to residents. Not a single resident had received a copy of the 
report containing the projected outline of the new neighborhood. An unhappy tenant of 
Petite Ile gave me his version of the SIDR renovation plan in 2009. “One fine day, 
without consultation, they put leaflets in envelopes and there was a meeting … ‘voilà 
[said the SIDR] we are reclassifying Petite Ile as RHI … from now on you will all be 
owners.’” Indeed, the first SIDR liaison officer had promised all the tenants that they all 
would be able to buy their houses, even though this was clearly impossible according to 
the 2003 demolition project. The liaison officer had then resigned and moved away from 
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Réunion. Succeeding SIDR employees attempted to untangle the mess of claims about 
who would be able buy whose bungalows. 
To re-organize the rights to buy the bungalows, the SIDR attempted to establish 
moral criteria of cleanliness. People who had appropriately looked after their houses, 
according to SIDR criteria, would have the right to buy them. However, Petite Ile tenants 
did not agree with the SIDR criteria. They complained that it was the fault of the SIDR 
that the neighborhood had become run-down. Tenants also created their own concepts of 
housing rights which reflected their own visions of the right way to live in social housing. 
Despite the SIDR’s attempts to establish norms of appropriate cleanliness, its own 
employees revealed that defining and sanctioning insalubrity was ambiguous and a 
standard idea of living in social housing did not exist in the SIDR. 
i. Investing in the space 
I interviewed a dozen SIDR employees at different hierarchical levels in the organization. 
They all considered that being a tenant conferred different rights and obligations about 
caring for a house than being a property owner. Tenants should keep appropriately clean 
houses, but they should not try and inappropriately “invest” in the space - for example by 
building extensions on their houses, or changing the fixtures rented with the house. 
Mr. Alba is the SIDR quality control manager. He and his assistant Mme Clain 
ensure SIDR tenant satisfaction. They manage SIDR repairs which are its responsibility 
such as major leaks, electrical faults and structural maintenance. Sometimes tenants do 
not understand what repairs are in the remit of the SIDR (such as outside walls and 
drainage) and what is their own responsibility (blocked sinks or changing light bulbs). 
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Mr. Alba talked with me about the appropriate way of living in a house, and the 
appropriate way of “investing” a space which a tenant rented.  
Mr. Alba told me about a tenant outside Petite Ile who had recently cemented 
down tiles in his new apartment because he decided they were easier to clean than the 
SIDR regulation linoleum. This broke the terms of the SIDR rent contract which 
stipulated that tenants could not modify the apartment flooring. The tenant had been told 
by the SIDR to remove the tiles, and was furious, especially because of his financial 
investment in improving his home. The very morning of our interview, Mr. Alba had 
heard the tenant on Réunion’s shock talk radio station, Radio FreeDOM. The tenant 
claimed that he would go on hunger strike until the SIDR allowed him to keep the tiles. 
“[The tenants] are crazy!” Mr. Alba concluded. “They claim rights which are stronger 
than the rights of property owners! Ils revendiquent un droit plus fort que le droit des 
propriétaires!”  
Whilst Mr. Alba fully understood the tenant’s desire for tiles instead of linoleum 
in his house, he considered that many tenants did not understand their rights and duties 
under the tenancy contract. Another SIDR manager told me incredulously about the 
tenants of Petite Ile: “people consider themselves like owners because they have paid rent 
for 30 years. [If they are to be moved out] they even want to be refunded for the work 
they have done on their house, for the tiles.” In contrast, tenants saw their investment in 
their social housing as giving them rights. Yet the SIDR did not think that tenants knew 
the “right” way of living in social housing.  
SIDR Petite Ile tenants had a very different idea about the rights of a tenant than 
SIDR managers. Tenants felt that they had been morally justified in readapting the tiny 
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two-bedroom bungalows in Petite Ile for their family needs, in according to their vision 
and possible budget for creating a comfortable house. As all residents had pointed out to 
me, what else could they have done? The bungalows had only been built with two 
bedrooms, even though families in the 1960s and 1970s were large, and having seven 
children was not uncommon. To improve their living conditions tenants had made 
handmade extensions, building over the front and back yards for their large families, and 
erecting shaded dining areas with semi-permanent materials like corrugated iron, breeze 
blocks or wood.  
Tenants considered that extending their houses and building extra rooms and 
shading was a logical necessity for their well-being. They had given themselves the right 
to construct extensions like an owner should behave. “We didn’t have the right, officially, 
but it was a right that everyone acquired for themselves (que tout le monde s'est appris).” 
Mme D told me. She justified her family’s practices by saying that they had not protested 
when the SIDR told them to remove the extensions. Mme D said that her family’s 
housing extensions were in good condition, because her father had been a foreman on 
construction sites. Some tenants were obviously not so skilled at constructing long-lasting 
extensions, or claimed that their budgets did not allow them to buy good quality building 
materials.  
Although tenants admitted that their houses were now insalubrious, they imputed 
problems with cockroaches and rats to the poorly maintained sewage and water system; 
the peeling paint and the faulty electrics were due to SIDR negligence, because it had 
never renovated bungalows in Petite Ile. Some tenants accused the SIDR of deliberately 
allowing the housing project to fall into disrepair during the 1980s and 1990s, so that 
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people could not buy their houses. Others told me that they had been specifically 
permitted to make housing extensions in the 1970s and 1980s by Mayor Auguste Legros’ 
government as long as the extension were semi-permanent - in wood, plastic or 
corrugated iron - rather than in concrete. SIDR and Réunion Islanders thus had highly 
different interpretations about what was an appropriate “investment” in the space of the 
house.  
Although the SIDR claimed to promote normative French housing practices, the 
application of these standards Réunionnais SIDR employees was ambiguous and 
inconsistent. The SIDR liaison worker’s office in Petite Ile was very dilapidated. During 
the rainy season children had broken one of the windows; water had infiltrated in the 
office. Inside, the floor was dirty, the furniture was rusty, and there was a smell of damp. 
The SIDR liaison officer, Mme Z, had never cleaned the office as there was no running 
water in the Portakabin.11  
I suggested Mme Z go next door to get a bucket of water from a SIDR tenant to 
clean it up. Mme Z told me it was not her job to clean the office. Yet Petite Ile tenants 
visiting her office invariably commented on its cleanliness to her, and to me, advising 
Mme Z that she should clean it up. Judging by their facial expressions when invited to sit 
down, tenants clearly considered her office was insalubrious, and that it was not an 
appropriate way of receiving the public. Even whilst she explained to me bungalows in 
Petite Ile would be would probably be reallocated to those who had kept a clean house, 
Mme Z did not see the contradiction of her own unclean work space, and the image it 
gave to SIDR tenants. 
                                                 
 
11 All intials have been changed to protect anonymity of Petite Ile residents 
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Tenants and SIDR employees had different ideas and practices of what was 
appropriate cleanliness and investment in social housing. The SIDR discourse about 
cleanliness was also ambiguous. It seemed to be both condoning and condemning 
insalubrity. Tenants in Petite Ile claimed that their living practices were not insalubrious. 
At the same times as they blamed the SIDR for abandoning the neighborhood and letting 
its infrastructure decline. The definition of ‘insalubrity’ and responsibility for it were 
linked a broader idea: how people should behave when they accept French social welfare.  
Although many residents had been happy with the idea of a renovation project in 
2003 and the chance to buy their houses they gradually became disenchanted. SIDR calls 
for tender were delayed.12 Operations to improve infrastructure such as sewers and roads 
did not even start until 2005. No houses could be improved until this was completed in 
2007. During this time increasing numbers of houses lay derelict. The SIDR did not want 
to move new people in until repairs had been completed. Tenants suspected the SIDR and 
the new St Denis city would distribute some of the derelict houses as political gifts. Many 
tenants considered that the SIDR did not care about the families who had spent years 





                                                 
 
12 Delays were caused by competition in the construction industry: there were more lucrative tenders to 
build private apartment blocks, (a booming construction sector because of French tax breaks) and to build 
sections of the EU-funded Route des Tamarins motorway built between 2002 and 2009.  




IV. Ending the “welfare mindset”  
Gisèle Tarnus worked on Réunion’s very first RHI operation after Cyclone Hyacinthe in 
1980 damaged a shantytown neighborhood in St Denis.14 She remembers arriving on her 
weekly visits to the neighborhood, and hearing the women calling to each other to warn 
that “the welfare is here! L’assistance i arrive! It was a running joke. Mme Tarnus knew 
that the shantytown inhabitants saw her as the conduit of financial aid, but were wary of 
her in case she started investigating whether the women had partners and thus did not 
have the right to single-mother financial aid. The inhabitants recognized that the 
relationship between social services and employees was one of differential power – Mme 
Tarnus could help them, but she also might have the power to stop their allowances. 
 French welfare policy has moved away from admitting this type of power 
differential between social workers and clients.15 The SIDR now claims not to “give 
welfare” but they “accompany”. They work with tenants rather than for them. SIDR 
employees do not want to “give welfare” to people who look for it because this will only 
reinforce a perceived culture of dependency, the “welfare mindset”. 
Every social worker and SIDR employee I spoke to were convinced that they 
were in a partnership with the people who sought housing aid and who lived in social 
housing. In this partnership, tenants must have a personal investment in their social 
housing. Yet as the previous section shows, the nature of a tenant’s personal investment 
                                                 
 
14 See her study of how rehousing shantytown residents to housing projects affected peoples’ lives in St 
Denis. Gisèle Tarnus, "De la ruelle au balcon : une expérience de résorption de l'habitat insalubre à Patate à 
Durand sur la commune de Saint-Denis" (Université de La Réunion, 1991). 
15 This is part of broader French social welfare policy ideas about enabling welfare allocatees rather than 
making them passive. See recent discussions about how the French welfare state has attempted to stop 
becoming an “état providentiel” by making social welfare recipients responsible for their condition 




is highly circumscribed. It is linked to French policy norms, not to Réunionnais 
construction traditions or their practices of sociability. Réunionnais in Petite Ile have a 
very different idea of what being a social housing tenant should mean and what being 
“actors” instead of “recipients” of housing welfare should achieve for them. 
i. Visions of insalubrity 
In 2005 the PR manager of the SIDR hired a Réunionnais photographer called Laurent 
Zitte to go with the SIDR neighborhood liaison officer and take pictures of the residents 
in their original Petite Ile bungalows. Zitte would later would photograph the tenants in 
their transition lodgings, and then in their final houses, whether renovated bungalows, or 
new apartments. Once in their final houses, a member of the SIDR will present these 
framed photographs to the tenants. This process was undertaken to make Petite Ile tenants 
feel “accompanied”, or implicated, in the renovation, rather than being passively 
“assisted” participants in a rehousing process which was against their interests.16 The 
SIDR currently undertakes similar photo projects with their other RHI operations. They 
are a hopeful attempt at maintaining good public relations for the SIDR in a context 
where tenants are often unhappy with the conditions of their rehousing.  
The two photographs below, whilst not of the same house, emphasize the 
ambiguous approach of the SIDR, and highlight different visions of the same Creole 
living practices. Whilst Laurent Zitte was paid to take very human portraits of all the 
residents in their sometimes dilapidated houses, at the same time the SIDR had paid a 
                                                 
 
16 This is in line with broader French welfare discourses of making allocatees of government social aid 
responsible actors of their own welfare rather than passive recipients of state largesse. The SIDR managers 
refer to this as ‘accompanying people in a social partnership’ rather than ‘assisting’ them – see next section 
 
  
consulting company to photograph the houses (without their tenants) to judge their 
degrees of insalubrity.17  
 
Figure 8.7 (left): Photograph by Laurent Zitte 2005 for SIDR tenant portrait series.
Figure 8.8 (right): Photograph for SIDR insalubrity investigation 2003.
 
Laurent Zitte’s photograph (Figure 8
Ile tenant as she smiles ironically in her doorway, probably mildly prote
photographed. By squatting in the woman’s yard, Zitte makes her house appear bigger
Her doorframe is enlarged by the shadows. Although her doorway is framed by peeling 
walls our eyes are drawn to 
The photograph for the 
shows another vision of the same type of bungalow.
house become the subject of the picture and are emphasized rather than hiding in 
                                                
 
17 these photos were only circulated to government agencies and were not publicly displayed
18 SIDR and ReA.R, "Etude pré
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her well-tended pot plants at the center of the photograph. 
SIDR insalubrity investigation of Petite Ile 
18 This time the objects around the 
 











shadows: potted plants lying in upturned brown earth and a wonky garden path indicate 
some effort to keep the house clean, but are offset by the rusty oil barrel and homemade 
wiring, elements of insalubrity. A female Metropolitan French investigator holding a 
clipboard is framed far away in the doorway. 19 She is talking to an unseen Réunionnais 
tenant who does not appear. Indeed, there are no pictures of any tenants in the entire 
series of photos taken to plan the project’s demolition.  
The contrast between consultants’ photographs of “insalubrity” and Laurent 
Zitte’s emphasis on the tenants’ histories underline the ambiguities of defining Petite Ile 
as insalubrious, and of promoting normative ideas of the “right” way to live in social 
housing. The SIDR has tried to make tenants conform to normative practices of 
cleanliness and appropriate welfare behavior. Yet it recognized that Réunion Islanders 
have different ideas about this. It employed a photographer to preserve the housing 
traditions of the Réunion Islanders. Even if it is demolishing the bungalows, it is obliged 
to acknowledge the residents’ attachment to their ways of living in their social houses.  
The ambiguity in these two sets of photographs suggests deeper social conflicts 
about the ‘right’ way to live in a Petite Ile bungalow. Indeed the conflict is publicly 
displayed by a large sign at the entry to Petite Ile just next to the church. The sign 
reproduces photographs by Laurent Zitte alongside photographs of the new SIDR houses. 
There is a legend “We renovate for you, with you!” (Nous aménageons pour vous, avec 
vous!). Smaller letters on the sign describe the SIDR’s housing renovation project which 
                                                 
 
19 It is not the woman’s whiteness which points to the fact she is Metropolitan French. It is strongly 
suggested by her body position, blonde hair tied in a chignon, sailor trousers ending above the ankle and 
her flat pumps  
 
  
is currently being undertaken in Petite Ile. This underlines that the SIDR is 
“accompanying” the residents, renovating 
Figure 8.9 and Figure 
with them, rather than for them. 
 
 














Figure 8.11 and Figure 8.12 Portraits of SIDR residents by Laurent Zitte 
 
Who is this woman? Is she welcoming us into our house, or is she saying goodbye? Is 
this nostalgia or resignation written on her face? Her ambiguous expression in Laurent 
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Zitte’s photograph mirrors the ambiguity of the right way of living in social housing. 
Petite Ile has been earmarked for total renovation, yet the photo celebrates a nostalgic 
image of Creole housekeeping. The photograph portrays a Réunionnaise of African 
origin, perhaps with some Malagasy antecedents. She is in the garden of a Petite Ile SIDR 
bungalow. She has fitted the window behind her with slatted glass panes and flowery 
curtains.20 Behind the crook of her elbow we can identify the thorny, crimson-red épines 
de Christ and some plants in pots - her garden is clearly well kept. A washing line 
traverses the photo from left to right, and a serpillière floor cloth has been left out to dry 
in the morning light, which tells the viewer that her house is clean.  
The photograph evokes an older Creole generation’s working-class respectability: 
a well-maintained house and garden, a strong-looking female matriarch who wears a 
capeline straw hat and who has welcomed her guests into her back yard, the domestic 
space and inner sanctum of many Réunionnais houses. The cleanliness of the house and 
its tended garden are also important because they index SIDR views of keeping a clean 
house. Good, personally responsible social housing tenants keep clean and well-
maintained houses, but they do not make repairs to them; morally lax tenants who are 
poor but have a welfare attitude let their houses slide because they are not the owners of 
the houses. The photograph on the sign attempts to elide social tension by showcasing 
some of the new developments alongside nostalgic, black and white photographs of 
Creole homes, which are valued as part of Réunion’s traditional past.  
                                                 
 
20 In 1960 the Petite Ile bungalows were delivered to tenants with no glass in the windows, only shutters. 
Even when shuttered these windows let in the rain. Most tenants subsequently fitted glass panes at their 
own expense.  
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These Petite Ile tenants are well aware that their houses and well-kept gardens are 
destined for destruction.21 The younger man in the second photograph sits on a wooden 
wire roller in his front yard, next to a young banana plant. He appears to have been 
photographed in the middle of emphasizing something, and his hand is outstretched. This 
house is closed up, but the front yard has mature fruit trees, giving shade. The man’s 
expression is much more somber than the woman’s. His house was destined for 
demolition and he had already moved out.  
The SIDR sign was erected in Petite Ile when the SIDR was already four years 
behind schedule and in conflict with numerous residents of Petite Ile who were covertly 
protesting against the renovation in different ways. Creating a personalized relationship 
with its tenants is especially important propaganda attempt in Petite Ile.22 As the SIDR 
sign at the entrance to Petite Ile claims, the SIDR is actively working together with 
residents: “for you, and with you”. The photograph has been deployed to improve the 
SIDR’s public relations in Petite Ile. It is aimed at convincing the residents of the housing 
project that the SIDR appreciates and respects the Creole housing practices of the tenants 
who will be affected by the renovation. However, significant ill-feeling and mistrust 
exists between SIDR employees working on the renovation, and the residents who are 
subject to it.  
 
 
                                                 
 
21 The tourist literature for the « villages creoles » promotes this image and anthropologists studying 
Réunion’s houses have concentrated on it e.g. Watin, "Habiter : approche anthropologique de l'espace 
domestique à La Réunion". 
22 Journal de l’Ile de La Réunion. J-B C. La SIDR envisage de raser 173 logements à la Petite Ile. 
13/8/1998 (I use the figure of 175 bungalows rather than the cited 173 houses because there are also 2 
shops in the neighborhood located in the bungalows) 
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ii. Mme Q’s new house: accompanying or welfare? 
Mme Z is in her early thirties and she is a Réunion Islander. Her job as a liaison officer is 
to mediate between SIDR managers and residents who are living through the renovation 
process. She tries to further SIDR renovation goals and she also deals with the residents’ 
requests for help. Every Tuesday morning she leaves SIDR headquarters in St Denis to 
holds public office hours in a Portakabin on the edge of the Petite Ile housing project. 
Mme Z is the third SIDR liaison officer to work in Petite Ile since 2003, because the first 
two left out of frustration, and she had found it challenging to get Petite Ile tenants to 
accept the renovation process. I often sat in on Mme Z’s office hours, and waited with her 
for tenants to come with problems to solve.  
 Some tenants came to Mme Z’s office to ask for help about paperwork relating to 
the housing renovation project, or for her to make phone calls to higher managers in the 
SIDR about their cases. Mme Z held the treasured telephone numbers of the SIDR 
bureaucracy which were unavailable to tenants. A visit to her office in Petite Ile was 
clearly an efficient way of moving things forward. Other tenants came to her office 
clearly drunk, with insurance papers in their hands that they did not understand how to 
fill, or they came asking her to find their children a house. Mme Z interpreted the 
different demands of these cases to me as either “welfare” or “accompaniment”.  
Some tenants were capable of going to the utilities office themselves to be connected, or 
could wait in their houses for the construction company to arrive. Others needed to be 
“held by the hand”, and she considered that these people only wanted “welfare”. In other 
words, they should have been capable of finding solutions to their problems with the 
social worker, but instead they wanted Mme Z to resolve their problems without their 
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input. Indeed, every SIDR employee I spoke to has a repertoire of “welfare” anecdotes 
about what they consider as the outrageous demands of tenants in their social housing. 
Tenants attempt to telephone the SIDR president because their sink is blocked; a tenant’s 
boyfriend who is not even on the rent contract threatens SIDR employees - he wants a 
larger apartment because he wants space for his dogs. While SIDR employees consider 
that most tenants “deserve” help, other people take advantage of the system.  
One day Mme Z explained to me the complexities of the “deserving”: those who 
would be allowed to stay in their bungalows, and who would be moved on to their 
apartments.  
[Some Petite Ile tenants] have houses in a really bad state. I don’t think that they 
should be allowed to buy a renovated bungalow, I think we should favor … 
people who looked after their houses, and give those people a chance … There are 
people who say to me “I should have worked [on my house] – would the SIDR 
have then kept it?” … I am someone who speaks frankly … I say … “yes … now 
it’s too late.”  
 
Mme Z admitted that some bungalows in Petite Ile might not have been labeled for 
demolition if people had just looked after their houses in the appropriate way – “investing 
in the space” was the jargon. She inferred that there was partly a moral element to tenants 
being allowed to buy their renovated bungalows: the SIDR had chosen which houses to 
keep and renovate, and which houses would be entirely demolished, based on how 
residents had maintained them. However, in practice, the SIDR’s visions of morality and 
cleanliness, and only “accompanying” people were often confounded by the tenants’ 
strategies to ensure that they got the most of the SIDR and the welfare system 
Mr. and Mme Q had lived Petite Ile since they had married in 1957. They had 
been moved into the SIDR project when the shantytown was knocked down. Although 
the SIDR bungalows only had two bedrooms, the Qs had managed to house themselves 
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and their ten children by building extra rooms out of corrugated iron in the back yard, and 
they had built an extra covered area in the front yard from corrugated iron so all the 
family could eat together outside in the shade – the preferred way of eating in Réunion 
and denigrated as contributing to the “shanty town” feel of the neighborhood. 
In 2003, the Qs had the advantage of both a well-kept house that did not need to 
be completely demolished and enough money to buy it. After the SIDR had finally 
renovated the entire infrastructure in the neighborhood in 2005, the Bs bought the house 
from the SIDR at a subsidized price. They then obtained a government grant to pay a 
different company called PACT Réunion to renovate the inside of the house. PACT-
Réunion’s renovations were supposed to follow French housing norms about the size of 
the house relative to the number of residents since they were paid by the government. 
Residents should also contribute their own labor to the renovation, rather than relying on 
state munificence; PACT-Réunion was not supposed to lay down flooring over the 
concrete base or to paint the walls – this was left to the occupants of the new house. 
Since all of the Q’s children had moved out of the SIDR house and lived in other 
homes, Mme and Mr. Q were also supposed to reduce their living area. Therefore, all the 
outside rooms and eating areas were to be demolished, and one of the bedrooms would 
become a renovated kitchen. The only place left to eat would be in the small living room. 
This may have conformed to Metropolitan French norms. It was obviously unsuited to 
living in a tropical island, where almost every household eats under the varangue or 
under a covered area.23 It is astonishing that Metropolitan housing norms are still used in 
                                                 
 
23 The varangue had been recognized as an part of Creole housing practices since the earliest SIDR reports 
in the 1950s and has been studied a typical feature of Réunionnais houses. Watin, "Habiter : approche 
anthropologique de l'espace domestique à La Réunion". 
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Réunion, but PACT-Réunion had to follow them to get paid by the French government. 
Nonetheless Mme Q was able to insist that PACT-Réunion renovate the house to her 
desired specification. She kept the two bedrooms, and a larger kitchen was built as an 
extension on to the SIDR’s land. She also retained the outside eating area made of 
corrugated iron. Mme Z the SIDR liaison officer affirmed the universal principle that all 
outside structures had to be demolished in the Petite Ile renovation. I mentioned Mme 
Q’s success in overturning this. “Ah yes, in fact she was lucky” I was told. Luck, 
however, was obviously not part of Mme Q’s strategy.  
Instead, it appeared to me that every time Mme Q was faced with a challenge she 
underlined her helplessness and poor situation – in a similar idiom to supplicating letters 
to the Prefect when the shantytown rents were reduced in the 1960s. Mme Q was 
certainly old and she had loyally paid her rent for fifty years to the SIDR. She also 
performed “I am a poor, defenseless old woman” when workers from the SIDR or other 
government agencies arrived at her house, in order to force them to accede to her 
demands. This performance included a lot of crying to SIDR officials. The first time 
Mme Q met me, she also assumed I was a social worker and immediately started crying, 
although she stopped when one of her family members arrived.  
Thus, the SIDR gave her exceptional financial aid to move her in to a nearby 
temporary house for eight months, and paid for her to move out again. Mme Q found 
someone to write a letter for her, and managed to get the SIDR to pay for painting the 
walls and laying her tiles. None of these expenses were supposed to be covered by the 
SIDR, yet Mme Q had negotiated them all. 
 
  318
I visited Mme Q in her new house a number of times. Each time I came across 
family members: one of her daughters passing by or her son-in-law who came to cook her 
lunch. Mme Q proudly told me how her children were good to her – a number of them 
lived in the neighborhood and passed by every day. Others of her adult children lived in 
the Metropole, but Mme Q told me that they regularly telephoned her on specific days in 
the week. “Of course, she doesn’t have family support” Mme Z told me. Mme Q had 
successfully performed being abandoned by her family and Mme Z had recently spent an 
afternoon driving Mme Q all over St Denis to help her sign her water and electricity 
connections, and to deal with her new housing insurance – other “exceptions”. “I don’t 
call that accompanying, I call that welfare” Mme Z told me “I don’t do welfare”. The 
liaison worker had consistently been forced to bend her policies, thanks to Mme Q’s 
performance of poverty and helplessness. The issue here is not merely to document one 
woman’s performance, but also to underline that the idea of “welfare” and 
“accompaniment” is practiced in very different ways between SIDR tenants and 
employees, who have different ideas about the rights of tenants and social welfare 
recipients. 
iii. When tenants claim their rights to welfare  
Many tenants did not share the SIDR’s definition of welfare and accompaniment. 
Reflecting the landlord-tenant relations of Réunion, some SIDR tenants considered that 
living in social housing for many years should confer ownership rights. Some tenants 
even accused the SIDR of deliberately profiting from them and hoarding the government 
money of RHI operations. Other tenants even accused the SIDR employees of 
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embezzlement - filling their pockets with government subsidies instead of helping 
deserving tenants. 
Mr. X was one of the first tenants to force the SIDR to sell him his bungalow, 
rather than be moved out to an apartment. He had simply refused to move out of his 
bungalow until the SIDR had conceded, eventually renovating his bungalow rather than 
knocking it down, or evicting him. For Mr. X, tenants had to stand up for their rights to 
French social welfare. Everyone else in Petite Ile had the right to buy their house, and 
they just had to claim these rights. “[The tenants of Petite Ile] should have their own 
houses … I had to hustle [faire des manières] to get mine. I have the right. It’s an RHI 
operation. … [The other residents of Petite Ile can] also have help [from the state]. … 
What are [social workers for]?”   
This turns the SIDR discourse of assistance and accompanying on its head. 
Tenants do not wish to be active participants in a social process of “accompanying.” 
Rather, they seek their rights to an “assistance” meted out by the state. For Mr. X, the 
SIDR renovation in Petite Ile had been subsidized by the state and by the municipal 
government. “The SIDR put in zero Francs, if I understand correctly…. It’s a golden 
opportunity (une aubaine) for [the SIDR] and for us, the [poor] we can buy a house at an 
unbeatable price, but … if [the SIDR] can … persuade a few people not to buy the 
houses, that they don’t have the right …”. Mr. X implied that the fewer houses the SIDR 
sold to the tenants, the more would be given to political followers.24  
                                                 
 
24 As chapter 5 demonstrates, the political advantages of the SIDR were durable gifts in kind which created 
durable political obligations. Four members of the SIDR executive board are always elected leaders of 
Réunion’s General Council (although the Mayor of St Denis is not currently among them). As of 2009 
Gino Ponin-Ballom the President of Réunion’s General Council, and deputy mayor of St Denis, is currently 
executive president of the SIDR. 
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Mme Z the SIDR liaison officer acknowledged that many tenants had these views. 
“It’s hard to explain [to the tenants]. It’s not logical for them. It’s like the SIDR only sees 
its own interest … the [SIDR] is often seen like the thief, [who steals land rather than] the 
savior who lifts people out of insalubrity.” Although Mme Z did not see herself as a 
“savior” by any means, she had been deeply offended by accusations of other SIDR 
tenants in St Denis that she was personally profiting from working on an RHI operation 
by not giving tenants their “rights”.  
In another St Denis RHI renovation, the SIDR had allocated a global budget of 
3000 Euros ($4200) to help any families who needed special financial assistance to pay a 
security deposit or removal costs. One tenant had political connections in the municipal 
government (which pays 20% of the RHI costs). He had obtained the budget sheet with 
this sum. He declared his rights to this sum. A SIDR manager said that the SIDR “must 
be conciliatory” so the tenant was given a subsidy for his moving costs. The next week 
the tenant returned to see Mme Z saying that the sum did not correspond to 3000 Euros 
and that he wanted 1000 Euros “to pay for the electricity” which of course did not cost 
that much. He was allocated the sum. Mme Z was exasperated; she claimed that even 
when she attempted to be strict, SIDR managers overturned her decisions. A different 
tenant in another area of St Denis had even openly accused Mme Z of embezzling these 
special aid funds.  
He said to me “your pockets are full, aren’t they?” (out poches lé plein, là non?) I 
replied “what do you mean, my pockets are full?” The tenant said “the 3000 
Euros I should have gotten, you put them in your pockets”. Honestly it was one of 
the worst days of my life. There he was saying my pockets were full. If I had done 




Whilst the SIDR claims that they work with tenants, rather than giving them welfare, 
many SIDR tenants appeared to feel that they are owed a certain welfare service from the 
SIDR. Tenants individually exerted pressure on SIDR employees to achieve their ends, 
and make claims on the housing agency. Tenants attempted to use contacts higher up in 
the SIDR, or politicians in the General Council and St Denis city government who might 
be able to apply pressure on the SIDR employees. Some tenants claimed as much of their 
perceived rights as possible, whether from a position of relative weakness or as they were 
convinced that the SIDR is profiting from them.  
V. Moral meanings of rent and new tenant-landlord relations 
Why had the SIDR not sold the Petite Ile houses to tenants? Who would be able to buy 
their houses? The issue of ownership, described as “delicate” by the President of the 
SIDR in 1998 was a fundamental one for tenants in Petite Ile. The vast majority wanted 
to become property owners rather than forever tied into paying rent to the SIDR.25 
Residents claimed it was their right to buy SIDR property because paying rent gives a 
moral basis to property rights, and loyal tenants should become property owners – just as 
rural Réunion Islanders had been allocated land by landowners to ensure their political 
loyalty.  
i. Understanding rental rights  
Some tenants in Petite Ile had not understood the SIDR’s reversal from promising rent-
to-buy houses in Petite Ile in 1957 to changing the policy to indefinite renting in 1958. 
                                                 
 
25 I only met one woman who had actually given up her right to buy her bungalow and had happily moved 
into a rental apartment in Petite Ile. She had moved into Petite Ile in 1978 and did not have an extended 
family network in the neighborhood. 
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Some Petite Ile tenants claimed that they, or their parents, had actually signed a twenty 
year rent-to-buy contract with the SIDR. The 1960 SIDR rental contracts for Petite Ile did 
not contain rent-to-buy clauses. These families were convinced that the SIDR had lied to 
them since 1960.  
The original cohort of Petite Ile residents had been rehoused in 1960 from the 
shanty town on the same site. Many people in Petite Ile would have been illiterate at that 
time.26 Rent contracts were often verbally agreed in shantytowns, and in rural areas. 
When tenants had signed a paper contract they could not read with the SIDR, some 
people (not all) in Petite Ile were convinced that their families had been tricked. 
Residents appeared to remember being promised the opportunity to buy their new SIDR 
houses in 1957. SIDR records show that the SIDR publicly abandoned the plans to let 
Petite Ile residents buy their houses. This was not remembered by the Petite Ile tenants. 27  
In addition residents claimed that elected leaders such as Mayor Legros had also 
made vague promises to the tenants of Petite Ile that they would be able to buy their 
houses. Mayor Legros had never written down this promise. It had also turned out to be 
empty.  
Mr. Juillerot had been a resident of Petite Ile since the 1948 cyclone. He felt that 
the SIDR had maliciously taken advantage of the tenants’ “ignorance”, or illiteracy. Mr. 
Juillerot felt the SIDR should give the residents their houses - due to them since 1960 - 
and stop lying to them. Even Mme Dany, the daughter of a resident of Petite Ile who did 
                                                 
 
26 Compulsory free schooling started in 1948, and most children over the age of 9 or 10 did not attend 
school anyway, meaning that in 1960 most adults were illiterate 
27 By 1959 the rent-to-buy option was no longer financially viable for the SIDR and was publicly 
abandoned before Petite Ile was finished (see chapter 4). No-one I spoke to in Petite Ile recalled the 
Communist activism in Petite Ile.  
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not overtly oppose the Petite Ile renovation thought that “there was deceit somewhere 
along the line, promises were been made about being able to buy the houses which were 
not fulfilled.” 
Mr. X considered the SIDR had been taking advantage of residents of Petite Ile 
even longer - since the original shanty town removal in 1959. He had lived in Petite Ile 
since his birth in 1963; his family had lived in Petite Ile for generations and made up a 
significant clan in the neighborhood. He told me that his parents had been “thrown out of 
their thatched house (case en paille) to come into the SIDR [and were promised] that in 
twenty years the house would be theirs. Fifty years later we still don’t have this house. 
We’re still fighting.” The SIDR had not honored the rent-to-buy contract which his 
parents had purportedly signed in 1960. Fifty years of paying rent later, his parents had 
now effectively paid for the cost of the house. Mr. X evoked both a moral, and a financial 
claim to his Petite Ile bungalow.  
Mr. X used the French verb cotiser to explain that his parents had “contributed” to 
paying off their house. Cotiser is usually associated with the notion of subscription. By 
using this verb Mr. X expressed a widespread belief amongst SIDR tenants in Petite Ile 
that French state housing welfare was a contrepartie – a reward for services rendered. 
Mr. X considered that the residents had been cheated in this contrepartie because “zot na 
jamais rien eu en retour” they had got nothing material back. For him, the point of 
paying rent was not merely to live in better social conditions than the shantytown. It was 
to pay off a house that they would eventually own. In this reading, Petite Ile tenants were 
not the passive recipients of munificent state housing welfare. Rather, by being forced 
into social housing and paying rent, Mr. X felt that it was the tenants who were funding 
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the salaries of SIDR employees through their rent payments.28 Mr. X felt swindled. After 
fifty years of paying and “contributing” to the SIDR for so long, his family were not all 
sure to be able to buy their respective bungalows.29 
The issue here was not merely that the tenants were promised that they could own 
their houses. The act of paying money to stay in a house was understood differently by 
the tenants and the SIDR. SIDR managers considered that it was normal for a tenant to 
perpetually pay rent. Their social housing rents were often subsidized by the Caisse des 
Allocations Familiales (CAF). Tenants’ rents were very low compared to the private 
sector. However this group of tenants thought that paying this rent would and should 
eventually confer property rights on them.  
“If they had been able to read the small print” Mr. C said knowingly, “they would 
have [read] that they were not owners. The SIDR property was never going to be theirs.” 
Mr. C was born in 1955 and had grown up in Petite Ile. Mr. C appeared not to reason in 
the same way as Mr. X or Mr. Juillerot, and did not seem to be bitter about the SIDR’s 
failed promises. Despite his understanding of the SIDR tenancy contract, Mr. C was also 
convinced that he was owed a house.  
After the 2003 survey, the SIDR had “fixed” all the inhabitants of Petite Ile as 
having the right to benefit from the renovation project. Subsequently Mr. C had split up 
with his wife and by 2009 he lived elsewhere in St Denis. However Mr. C had attempted 
to hide his change of residence from the SIDR. By pretending to still live in Petite Ile 
with his wife he implicitly intended to use his “right” to buy a house there - as a certified 
                                                 
 
28 Which was not wrong, because government subsidies are usually for construction or renovation costs, 
with salaries, light repairs and running costs paid out of the rent receipts 
29 He was not wrong – government subsidies usually paid for initial construction of SIDR buildings, and 
SIDR rents then paid for their upkeep and the salaries of the SIDR employees 
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resident of Petite Ile at the moment of the 2003 study. A belief his in moral rights based 
on being born and living in Petite Ile co-existed with his cynicism of others’ feeble 
understanding of contract law. Perhaps the most surprising thing in Mr. C’s case was that 
the SIDR employees dealing with Petite Ile knew that he was no longer living with his 
wife, and that he had no more rights to a renovated bungalow. Yet they had allocated him 
a plot of land in Petite Ile, anyway, separate from his ex-wife’s new house.  
What appeared at first an anomaly, I eventually understood to be fundamental to 
the way that Réunion Islanders in Petite Ile had managed to enact their moral claims to 
ownership of their environments and to being able to navigate in the choppy seas of 
housing welfare. The SIDR preferred to acquiesce to these demands, rather than face the 
threat of social disturbance in Petite Ile. This policy of acquiescing to residents’ demands 
was mirrored in similar compromises in SIDR housing projects in St Denis or elsewhere 
in Reunion.30 Unhappy residents used different tactics of interacting with the SIDR and 
other housing welfare agencies to make claims – to better housing renovation or to 
buying their property. Whilst the nature of these claims depended on their personal 
circumstances, they had the cumulative effect of changing SIDR housing policy. 
VI. Inverting landlord-tenant relations in Petite Ile: the power of families 
Unlike in the 1950s, Réunion Islanders now have much more financial power thanks to 
the post 1963 increase of French financial transfers to Réunion. Many residents of Petite 
Ile work in the French administration or the city councils.  Others who do not work 
benefit from French welfare revenue and the Revenue Minimum d’Insertion, applied in 
                                                 
 
30 This was claimed to be by numerous SIDR employees and managers, as well as Réunion’s Prefecture 
reports since the 1970s 
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Réunion since 1991. Although residents of Petite Ile think in terms of landlord-tenant 
relations in relation to the SIDR – the SIDR should give them their houses because they 
had been loyal tenants – Petite Ile residents also had a growing social and political power 
over the SIDR.  
The power of extended families living in social housing neighborhoods such as 
the SIDR allows them to make social problems for the housing agency and the French 
administration. The French administration and the SIDR are unwilling to enter in open 
conflict with social housing residents, enabling residents to make bolder and bolder 
claims on the housing agency, inversing the landlord-tenant relations of the past. Petite 
Ile families were able to dictate allocation of new houses and who would move in to 
apartments by using heterogeneous means of pressure of the SIDR. This pressure was 
widespread and successful because the French administration and the SIDR feared the 
threat of protest and public disorder from these families. They accommodate families’ 
claims with help from the city government. This creates a system where Réunion 
Islanders are able to make effective claims about their place in social housing 
neighborhoods, and effectively dictate the housing allocation and renovation policy to the 
SIDR.  
i. Inheritance of social housing  
Réunion Islanders prefer living in social housing neighborhoods with bungalows and 
yards like Petite Ile. When people move out of a new bungalow, SIDR employees choose 
the new tenants during private meetings based on criteria such as family size and links to 
the neighborhood. Employees know that SIDR tenants already in the neighborhood 
expect their own family members, or those of their neighbors to be given priority. 
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Tenants feel that they have a privileged right to direct who lives in the neighborhood 
because their families have invested the space and lived there for significant amounts of 
time, giving them a strong physical link to the neighborhoods. As some people claimed to 
me “my umbilical cord is buried there” – and this is still a common practice for some 
Creole families.  
 This creates a system where many house neighborhoods are excluded from having 
residents from outside (this is not the case with apartments). Existing tenants transfer 
leases between members of the same family, and even pass them on to descendents, a 
form of property transmission which is not based on strict ownership because the houses 
remain the property of the SIDR. Leases on social houses are frequently allocated to 
people who do not meet criteria such as family size (for example a couple will be 
allocated a three bedroom house) in order that there is no social disturbance. Tenants also 
deploy other means – such as the sacredness of their Hindu deities - to make claims about 
their rightful place in a neighborhood, and to reserve spaces for themselves.  
All the people I spoke to in Petite Ile saw it as logic that houses remained in the 
same family circuit, even if it the housing was not adapted to the family’s size. 
 Mr. Perny was born in Petite Ile in 1958 but his family moved to Chaudron in 1972 
when the number of children grew too big to fit in the tiny bungalows. His cousin, a 
member of the V family, took on the lease of the Petite Ile house. Years later, when his 
mother died and his brothers had left home, Mr. Perny stayed in the three bedroom family 
house, even though it was too big for him and should have been allocated to another 
family (“I just never went upstairs” he said). For Mr. Perny, keeping people in the same 
neighborhoods alleviated a fear of the unknown. “I think that if people who live there can 
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stay there, its better. Even if [they could move elsewhere] they don’t know who they’ll be 
moved next to, sometimes you can have neighbors who are really, you know ….” Mr. 
Perny left silent his fear of unknown neighbors, and of the possible conflicts which could 
result from living in a neighborhood full of strangers.  
The transfer of leases is an accepted social practice. It alleviates the risk of the 
unknown and enables families to stay in the prized houses. Grandparents, parents and 
children often live in the same house, and will ask the SIDR to transfer the lease to the 
younger generation rather than have the house leave the family circuit. Mr. Alba and 
Mme Clain who worked in quality control at the SIDR described the importance of 
neighborhoods with bungalows for people in social housing. “[They] function in a closed 
circle. A house comes up for rent, if it’s attributed to someone from the neighborhood it’s 
accepted … a person from outside will have a difficult time, believe me.” Problems for 
outsiders could include being ignored by neighbors, harassment or dogs being poisoned.  
 Mr. Alba also admitted that if the SIDR transferred such leases to other family 
members, houses would be attributed to people who did not meet the family size criteria. 
“One person recently didn’t fit the [house] criteria at all, he was single, but he insisted 
and he was allocated the lease.” Placating people who claimed the right to stay in the 
“family house” was purely to keep the peace in the neighborhood, but this created a 
knock-on effect. Other tenants recognized that one person succeeded and tried to do the 
same by pressuring the SIDR. “… [Tenants] claim their rights, and when they have rights 
they will make sure they receive welfare (ils vont se faire assister) because “I have the 




ii. Housing the Gods 
Not all tenants can claim houses for their family members. Other tenants use strategies 
such as claiming a place for their religious deities in the house. For social housing tenants 
who have Hindu faith, once they have set up an altar in the house or in the garden, the 
place becomes sacred. Some of these tenants then use the sacredness of the ground to 
push the SIDR to allocate them the land, or to financially compensate them in the case of 
moving out. They consider that the SIDR is in the obligation to respect their religious 
rights, thus giving tenants their rightful financial compensation or even rights to the land. 
In Petite Ile one of only a few Hindus has gradually appropriated an area of land 
outside his bungalow to make a small temple, and to store his brightly colored procession 
chariots.31   
 
Figure 8.13 Petite Ile resident with Hindu altar  
                                                 
 
31 Hinduism in Reunion derives from the popular practices of Tamil-speaking Southern Indian indentured 
laborers who arrived in Réunion in the 19th century. Many Hindu Réunion Islanders are also Catholic at the 
same time, a practice derived from being forced to practice Catholicism on the plantations. Benoist and 




When the SIDR renovation process went ahead in Petite Ile, this Hindu tenant was able to 
purchase his house. It was subsequently renovated by PACT-Réunion. Because the tenant 
had already been able to by his bungalow, he negotiated with the SIDR to buy the extra 
land next to his house which he had appropriated for his religious beliefs. According to 
the renovation goals, tenants were not supposed to buy extra land (although Mme Q also 
negotiated for extra land for her kitchen). 
This tactic of having the SIDR allocate land in Petite Ile for his deities was not an 
isolated incident. Other people in social housing renovation projects were not as fortunate 
as the Hindu tenant of Petite Ile. They were not able to stay in their houses or buy them. 
This led them to negotiate more forcibly for the SIDR to recognize their religious rights, 
and to allocate them – and their deities – more housing space in the neighborhood.  
In another case in St Denis a woman with a large family lived in SIDR social 
housing bungalow. When the neighbors moved away, the woman managed to procure the 
adjacent house for her family needs. In the garden of this second house she also installed 
an altar where she put her pantheon of Hindu deities. In 2007 there was a shanty town 
operation in the area. All the residents were supposed to leave their bungalows for two 
years and move into a specially built transition apartment in order that the SIDR rebuild 
their houses. The woman refused to move - risking the start of the entire building site -
until she could have her conditions fulfilled: a piece of land with a house for her deities, 
the SIDR to pay the removal costs and an extra large flat in the new transition apartments 
because she had the “right” having been a member of the bungalow residence.  
She obtained all of this, “although I asked for receipts for the costs of moving the 
deities” a SIDR liaison officer somewhat helplessly justified. The woman now lived in a 
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different bungalow which had been given her by her contacts in the municipal 
government (rather than the SIDR) indicating that her political loyalty was important. 
She had signed the tenancy contract, and extended her family presence in the apartment 
by allowing her son and daughter-in-law to live in the transition apartment while she 
stayed in the house given by the municipal government. The SIDR were well aware of 
this, but they had been forced to accept her conditions at the risk of the entire apartment 
block being delayed.  
These incidents were not limited to the SIDR. An ex-manager of the SEMADER 
a Réunion Islander with some Hindu ancestry told me incredulously that the company 
had paid a tenant 7000 Euros (about $10,000) for the cost of moving his deities.32 He 
thought that the SEMADER had paid such an outrageous sum because the project 
manager was from Metropolitan France, and was overly culturally sensitive to Réunion 
Islanders’ religious needs, to the extent of not detecting the charlatans from the really 
faithful. 
SIDR managers revealed that despite a discourse of firmness and “accompanying” 
tenants, these policies were continually overturned by the need to “negotiate” with 
tenants’ demands. Mme Z, the SIDR liaison officer, claimed that she had started by 
attempting to be firm with tenants’ demands. In her view some tenants had merely 
bypassed her and asked more senior managers who had conceded. Some tenants even 
used their political connections with the SIDR executive directors until they had got what 
they wanted. After all, for local politicians a satisfied household or a family’s political 
loyalty could be key at election time. The link between SIDR tenants, family networks 
                                                 
 
32 SEMADER (Société d'Economie Mixte d'Aménagement, de Développement, d'Equipement de La 
Réunion) is another Reunion Island mixed-economy company that provides social housing 
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and political networks are obviously strong, as the woman who obtained a new house for 
her deities from the municipal government demonstrates. Yet people who wish to move 
their deities are at the lower end of political and extended family pressure on the SIDR. 
The following case of Mme V shows the extent to which defiance and rights claiming can 
generate property ownership.  
iii. Family power to save an “insalubrious” house  
Mme V, who is 73, belongs to a Petite Ile family who lived in Camps des Noirs before 
being moved into the SIDR project. Numerous members and branches of the M family 
still live in Petite Ile. Mme V’s house is different-looking to most of the others in the 
neighborhood. The SIDR liaison officer put it tactfully when she said to me “it’s old-style 
Creole living, wood stove and everything.” However this ‘old-style’ living was not the 
picturesque type, such as the picture of the woman with the straw bonnet celebrated at the 
entrance sign to Petite Ile. “Old-style” living in this case meant poverty and keeping junk 
in the back yard in case of need. Mme V’s corner bungalow was fenced around with 
corrugated iron of varying rustiness. Unlike most Réunion Islanders Mme V still did her 
clothes washing by hand in a basin in the back yard. The original concrete house was 
practically invisible: it was covered by corrugated iron sheets and cardboard boxes.  
Mme V did not have enough money to take out a 12,000 Euro loan to buy her 
house from the SIDR. Given the SIDR liaison officer’s claims about houses being 
allocated based on cleanliness and “investment” in the space, Mme V did not have the 
possibility of buying her house. She risked being permanently moved into an apartment 
building and watching her house destroyed. Instead of conceding to the SIDR’s plan, in 
2004 the M family decided to block the demolition of her house. Mme V refused to be 
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moved out, and that she refused any suggestions of rehousing put to her social workers. 
Other members of the V family who lived on the same street also refused to move out of 
their houses, until they could all buy their houses.  
Previous experience had taught Mme V it was highly unlikely that she would be 
evicted by the police. How would it look for the SIDR, the St Denis municipal 
government and the Prefecture who gave final authorization for evictions to evict a 73 
year old woman out of the house she had lived in all her life, in a neighborhood all her 
ancestors had lived in?  
In 2005, one of Mme V’s daughters had been evicted from an apartment 
elsewhere for not paying her rent for the better part of a year. Mme V’s daughter had 
immediately gone to squat with her five children in a SIDR Petite Ile bungalow which 
was laying vacant, awaiting demolition to build a transition apartment building. The 
Prefect had been adamant that no police action should be taken to evict the daughter from 
the SIDR bungalow “in case it should trouble the already fragile peace of this 
neighborhood.”33 Mme V’s daughter stayed in the house for over a year, also blocking 
the destruction of a different row of houses in the Petite Ile neighborhood renovation 
project. If the Prefecture had refused permission to evict Mme V’s daughter and her 
young children, they were likely not to evict a 73 year old woman living on her own. 
The V family’s resistance to the SIDR stalled the demolition of the entire street, 
which impacted on the planned construction of transition apartments in Petite Ile. Two 
dozen other families in Petite Ile were waiting to move in to these transition apartments 
to while their houses were renovated, and were not happy with their wait. Events came to 
                                                 
 
33 I have seen the prefecture’s correspondence for this but I prefer not to cite the source. 
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a head in April 2009 when people, including members of the extended V family 
vandalized bulldozers which had been brought in to demolish the vacant houses in the 
lots adjacent to where the V families were still living.  
The SIDR attempted to counter the family’s dominance in the neighborhood by a 
counter-maneuver. It held a public meeting in Petite Ile where SIDR employees 
explained that the delays in continuing Petite Ile’s renovation project were due to the 
resistance a few Petite Ile families, hoping that public pressure would induce the resisting 
families to negotiate. Public pressure did succeed, but Mme V posed two conditions to 
negotiating her move out of the apartment.  
Her first condition was not to be moved out until she had been allocated a totally 
redecorated bungalow. She refused to be moved into an apartment, and refused to comply 
with the SIDR idea of accompanying social housing tenants which aimed to make tenants 
invest their own labor in their new surroundings. She wanted welfare and a new house. 
Her second condition was that the SIDR allocated bungalows in the Petite Ile 
neighborhood for two of her adult children– one of whom was the daughter who had 
squatted in the SIDR bungalows in 2005. Mme V’s adult children were to be rehoused 
with their families in Petite Ile. However, they would be rehoused in bungalows which 
were also destined for destruction in the coming years, to be sold off as empty lots for 
people to build their own houses on. The people who were due to buy these new plots of 
land worried that in a couple of years Mme V’s adult children would use the same tactic, 
and refuse to move out of their temporary houses.  
Although I did not have the opportunity to speak with Mme V, her family 
members saw her property rights in a completely different light to the SIDR, or to the 
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new neighbors of Mrs. V’s children. For them, Mme V had the rights to hold out for a 
new social housing bungalow because of her age, and her moral claims to residency in 
the SIDR: “She’s been there for fifty years! She’s 73 years old! The very least they could 
do is give her a house.” 
Extended families are able to use the threat of their disturbance to dissuade the 
SIDR and even the Prefect of Réunion from sending in the police to evict them. This is 
not unique to Petite Ile. A SIDR manager explained that when he worked in the bungalow 
neighborhood of SIDR Chaudron at the other side of St Denis he was confronted with 
very similar claims. “They aren’t owners, it’s not up to them, [but] for them it’s 
absolutely normal … ‘I want to live here, my son will live here, my umbilical cord was 
cut here, we are attached here, even the SIDR can’t throw us out’ – many people said that 
to me.” The tenants of Petite Ile had understood their negotiating power to ensure that 
they appropriated space and free houses for their families, and even their deities, to 
ensure that everyone could benefit from their moral rights to live in the social housing of 
their choice.  
iv. A “Home Depot” house – once it’s in the family you can’t let it go 
The final example of Mr. F underlines the importance of staying in social housing 
bungalows for tenants, to the extent of not wanting to give up the family’s hold in the 
area. Mr. K lived three doors up the street from Mme V’s house. This was also part of a 
block to be destroyed and replaced by an apartment block. Mr. K’s house was the 
complete opposite of Mme V. Mr. K earnt more money than most of the other residents 
of Petite Ile. As soon as he heard of the RHI operation in 2003, and that his house was 
destined for destruction, he decided to invest more money in his SIDR house, in the hope 
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that the housing agency would no longer knock it down, even though the whole block 
was destined to be replaced with apartment housing for 40 people.  
Mr. K’s house now looks like an example from a catalogue of a hardware 
superstore. The concrete house is totally covered in pine, the gates and fences are covered 
in pine, and he has a pine deck in the front yard. People who lived in Petite Ile admitted 
to me that his house had been done up in good quality materials-   even if they all 
admitted in the same breath that he shouldn’t have done it, and he shouldn’t be blocking 
the building site for everyone else.  
Mr. K was afraid of being moved out of his SIDR home. He earned too much 
money to still be in state-subsided housing. His income also stopped him being able to 
buy a SIDR house. Yet like other Petite Ile tenants, he valued living in the neighborhood 
and paying a low rent. For four years he refused to speak to the SIDR liaison officer, 
apparently claiming that the only person he would speak to was the President of the 
SIDR. Yet he was never threatened with eviction, even though he was benefitting from a 
service ostensibly reserved for people who were in financial and social need. 
After the public meeting of April 2009 denouncing those who were delaying the 
renovation operation, Mr. K finally agreed to see a social worker, to arrange leaving his 
house, but again with very strong idea about his rights to housing welfare. “Don’t even 
think about moving me into a transition apartment” he told her. Mr. K refused to move 
house unless one of two conditions were met: either he would be given a SIDR house 
elsewhere, and the difference between his Petite Ile rent and the new rent would be paid, 
indefinitely, by the SIDR or he was given a newly renovated house in Petite Ile “clef en 
main”- with all the interior painted, and the floor laid – and the SIDR would pay for the 
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renovation, not him. He also expected to be refunded for his housing improvements. 
Although this case had not been resolved by the time I left Réunion in August 2009, and 
the social worker claimed that the SIDR would not accede to Mr. K’s outrageous 
demands, the other cases documented in this chapter suggest that Mr. K was probably 
going to receive some form of SIDR housing, despite the fact he was in no way eligible 
for it, just to allow the construction of the apartment block to go ahead. 
 
VII. Conclusion 
About twenty five percent of Réunion Islanders -200,000 people- live in social housing 
compared to fifteen percent of people in Metropolitan France. As Réunion’s oldest and 
largest social housing agency, the SIDR houses ten percent of Réunion’s entire 
population, although this rises to thirty percent of the population of St Denis. What can 
the extreme case of the delays in Petite Ile tell us about the meaning of French housing 
welfare goals and ideas about social rights in Réunion sixty years after 
“departmentalization” and Réunion’s integration in to France was presumed to have 
occurred?  
Réunion Islanders’ strategies are cumulatively successful but are not publicly 
expressed as social movements. Unlike social movements in French banlieues Réunion 
Islanders rarely take to the streets for social protest. Rather, they favor individual and 
family-based strategies for political action which enable them to subtly work inside the 
local networks of power and patronage which actually manage social housing, and 
maintain France’s presence in Réunion.  
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From the 1960s, locally elected elites appropriated the means of distributing 
welfare, in order to further their political projects. Social housing residents have now also 
appropriated and instrumentalized French welfare allocations and houses. Rather than 
being submissive to landholders, some urban residents in social housing have inverted 
landlord-tenant relations. Tenants are now able to use different tactics – helplessness, 
stubborn resistance, hustling and family pressure – to put pressure on landholders and 
claim rights to social housing, even to property ownership. Many of these strategies take 
years to come to fruition.  
Petite Ile is representative of maneuvers undertaken by many other Réunion 
Islanders, using their family networks, to put pressure on local governments and the 
French administration.  Réunion Islanders usually claim welfare rights in family groups 
rather than in group claims or marching in the streets. Réunion Island’s multicultural 
society inhibits group claims federation. Also individual claims on SIDR resources are 
more easily realized through negotiations with political leaders and SIDR employees. 
Although the cold war and fear of Réunion Island’s independence is over, fear of social 
housing neighborhood disturbances – and riots – clearly informs the pervasive 





CHAPTER 9 CONCLUSION 
 
In February and March of 2009, inhabitants of Réunion, Martinique, Guadeloupe, and 
Guyana all launched protests, and strikes, about the prohibitive cost of living in Overseas 
France compared to Metropolitan France. In Réunion, the COSPAR, a broad-based 
coalition of political parties, trade union and grassroots groups petitioned for a reduction 
in the high cost of living in Réunion.1 The organization claimed that 52% of Réunion 
Islanders live below the French poverty line, compared with 18% of Metropolitan French, 
and demanded an increase for the lowest-paid workers, who earn less than their 
compatriots in Metropolitan France. They called for reductions in the price of living 
including less expensive gasoline, cheaper flights to Metropolitan France, and a reduction 
in the cost of basic household supplies. The second major area of their protest was the 
cost of living in social housing. Out of 257,000 families in Réunion, 50,000 live in social 
accommodation, and 56,000 families live in privately rented accommodation. However 
there are currently 26,000 families on the waiting list for social accommodation. “What 
type of dignity for the human being without housing to live in insalubrious housing … 
[nothing but] broken lives and children without direction.”2 
                                                 
 
1 COSPAR : Collectif des organisations syndicales, politiques et associatives de La Réunion 
2 http://www.npa2009.org/content/la-r%C3%A9union-plate-forme-revendicative-du-cospar Accessed 
January 9 2010 
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There are two easy interpretations for these actions. It could appear that the 
French colonial project in Overseas France has been an unqualified success. Rather than 
demonstrating for independence and autonomy, French citizens in Réunion and in the 
Caribbean appeared to be rioting for social equality with Metropolitan French – they 
were simply demonstrating to stay part of France.  
Linked to this interpretation is the postulate of the “welfare mindset.” More 
recently, Caribbean author Maryse Condé has decried the disappearance of autonomous 
production, and the slip into “assistance” of Guadeloupians. “The younger generation [in 
Guadeloupe have] become consumers rather than producers” says Condé. Similarly the 
Réunionnais critic Françoise Vergès reviles “the culture of dependence” in Réunion 
which creates passive accomplices of state violence.3 They critique the French state’s 
moral abandon of these populations on welfare. While this is the binary opposite of fears 
that populations in Overseas France abuse the generosity of the French welfare system, in 
both interpretations, poor populations are passive and dependent on state financial 
outlays. This welfare dependency has been described as “welfare colonialism” in places 
where peripheral populations are considered to be passively dependent on central 
government transfers.4 
Neither concepts such as welfare dependency nor French colonial or state 
hegemony can account for the diverse practices of governance which have been needed 
to install and maintain systems of French social legislation in Réunion. This dissertation 
                                                 
 
3 Maryse Condé, "On the Apparent Carnivalization of Literature from the French Caribbean," in 
Representations of Blackness and the Performance of Identities, ed. Jean Muteba Rahier (Westport: Bergin 
and Garvey, 1999); Vergès, Monsters and revolutionaries : colonial family romance and métissage. 
4 ‘Welfare colonialism’ was a term coined to describe the economic integration of the native population in 
Northern Canada. Robert Paine, The White Arctic : anthropological essays on tutelage and ethnicity, 
Newfoundland social and economic papers ([St. John's]: Institute of Social and Economic Research, 
Memorial University of Newfoundland, 1977). 
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has analyzed the formal and informal governance of social welfare. It has demonstrated 
how the application of French social legislation in Réunion was shaped by pre-existing 
networks of landed obligation and social control. It also showed the complex networks of 
interdependence between distributors and receivers of welfare, from the national to the 
neighborhood level.  
It may appear that members of the COSPAR were merely demonstrating in 2009 
to remain part of France. Yet the group also used the same logic as the deputies of 1946: 
Réunion’s inhabitants should have the same social equality as France’s workers. Over 60 
years after the theoretical legal assimilation of Réunion to Metropolitan French social 
legislation, there are still numerous parts of social legislation for which Réunion Islanders 
are not eligible. If Réunion Islanders and other French citizens in Overseas France 
continue to demonstrate for the right to have the same social equality as people in 
Metropolitan France, it casts doubt on the success of the project of making France 
Overseas. Are the ideals of the French Republic exportable, even on a tiny island which 
has been French for 350 years?  
On the other hand, part of the causes of the high cost of living in Réunion was 
silenced by the COSPAR protests, as they have been ignored by the French 
administration since 1946. Some of the reasons of the high cost of living in Réunion are 
the import-export and financial monopolies in Réunion.5 Finances for local social 
programs are gathered in an import tax on consumer goods, including gasoline - l'octroi 
de mer – funds which are then distributed to locally elected bodies, which in turn pass on 
                                                 
 
5 In October 2009 French bank charges in Réunion were revealed to be three times higher than in 




the material benefits to some of their constituents. Another reason for the high cost of 
living is the continued 50% higher payment of everyone who works for a state agency in 
Réunion. The high cost of living in Overseas France is therefore less to do with the 
successful project of French state welfare colonialism than the maintenance of local 
financial and political interests through local distribution networks, and the local elite’s 
appropriation of the French administration’s resources. 
 
As the dissertation demonstrated, after 1946, the French administration appropriated the 
governance of Réunion. It did not allow either Creole elites or the Communist party to 
direct the use of French government resources in Réunion. Yet paradoxically, given the 
importance of landholding to local systems of governance, the French administration 
allowed the Creole elites to continue their monopoly on rural land.  
The French administration successfully repressed the Communist Party, and its 
urban influence in Réunion through the 1960s through electoral fraud and political 
surveillance. The arrival of Michel Debré in 1963 was instrumental in ending any serious 
Communist Party challenge to the French administration. Debré ushered in new systems 
of state-sponsored welfare after 1963 to ensure that popular political support for the 
Communist party waned. These welfare systems became the tools for ensuring that 
locally elected elites – rather than the traditional rural landholding elites – became 
powerful political figures in their own right. These systems of welfare enabled 
Communist Party leaders to become re-elected Mayor at the city council level after 1971, 
and effectively funded the continuation of a polarized political discourse between Vergès 
and the French administration until 1988. 
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From the 1960s and local elites appropriated the new welfare systems to further 
their own political power. They also took control of French administrative organizations 
such as the SIDR. The Mayor of St Denis used the SIDR to become a new type of 
landholder. He appropriated the French administration’s resources to attempt to govern 
social housing tenants in Réunion in the same way that rural landholders had politically 
controlled their tenants. At the same time he distributed jobs and material goods, funded 
by the French administration.  
Although the French administration effectively funded the ambitions of a new 
class of Réunion Island politicians, most importantly the distribution of welfare 
(combined with the role of the French education system in Réunion) created a new lower-
middle and middle class. The mass of Réunion Islanders no longer lived in the same 
crushing conditions of economic poverty as they had in 1946, and were able to take 
advantage of this welfare distribution to improve their living conditions.  
From the 1990s, the French administration in Réunion and the SIDR housing 
agency has been concerned with the idea of the “welfare mentality” in Réunion, and has 
attempted to create housing policies which will create personal responsibility and 
autonomy for Réunion Islanders in the social housing system. However, many Réunion 
Islanders in social housing see the distribution of French welfare resources as their right. 
They also view their rights as tenants in a similar way to rural tenants in the 1950s – that 
in return for loyalty, the landlord should provide a plot of land for them to own. Hence, 
the Petite Ile housing renovation has already taken twelve years, and is still not complete. 
The “welfare mentality”, if it exists, is far from passive. Many residents of Petite 
Ile have used all the resources they can muster to force the SIDR, city councils, and other 
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parts of the French administration, to agree to meet their demands for housing and 
property rights. Even the poor in Réunion are increasingly appropriating the resources of 
the French state. 
 Creole descendants of Africans, Malagasy, Indians and Europeans came to 
practice being French in Overseas France through their appropriation and local 
governance of French welfare systems. As historically landless populations were able to 
influence the governance and distribution of social legislation in Réunion, racial and class 
divisions in Réunion have been attenuated through the distribution of the material 
benefits of welfare policies.  
The distribution of local employment through the state funding of school canteens 
enabled mass employment in city governments from the 1960s, allowing a generation of 
workers access to jobs which were paid a minimum wage, and had social coverage, 
unlike agricultural and domestic work, traditionally the labor of the landless masses. 
However, despite this flattening of inequality, conventional statistical measures 
comparing Réunion and Metropolitan France demonstrate that Réunion Islanders have 
less employment, training and jobs than the average in Metropolitan France.  
 
Rather like the politicians in France who started to realize that full French employment 
was not France’s destiny, but was a historical moment of the postwar Trente Glorieuses 
postwar period, my dissertation suggests that the current focus on 19th and early 20th 
century French colonialism could be enriched by an acknowledgement of the much 
longer time period of French colonialism – or the project of Overseas France - which 
extends to the present day. Understanding France after the so-called period of 
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decolonization reveals a continuation of certain state policies of high colonialism, or at 
least calls into question the conventional narratives of French colonialism. 
Réunion Island has been part of France from 1663 until the present day. Its 
continued presence in the French Republic suggests we take histories and challenges of 
studying contemporary Overseas France more seriously, rather than seeing Overseas 
France as an inconvenient and inauthentic anomaly to an earlier colonial plan that is 
seemingly easy to understand.  
 In the French Antilles there have been calls for a referendum to reconsider its 
political relationship to France in the wake of the 2009 strikes. Few in Reunion, even 
Nelson Dijoux, seriously believe that independence would be a viable option for the 
island. As in 1946, the problem of an identifiable racial majority remains unresolved, and 
the state remains a convenient mediator between different interest groups. I cannot help 
but be reminded of the French-Algerian conflict and the speed with which France moved 
from a full support of French Algeria to a rejection of its claims to be part of the 
Republic. Perhaps at the right moment, France will simply jettison Réunion and the other 
areas of Overseas France in the same way. However, as the presentation of the IHEDN 
seminar relates at the beginning of this dissertation, many people have a stake in 
emphasizing and creating links to ensure that Réunion’s separation from France remains 
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